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Introduction 
When the democratically-elected Coalition Government of Dr T1moci 
Bavadra was ovenhrown in a military coup in May 1987 the world was 
stunned. Fiji had long been seen as a shining example of stable and 
democratic government. Now the image was shattered. And in the 
search for explanations the racialist olthodoxy which for so long 
predominated in explanations of Ftji politics once again reared its ugly 
head. Fiji politics was the politics of race, and the crisis of 1987 was 
just another example of this. In the wake of the Alliance's defeat, 
according to this line of argument, Fiji's paradigmatic multiracial 
harmony could no longer be sustained because the balance of racial 
forces had changed ftmdamentally and unacceptably. Fijians were no 
longer prepared to tolerate the 'threat of Indian domination•. Indians 
'controlled' the economy, now they also had political power. To 
Fijians this was intolerable. The upheavals of 1987 were therefore 
explained as an attempt by Fijians to reaffirm and protect the 
'paramountcy of Fijian interests'. 
I left Fiji after the May coup and returned for two weeks in the 
following August. In downtown Suva I met an old and dear friend, a 
long time supporter of the extremist Fijian Nationalist Party. He had 
taken part in the April 24 demonstration in Suva organised by the 
extremist and racist Taukei Movement as pan of a wider destabilisation 
campaign which led eventually to the coup. We talked at length and he 
explained how tough things had become for him. His income had fallen 
drastically, prices were much higher, school fees had to be paid, and so 
on. I then asked what the general talk in the village was, how people 
were feeling three months after the coup. His response was immediate: 
'Sa dola na mata', which literally means, ''The eyes have opened'. 
1bere was a feeling. he explained, that for a coup that was supposed to 
help Fijians it had instead caused immense hardship. People were now 
beginning to see that the upheavals had benefitted only a small number 
of Fijians, not Fijians generally. Nearly two years later that view has 
become even more strongly confirmed by the growing evidence. 
It should not be surprising that the critical struggles in post-coup 
Fiji are intra-Fijian struggles. 'The key lines of tension are now between 
chiefs, between tribes, and between commoners and chiefs, eastern and · 
western Fijians, and urban and rural Fijians. Within the trade union 
movement and the Church Fijians are also divided. And educated Fijian 
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commoners worry increasingly about the real possibilitr of their 
democratic rights being eroded by a proposed constitution which 
promises to entrench chiefly power even more. nus is the critical 
reality of Fiji today, but the racialist orthodoxy cannot explain it For 
on the logic of racialist explanations, the post-coup situation ought to 
be characterised by Fijian unity. After all, with the 'Indian factor' 
having been removed so to speak, the supposedly primary determinant 
of conflict - race - is negated, and what should emerge is a happy and 
contented Fijian race. But this is not the case, and clearly the intra-
Fijian conflicts need to be explained in terms other than of race. What is 
more, it is clear that the origins of these conflicts do not lie just in the 
post-coup situation. Instead the conflicts are rooted in structural 
tensions which lie deep in Fiji's history - tensions which have for a 
very long time been masked by the politics of race. There is a hidden 
history which needs to be recovered. 
For a long time racialist orthododxy, ideology and practice hid 
from our view the fundamental bases and mechanisms of exploitation 
in Fiji. Now they stare us in the face. Free, as it were, of the 
confounding influence of race, the present intra-Fijian struggles have 
served to expose not only a whole series of tensions and contradictions 
within Fijian society but also, very importantly, a key axis of conflict 
that cuts right through Fiji society as a whole and whose origins lie in 
the entry of capitalism into Fiji nearly two centuries ago. That axis of 
conflict is class. The central task of this discussion, therefore, is to 
challenge the racialist orthodoxy, recover this long neglected dimension 
and restore it to its proper place of Fiji's history. 
In challenging the racialist onhodoxy, however, we are not 
suggesting that racial factors were unimpottant or that they have or will 
become so. Oearly they have a salience, a materiality and pertinence of 
their own which cannot be explained in terms of class. The same also 
applies to other factors. Tribal conflict, regional tension and chiefly 
nvalry, for example, existed before contact with Europeans and 
although they were also subsequently influenced by emergent class 
relations, they too have a residual salience which cannot be reduced to 
class. The argument here, then, is not that class factors explain 
everything, nor even that they are always the most important causes. 
The argument is simply that the strongest tendencial forces which have 
shaped Fiji's post-contact history have been class ones and that they 
have assumed predominantly racial forms. 
nus new interpretation was first developed in my earlier work 
which was completed in 1984 and which took the historical discussion 
up to 1980. There I examined the racialist orthodoxy and examined key 
works by anthropologists, economists, historians, geographers and 
political scientists which advance racialist explanations. Among these 
were works by Ali (1980), Ali and Mamak (1979), Anthony (1969), 
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Belshaw (1964), Bums (1963), Desai (1978), Fisk (1970), Gillion 
(1962; 1977), B.V. Lal (1982), MacNaught (1976; 1978), Mamak 
(1978), Mihle (1975), Murray (1978), Norton (1977), Premdas (1978; 
1980; 1981), Rae (1979), Vasil (1972), R.G. Ward (1972a), Watters 
(1969) and West (1961). Two other similar works appeared later: 
Lasaqa (1984) and Scarr (1984). 
Running through writings such as these is a pluralist conception 
which sees Fiji primarily as a plurality of racial groups and which 
explains social conflict and historical change primarily in racial tenns. 
My main disagreement with the pluralist approach is that it begs 
fundamental questions: what were the conditions which gave rise to 
racial plurality and conflict? How and why did racial conflict persist? 
What were the underlying structures and processes which reproduced 
racialist ideology and practice? 
When. for example, the colonial government recruited indentured 
workers from India, it did so not because it wanted to make Fiji an 
even more racially plural society (Europeans were already in the 
country) but because labour was required by capitalists wishing to 
develop a sugar industry. The racial tensions which followed in the 
wake of indenture cannot therefore be understood outside of the needs 
and imperatives of capitalist development in Fiji. And it is precisely 
because capitalist relations came to predominate in Fiji that class 
relations are here seen as the strongest tendential forces which shaped 
the country's broad trajectory of development. 
By the time I was developing this argument in my earlier work, the 
racialist orthodoxy was already under challenge. The first major break, 
spearlleaded by a small group of local writers, began to appear in the 
early 1970s. By then the modemizationist approach to Third World 
development was under increasing attack from dependency and neo-
Marxist approaches and it was from these that the local writers drew 
inspiration. In 1973 Fiji: A Developing Colony of Australia was 
published. Authored by Amelia Rokotuivuna and others, this 
pathbreaking work was followed by important contributions from, for 
example, Jay Narayan (1976; 1984), John Samy (1977), Wadan 
Narsey (1979) and Jone Dakuvula (1980). But major contributions also 
came from non-Fijian writers like Stephen Britton (1979; 1983), 
Michael Moynagh (1981) and Richard Peet (1980). The collective 
importance of these worts lies in the way they reshaped the debate on 
Fiji by introducing the discourse of dependency and class. Against the 
racialist orthodoxy, they offered alternative explanations in terms of 
external dependency, foreign control, class interests and so on. 
Despite my disagreements with them, my 1984 study was 
influenced by these worts and I saw my work as a further contribution 
to the new critical tradition which they had started. My original 
intention was to investigate the stale and capitalist development in post-
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independence Fiji. As I sought to locate that nt8DDM project in its wider 
historical context, however, I found mysetr increasingly at odds with 
existing accounts of Fiji's history. It was then dJat I abandoned my 
original plan and embarked instead on a reinterpretation of Fiji's post-
contact history. 
1be only work that was akin to my new project in terms of its 
historical scope and broad theoretical approach was Jay Narayan's 
(1984). Written from a dependency perspective, it threw new light on 
Fiji's history but it also suffered from many of the shortcomings of 
dependency approaches. In particular it lacked a sustained analysis of 
the dynamics of class relations in Fiji and of the role of the state. My 
study sought to provide such an analysis. 
Since the mid 1980s the critical literature on Fiji has grown and 
there is now greater recognition of the imponance of class in Fiji's 
development process. This is evident in the burgeoning literature on 
post-coup Fiji, although writers differ in the weight they place on class-
based explanations of the crisis. A review of that literature is provided 
by MacDonald (1990). Unlike the other accounts, the present study 
~es that, as with the broad historical trajectory of development in 
FiJi. the strongest tendential forces behind the crisis of 1987 were class 
ones and, furthermore, that this is also true of the general trend of 
development since the crisis. 
As far as the coups are concerned, then, the argument here is that 
what appeared to be a racial struggle was in fact a struggle waged by a 
small group of Fijians who stood to lose the most by the defeat of the 
Alliance Party- the Fijian chiefly elite and the seruor echelons of the 
Fijian state bourgeoisie. In order, however, better to understand the 
class character of that battle, and also of the present struggles and 
where they are leading, it is necessary to go back in time and beyond 
the racialist orthodoxy. 
We need to recover Fiji's hidden history. Only then will it be 
possible to see more clearly how the masses in Fiji have been 
oppressed and kept divided so that the elite might prosper. Only then 
will it become clear that there is another reality 'beyond the politics of 
race'. 
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Chapter 1 
Str~ctural Change in Pre-colonial Fiji 
Considerable gaps exist in our knowledge about conditions in Fiji prior 
to contact with Europeans. Most written materials are concerned with 
either the remote past, particularly the original peopling of the islands, 
or the post-contact era. Uttle is known of the interv~ period which 
Thomson, displaying the ethnocentrism and paternalism typical of 
many of Fiji's early historians, described as 'the centuries which lie 
between the age of myth and the age of history' (Thomson 
1908/1981:21). 
To the early Europeans, the most outstanding feature of Fijian 
society was recurrrent warfare and accordingly this figured most 
prominently in the early historical writings.1 Later accounts also 
devoted a great deal of attention to indigenous warfare; this is 
illusttated, for example, by the tribal histories which are preseived in 
the records of the Native Commission (France 1969:10). They are full 
of accounts of turmoil and although peaceful interludes are also 
recorded the overriding impression they project of precapitalist Fiji is 
one of social upheaval. 
Given that the oral sources on which these histories were based 
were replete with tales of hostility and unrest, their bias is 
understandable. But it would be wrong to conclude that the normal and 
universal condition of precapitalist Fiji was that described in the tales. 
This is the kind of error against which France rightly cautions 
(ibid.,:13-14). For example, the extensive genealogies of the hill tribes 
of central Viti Lew which Brewster (1922:72, 73) documented tell of 
times when 'fighting was unknown and a profound peace prevailed•. 
Yet it is certainly true that when the first Europeans settled in Fiji the 
countty was embroiled in violence and turmoil. 
Why, then, was there so much indigenous warfare? And what did 
this social ferment signify? We are not interested here in the details and 
1 See for example, Thomson (1908/1981); Williams (1858/1982); 
Waterhouse (1866); im Thmn and Wharton (1925/1982). See also the 
following later works: Deane (1921); Morrell (1960); arid Orr (1977). 
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structural transformation. We also argue dW the fundamental causes of 
that process of change lay in the inherent contradictions of piecapitalist 
Fiji. But to know what those contradictions weie, why they caused 
conflicts, and how those conflicts in tum produced strucniral change in 
Fijian society, we need to know something about the general structure 
of piecapitalist Fiji. With that, we will better understand how and why 
it was dW capitalism was able, upon its entry, to influence that process 
of change and eventually come to predominate. 
Structure, contradiction and transformation 
Precapitalist Fiji was composed of small and ielatively autonomous 
social groupings which have been ieferred to variously as tribes, 
chiefdoms, kingdoms and states. The use of these sons of labels 
underlines the way in which the early writers on Fiji were preoccupied 
with appearances - with forms of social organization. Fijian societies 
were seen in terms of their degree of stratification, level of political 
development, land tenure practice, kinship, and so on. Imponantly, 
there was also the appearance of internal cohesion within Fijian 
societies. And yet at the same time there was the conttadictory reality of 
inter-tribal warfare. How, then, is dW coottadition to be explained? 
The inability of eady writers to provide adequate explanations 
stems from their preoccupation with appearances and their consequent 
failure to explain adequately what we will argue was the fundamental 
contradiction in Fijian societies - the exploitation of commoners by 
chiefs. They acknowledged such exploitation but explained it in 
functional terms. 
'Traditional' Fijian societies, the usual argument ran, were 
organiz.ed along 'communalistic' lines and chief-commoner relations 
were functional in that they served to maintain the unity and cohesion 
of the society. Chiefs provided protection and subjects reciprocated 
with deference and material tribute. Additionally, chiefly rule also 
depended upon chiefs demonstrating concern for the welfare of their 
followers. One very tangible way of doing that was to return to the 
commoners a portion of their material tribute. This served to enhance 
the prestige of the chief and strengthen the loyalty and suppon of his 
followers. Thus the cohesion and unity of the society was maintained. 
However, this kind of functionalist explanation is inadequate 
because it says nothing about the material basis of chiefly power. Real 
power springs not from ideas or beliefs about who should or should 
not rule but from some independent, material foundation. It is true that 
concern for subjects could help to sustain chiefly rule but such conccm 
is not the foundation of chiefly power. After all, many people show 
caring and concern for others but they do not all become chiefs. Wheie, 
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complexities of particular wars or battles but in the broader social
forces which produced the general state of war. The argument we
develop is that the wars gave expression to an underlying process of
then, does chiefly power originate? wnat, m oincr wuim, w iU
material foundation?
Chiefs, like anyone else, had to survive physically. They needed
food, clothing and shelter. But they did not produce these material
things; their subjects did. It was the commoners who laboured and
produced the wealth of the society. To meet their material requirements
of existence, then, the chiefs simply appropriated the surplus
production of the commoners and it is in this sense that we speak of
exploitation by chiefs. It is precisely in this relation of exploitation that
the most basic contradiction of Fijian society is found — the
appropriation by one class (the chiefs) of the material wealth produced
by another (the commoners).
The mechanism of wealth appropriation by the chiefs was the
payment of tribute. This took two main forms — lala and sevu,
whereby chiefs commanded certain types of labour and were given the
best produce. As Williams put it, 'In Fiji, subjects do not pay for their
land but a kind of tax on all their produce, besides giving their labour
occasionally in peace, and their service, when needed, in war'
(1858/1982:40).
But how and why did the chiefs get away with all this? What was
the material basis of their power which allowed them such influence? In
short it was their control over the most important means of production,
land.
In general, working implements were individually-owned but they
were also subject to the powerful and socially-sanctioned practice of
kerekere, which essentially was a form of customary borrowing that
carried an obligation to reciprocate sometime in the future. With land,
however, the situation was different, for although there appears to have
been a small degree of private ownership (see Clammer 1973; France
1969), the predominant practice was for land to be held collectively.
Land immediately contiguous to a family home was the exclusive
preserve of family members but land beyond the immediate area was
held collectively by the wider social unit to which the family belonged.
In general, the landholding unit was the mataqali (mere were
exceptions) and access to mataqali land was secured through the
consent of the mataqali chief. That control over land was the material
basis of chiefly power.
Of course, exploitative relations are always problematic because the
danger always exists that the exploited might rebel. For the dominant
class, therefore, it helps a great deal if the exploitative aspect of the
chiefs' dominance can be hidden. How was this possible in
precapitalist Fiji? The answer lies in the form of social organization
and the key to our explanation is the mataqali.
In general, Fijian societies were organized along the following
lines. Elemental patrilineal descent groups, i tokatoka, combined to
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form the primary division of the village, the mataqali. Mataqali which
shared a common line to an ancestor god formed a yavusa and the
various yavusa within particular localities combined to form a wider
body politic, vanua. The latter in turn were joined, often by conquest,
to form the widest political unit, matanitu , and there were three —
Burebasaga, Kubuna and Tovata. (Referred to variously as states,
governments or confederacies, these traditonal political alignments
groupings became an important factor in the aftermath of the May
coup.)
As the primary line of division at the village level, the mataqali
became the major determinant of a person's place in the wider social
structure. One resided in a village but one's place in the broader
structure was determined by the mataqali to which one belonged. The
mataqali therefore served as primary basis for individual attachment and
identification, so that although commoners deferred to the mataqali
chief, their prime attachment was to the group. They belonged to and
identified with their mataqali, not their turaga ni mataqali (mataqali
chief). The group, not the group leader, served as the primary referent
of social organizatioa
With social relations structured around and mediated through this
very group-centred form of social organization, the exploitative nature
of chief-commoner relations became obscured. In other words, Fijian
forms of social organization presented an appearance of social cohesion
while hiding an underlying reality of chiefly exploitation.
Although control over land was a powerful basis of chiefly
authority, chiefly rule was more likely to persist if it could be
legitimized politically and ideologically. That is, chiefly rule would
simply be much easier if people believed that only the chiefs could and
should rule. What, then, were its major ideological and political
foundations?
The most important ideological prop of chiefly power was mana. A
chief's mana derived from a special relationship which he claimed to
have with an ancestor-god, and by virtue of the spiritual authority so
bestowed upon him, he was tabu or sacred. Placed above mere
mortals, he was accorded the greatest respect— a respect which had as
one of its critical dimensions the belief that manual labour was beneath
the dignity of his position. Supposedly charged with a divinely-
ordained task of ruling, chiefs were not meant to engage in the
drudgery of producing food, clothing and shelter. Those were tasks for
lesser people whose obligations stretched to providing the material
requirements of their rulers.
To maintain their mana chiefs had to demonstrate concern for the
welfare of their subjects and from their position of power and privilege
that was a relatively easy thing to do. For unlike commoners who had
to spend hours toiling, the chiefs had much free time to talk, listen,
Structural change in pre-colonial Fiji 11
abritrate, counsel and so oa Also, because they could not consume all
the produce given to them as tribute, they returned some of it to the
people and so increased their prestige further. Thus it was not difficult
to appear to be caring. This is not to suggest that chiefs were not
genuinely concerned about the welfare of their people. The point,
simply, is that chiefs were well-placed to do what was necessary in
order to maintain their mana and hence their power.
The scope for demonstration of chiefly concern was wide and in
that regard mention should be made of two cornerstones of customary
social practice, kerekere and solevu. Kerekere, occasional borrowing
which required reciprocation in the future, and solevu, organized
exchanges between villages, were institutionalized practices by which
people could secure items which they either could not produce
themselves or could not produce in sufficient quantities. Crucial to the
reciprocal satisfaction of material needs, these forms of social exchange
were given great importance. And with prestige being largely a function
of generosity, group-giving was often highly competitive.
At the level of appearance, therefore, the widely-held view that
Fijian society was 'egalitarian' and 'group-oriented' is understandable.
But beneath the apparent generosity lies a reality of inequality and
exploitation— a few actually got far more than others. The chiefs, who
produced very little of the community's wealth, received a
disproportionately large share. By returning some of that share to their
subjects, they were able to increase their mana and strengthen their
dominance. As long as the level of chiefly exploitation did not become
unbearable, the position of chiefs remained reasonably secure. Yet
there were demands and stresses which increased the possibility of
further exploitation. Chiefs were tempted to improve their lifestyle,
their functionaries and sycophants had to be catered for, larger
populations meant greater demand for land and so on. In those kinds of
situations, increased tribute could be secured either by making greater
demands on the producers or by military conquest— or both. But war
entailed the additional burden of having to contend with rival chiefs
who themselves were faced with precisely the same sorts of internal
contradictions. Warfare, therefore, superimposed a secondary
contradiction on the primary one. Of course, the fruits of victory could
be great — more land could be secured and the number of tribute-
paying subjects increased. Equally importantly, success in battle
enhanced the victorious chief's reputation as a protector. Military
prowess and success therefore served as a political legitimator of
chiefly rule.
This, then, is a brief account of the hidden contradictions of
precapitalist Fiji, contradictions which propelled the country along a
path of structural transformation violently manifested through tribal
warfare. However, before considering how that process of change was
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affected by the arrival of Europeans, the broad picture of precapitalist
Fiji presented here needs to be qualified because there were significant
regional differences — differences which are particularly pertinent
insofar as they have persisted to the present day.
Differences in social stratification were marked between the eastern
part of the group on the one hand and the west and interior of Viti Levu
on the other. Stratification was more highly developed in the east, due
in part to the much stronger Polynesian influence there.2 The eastern
region had a much longer history of contact with Polynesia,
particularly Tonga, and over the years new goods and skills were
introduced. That raised the level of development in the east and led to
more uneven development in the country as a whole. But the Tongans
also brought military skills and technology which often were superior
to that existing in Fiji, and in time Tongan chiefs, notably Ma'afu,
established themselves in positions of power. They also introduced
Tongan hierarchical divisions. So it is not surprising that eastern Fiji
became even more highly stratified than other regions.
hi western Viti Levu, for example, it appears that emphasis on rank
was rather less marked, and even less so among the hill tribes of the
interior (Norton 1972: chapter 3). Of the latter Brewster argues that
although members of the clan were expected to die for it and sacrifice
themselves, when necessary, for the chief, 'all men were free and
equal, and tyranny and oppression not to be born with' (1922:71). That
is probably exaggerated but it does suggest that hierarchical divisions
were not as great in the interior as they were in eastern Fiji.
There were also differences in political organization. Whereas the
lower-level social units— i tokatoka, mataqali, and yavusa— existed
universally, the wider political groupings— varum and matanitu— did
not. By the time of contact at the turn of the nineteenth century,
matanitu in particular were peculiar to eastern Fiji. By way of contrast,
the largest stable political grouping in Nadroga in western Viti Levu
was the vanua, and in the interior hill country it was the yavusa
(Norton 1972:1 14-1 16). Again these differences probably owed much
to the greater Tongan influence in the east (ibid.: chapter 3) but it also
had to do with the relative isolation of the west With the densely-
forested Nakauvadra Range running north-south down the middle of
Viti Levu, contact between east and west was often difficult
Importantly, however, in the first fifty years or so after contact,
political alignments came to be centred largely around three
confederacies (matanitu) — Tovata, Burebasaga and Kubuna. (See
Map 1.) In Chapter 8, we shall see how these traditional lines of
2 There was some Tongan influence in Nadroga province also.
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political allegiance resurfaced as a major source of tension in the intra-
Fijian struggles of post-coup Fiji.
There were also variations in land tenure practice (France 1969;
(Hammer 1973; Derrick 1946), so that while the predominant practice
was for land to be held by the mataqali, there were exceptions. In some
places, for example, it was held by i tokatoka (France 1969:1 12) What
is more, it appears that there were also regional differences in the
understanding of these concepts (ibid.)
These regional variations are important because they hint at the
complexities of Fijian societies. For our purposes, however, they are
noted mainly to identify the historical roots of a very important regional
cleavage which continues to this day, but which has been exacerbated
by uneven capitalist development and has become an increasingly
important factor in post-coup Fiji.
Regional variations notwithstanding, there was in precapitalist Fiji
a hierarchical and exploitative social structure that was common to all
the societies. At the apex of that structure were chiefs who increasingly
waged war. The turmoil into which they plunged the country had
reached new heights by the time the first Europeans arrived.
As we have argued, indigenous warfare was the visible
manifestation of a process of profound structural change, the root
causes of which lay in the contradictions and antagonisms inherent in
the exploitative system of social relations that separated chief from
commoner. It is true that in particular conflicts factors like revenge,
vindictiveness and jealousy were important But we are not concerned
here with the details of specific wars or battles. We are instead
concerned primarily with the strongest tendential forces which
produced structural change. What, then, were some of the more critical
historical developments in that process of change?
It is believed that the Fijians originally settled in the north of Viti
Levu and oral sources tell of two early streams of migration from the
northern coast of Viti Levu, one sweeping downwards towards the
southeastern coast, the other across the strait to the second-largest
island, Vanua Levu. Subsequent migrations outwards, together with
waves of migration from Tonga, led to the peopling of the smaller
islands in the east and south of the group. Considerable intercourse,
mainly in the form of exchange of goods, existed between the various
communities but there is little evidence of early expansionism, and it
was not until the eighteenth century that the first signs of power
concentration on a large scale began to emerge.
Some time in the early years of the eighteenth century an event 'that
was destined to have a tremendous influence on the political destiny of
the islands' occurred (Thomson 1908/1981:22). There appears to have
been a 'major upheaval' among the inland communities of Viti Levu
and although there is no hard evidence, nor even a tradition which
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might throw some light on its causes, Thomson speculates, not
altogether implausibly, that the need for new lands might have been the
main reason.
Among the emigrants to the southern coast of Viti Levu were
members of the Bau tribe who settled on the southeast coast between
the leading societies of that region, Rewa and Verata. The Bauans were
renowned for their fierce independence and military prowess and soon
they were continually at war with their neighbours. After all, they had
to secure the material means of their subsistence and that meant taking
from others. Their success owed much to their courage and military
skill and by the middle of the nineteenth century Bau had emerged as
the leading political centre in eastern Fiji.
Similar struggles were also being waged in other parts of the
country and for essentially the same sorts of reasons. They too left their
imprint on the changing face of Fiji politics. But in the flux and fluidity
of eighteenth century Fiji, the outcome of war was largely
indeterminate as 'insignificant states waxed to importance [and] leading
states suffered eclipse or waned into obscurity and servitude' (Derrick
1946:22). It was not until the following century that large and powerful
political groupings appeared. When that happened the more powerful
chiefly classes were better able to contain the contradictions inherent in
their own societies and also the secondary contradictions arising from
rivalries between chiefs.
Thrown, then, into turmoil by the expansionist designs of rival
chiefly classes, Fiji at the turn of the century was caught up in a
process of profound social change. Conflict grew, small societies gave
way to larger ones, and power become more and more concentrated.
But those transitional struggles had not yet come to a determinate
conclusion at the time of capitalist penetration and in their attempts to
reach such a conclusion the vying chiefs sought assistance from the
first agents of capitalism in Fiji — the Europeans.
European contact: origins of capitalist penetration
By the beginning of the 1800s mercantile trade between Australia and
China had reached new heights and it was around that time that a
schooner, the Argo, was wrecked on a reef in Fiji during its return
voyage from China to Australia. Some of the survivors are believed to
have been the first white men to live among Fijians and they were
joined soon after by survivors of other wrecks and by 'deserters,
marooned sailors and derelict scourings of the ports of the Old World'
(t&«f.:37).
A survivor of the Argo, Oliver Slater, had seen sandalwood
growing on the coast of Bua Bay in Vanua Levu and later took news of
it to Port Jackson, New South Wales. As the news spread, a rush of
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fortune hunters quickly set in. Ships from Port Jackson, Calcutta and
the New England ports of America soon arrived in increasing numbers.
Sandalwood was eagerly sought in China and before long Fiji was
integrated into the growing triangular trade between China, the Pacific
and the northwest coast of America. Profits from the sandalwood trade
were extremely lucrative, averaging 600 per cent but rising much
higher in the peak years of 1808 and 1809. The ruthlessness and
unscrupulous practices of the visiting traders have been well
documented (see Williams 1858/1982; France 1969; Derrick 1946).
A major consequence of the sandalwood trade was the introduction
of firearms, the means of violence without which the successful
penetration of capitalism would not have been possible. Charles
Savage, a survivor of the wrecked sandalwood ship Eliza, managed to
salvage some of the ships supply of arms and introduced them to the
chiefdom of Bau. But how precisely the introduction of firearms
changed the face of Fiji politics is a matter of dispute. Some argue that
it intensified internal warfare while others, like France, say that it
served merely to consolidate the influence of chiefs who had already
established themselves in positions of power.3 Whatever the merits of
the opposing views, there can be no doubt that firearms added a whole
new dimension to the process of social transformation that was already
in motion. In one way or another, access to firearms bore upon the
fortunes of the rival chiefs.
The sandalwood trade lasted only ten years but it opened the way
to a much larger trade in Mche-de-mer. Among the wealthy classes in
China, demand for the sea slug was great and by 1829 the trade in
bfiche-de-mer reached new heights. Around that time too, whaling in
Fiji waters had developed into a sizeable and profitable activity
dominated by whalers from Port Jackson and New England. By 1840
both whaling and the trade in bfiche-de-mer had declined. By then,
however, Fiji was already caught up in a process of transformation by
capitalist relations.
The traders were able to secure their labour requirements by
working through the chiefs. Sandalwood trees had to be felled, cut to
size and transported to the ships and the procurement and curing of
beche-de-mer was also a highly organized activity, often involving
upwards of three hundred people (Ward 1972). Through their
involvement in the capitalist labour process, Fijians were being drawn
increasingly into capitalist relations. Labouring under the constant
supervision of white overseers, they had their first taste of capitalist
discipline. Also, the scale of operations was such that Fijians were
France (1969:22). Leading exponents of the opposing view include
Derrick (1946:44-47); Legge (1958:11); and Burns (1963:153).
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often away from their villages for long periods. Inevitably, therefore,
there was growing pressure on the precapitalist system of production.
Capitalist production relations, in other words, were beginning to
condition the precapitalist ones. In the 1860s they would come to
predominate.
The early period of capitalist penetration was important for another
major reason: it saw the implantation ofvarious political and ideological
forms of capitalist relations.
Dependent as they were for their survival on Fijian beneficence, the
early survivors were forced to conform to local custom and practice and
in time they learned the local language. It is not surprising, therefore,
that they played key roles in the political and ideological transformation
that was about to unfold with the arrival of the traders, missionaries
and the later waves of white immigrants.
As interpreters for and agents of the traders, they helped to expose
Fijians to the fundamentals of capitalist economics and practice. For the
Fijians, items like sandalwood and b6che-de-mer had only use value
but soon they were being introduced to the concept of exchange value.
As France (1969:22) put it, '[tjraditional economics had been based on
public displays of largesse and the open acknowledgement that goods
or services had a specific value attached to them was foreign to Fijian
ideas'. Labour too was now being presented in a new light. Previously
work was undertaken to meet subsistence needs, communal obligations
or tributary dues. Now, however, it was being undertaken as part of an
agreement which provided for compensation. Initially payment was in
kind but later it would take the form ofmoney.
These ideas and practices were soon reinforced by missionary
activity. Upon their arrival at Lakeba on 12 October 1835, Fiji's first
missionaries, William Cross and David Cargill, were promised a piece
of land and temporary houses by the local chief. After selecting a site
outside the village and having the villagers build their home, Cargill
and Cross duly set about erecting fences around it. That act had
enormous signficance. Indeed, it represented a fundamental challenge
to the very foundations of Fijian social relations because it symbolized
the introduction of private ownership. Here before Fijian eyes was the
first visible sign of the new order. But more was to come.
Believing that Fijians were locked in a state of spiritual darkness
and unredeemed depravity, the missionaries plunged headlong and with
great zeal into the task of rescuing the natives. That not only
undermined local religions, it also paved the way for the introduction of
bourgeois law.
In order for Christianity to succeed, Christian morals had to be
enforced and to that end the missionaries set about winning for the
church a place in the highest levels of the Fijian hierarchy, a goal which
they achieved with some distinction in the eastern part of the country.
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With that success behind them, they drew up 'rules for civil
government' at Viwa in October 1847. They realized that the rules
would need the approval of the chiefs and their first target was the
Christian chiefs. Unfortunately for them, however, the chiefs did not
favour the rules. Nevertheless, the very existence of the rules prompted
a few experiments in bourgeois legal procedure (ibid.:32). In
particular, the introduction of bourgeois legal concepts cleared the way
for attempts to 'legalize' land dealings. That began to happen in the
1840s and, inevitably, the rate of land alienation increased rapidly and
peaked in the 1860s.
These, then, were the sorts of political and ideological changes
which facilitated the entrenchment of capitalist relations in Fiji. They
helped the first seeds of capitalism to germinate. Ahead lay the next
stage of the development of capitalism in the country — a 15-year
period which saw the firm establishment of capitalist agriculture and at
the same time marked the transition to the dominance of capitalism.
Transition to capitalist dominance
By the end of the 1850s the European community was still small and
although a few were engaged in coconut planting, the major economic
activity was merchant trading. However, this was to change over the
next decade.
The American Civil War produced world-wide cotton shortages
which in turn prompted industrial capital in Britain to search for
alternative supplies from other parts of the Empire. Cotton was already
being grown in Fiji and at the request of the Manchester Cotton
Growers' Association, the Secretary of State for the Colonies
commissioned a botanist, Berthold Seeman, to investigate the potential
of Fiji cotton. Seeman's favourable report, together with rumours of
pending annexation, sparked off a sudden influx of white settlers from
Australia and New Zealand, an influx that soon developed into a 'rush'
when a trade depression hit Australia in the late 1860s. In addition to
aspiring capitalists, these waves of immigration also brought fugitives
from justice and other undesirables. With their (often limited) capital,
they came in search of land and labour and in the course of the cotton
boom the foundations of a capitalist-dominated, export-oriented
agricultural economy were firmly cemented.
The boom lasted for only five years but in that time cotton overtook
coconut products as the main export commodity. In 1864, for example,
coconut oil and fibre brought in £15,350 as against £3,260 for cotton.
Three years later, those figures changed dramatically to £3,260 and
£34,004 respectively. Proportionately, that represented a drop for
coconut products from 77.5 per cent to 8 per cent of total export
earnings compared with an increase from 15.2 per cent to 85.1 per cent
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for cotton (Derrick 1946: 160). But the cotton boom had even more far-
reaching effects:
The development of planting on a large scale drew with it the
paraphernalia of commerce — the establishment of trading
nouses, which not only provided the mercantile services of the
community but also acted as credit institutions, financing the
extension of planting; the growth of a busy harbour; the
appearance of a small professional community; and the rest.
This was very different from the commerce in native produce
which had been carried on before the planting began, and
represented rather the equipment of a vigorous young society
[in which] Levuka...became the thriving centre of the
commercial activities of the group (Legge 1958:46-47; also see
Derrick 1946:194).
In class terms, a white bourgeoisie consisting of three distinct
fractions — plantation capital, commercial capital and a small
professional class — had begun to crystallize and shape Fiji's history
in quite significant ways. That influence would become even more
profound as the ever-increasing demands of the white bourgeoisie put
immense pressure on precapitalist social relations and the chiefly class
became increasing unable to cope. The balance of class forces was
beginning to tilt as the transition to capitalist dominance gathered
momentum.
The vast increase in land alienation during the 1 860s has been well
documented and so too the often unscrupulous practices of plantation
capital as it searched for cheap labour (Ward 1969; Derrick 1946:
chapter XIV; Legge 1958: chapter 3). Although some labour was
secured through deals with the chiefs, many Fijians were reluctant to
work in the plantations. To make up for the shortfall, planters turned to
the pernicious labour traffic from other Pacific Islands that came to be
known as blackbirding (Derrick 1946: chapter XV; also see Parnaby
1972 and Corns 1970).
As they jostled for land and labour, white capitalists resorted to all
sorts of malpractices and 'acts of tyranny'. But these perpetrators of
'chaos and lawlessness' were identified by their race (European) rather
than their class (capitalist). That kind of identification was very
important because it obscured the fact that the main reason for white
lawlessness was the pursuit of capitalist interests. White lawlessness,
in other words, was perpetrated not so much in defence of white
interests but rather in pursuit of capitalist interests. For the bourgeoisie
as a whole, however, the resulting chaos had a contradictory effect.
Capitalist production, they realized, depended for its success on order,
political stability, the existence of a bourgeois legal system, and
effective law enforcement agencies. Nowhere was this more poignantly
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demonstrated than in the struggles over land, and in particular the form
of land ownership. As France put it:
The planters' fences, armed labour and 'No Trespassing'
notices gradually forced upon Fijians the realization that land
had an intrinsic value and could be 'owned'...[But as]
European notions of real property were slow to take root
among Fijians, there was an increasing demand from the
planter for European institutions of government to keep them
in absolute possession (1969:53-54).
It was very clear to the embryonic bourgeoisie that if capitalism
was to become dominant, there would have to be a bourgeois state.
They therefore proposed the establishment of a 'native government
aided by the counsels of respectable Europeans' (Derrick 1946:158).
Three attempts at constituting bourgeois government followed soon
afterwards — in 1865, 1869 and 1871. (For discussions of these
experiments, see ibid.; France 1969: chapters 5, 6; and Legge 1958:
chapter IV). Plagued, however, with suspicion, hostility and
conflicting interests, and based as they were on constitutional principles
that were manifestly inappropriate for Fiji at that time, all three attempts
failed. At root, intra-capitalist rivalry was a major reason for the failure.
At the time of the first two experiments, plantation capital was the
strongest fraction of the bourgeoisie and therefore figured most
prominently in the two ill-fated 'governments'. With the collapse of the
cotton industry following the sharp drop in the London cotton price in
1870, plantation capital weakened considerably. Commercial capital
then became the dominant fraction and, therefore, was the major force
in the third government — the 'Cakobau Government' of 1871. As
Derrick (1946:197) put it, 'the centre of political gravity shifted from
the country to the town'. On the other hand, the bonds which held the
fractions of capital together remained strong and that is shown very
clearly by the response of the Cakobau government to the needs of
plantation capital.
International humanitarian pressure which followed in the wake of
the abolition of slavery eventually forced Britain to compel its subjects
in Fiji to abandon their abusive labour practices, which by this time
included the use of forced labour and slaves (ibid.; also see Young
1984:7). Confronted with the need to find new and more acceptable
methods of drawing Fijians into wage employment, the Cakobau
government introduced poll and labour taxes and other labour
arrangements. The tax system produced much-needed revenue, of
course, but the real intention behind it is unmistakeable: 'Under the
Cakobau Government...the system of taxation of Fijians had been not
so much a revenue measure as a means of providing labour for white
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planters' (Roth 1953:45). Capitalists will compete with each other but
when their common interests as a class require it, they close ranks.
The Cakobau government lasted only two years and with its
demise capitalist anxiety and desperation intensified. Capitalism had
become more and more entrenched in Fiji but the transition to capitalist
dominance could not be completed without a strong and sympathetic
capitalist state. The white bourgeoisie did not have long to wait
Crisis and state formation: the annexation of Fiji
By the end of the Cakobau government, the devious and disreputable
practices of the settlers had given rise to such an intolerable situation
that the governor of New South Wales openly attacked Europeans in
Fiji:
[t]he white settlers are striving to... reduce Fijians to serfdom
and a feud has begun by Her Majesty's subjects whose
principal object is to kill off the Fijians and acquire by murder,
treachery and fraud their lands They are incapable of
exercising the privileges of self-government with justice or
with any regard for the welfare of the great bulk of the
population (quoted in Khan 1975:48).
The deteriorating social situation was worsened by the fact that
trade was at a virtual standstill. The country was on the verge of
bankruptcy and the level of discontent was approaching dangerously
high levels. It is not surprising, therefore, that the call went out again
for Britain to colonize Fiji. The clamour for annexation had first been
made as early as the 1860s; now it was repeated with increased vigour.
This time Britain responded positively. On 10 October 1874 Fiji was
ceded to Britain.
On outward appearances, the colonization of Fiji was the result of
the chaos and instability instigated by white British subjects. This is
certainly the argument advanced in standard accounts of Britain's
colonization of Fiji. For Britain to have continued to stand idly by
while its subjects wreaked havoc on the Fijian race would have been
morally wrong. Britain had a responsibility to protect the helpless
natives from its lawless subjects and it acted on that responsibility. The
argument here, however, is that the real causes of annexation were
different and to find them we need to break through the whole ideology
of British benevolence.
Britain has been referred to as a 'reluctant colonizer', a view which
has some merit when we consider that offers of cession were made in
the 1850s and were rejected. But the main reason for rejection was that
Fiji did not promise the kind of economic or strategic advantage which
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might have warranted annexation.4 When Britain initially chose to stay
out of Fiji, the local white bourgeoisie made two attempts in the 1860s
to form a government. They failed. Then came the new influx of
Australian capital in 1870/71, followed by yet another attempt at
forming a government. By 1874, however, the situation in Fiji was
rather different from when Britain first refused to colonize. There were
now more Europeans in the country; more importantly, there were
more capitalists and because many were from Australia it is not
surprising that some of the strongest calls for British annexation came
from Australia (Derrick 1946:199, 222, 235).
The argument here, then, is that the colonization by Britian was
linked to the process of structural transformation in Fiji, and in
particular to the development of capitalism there. By the early 1870s,
the transition to capitalist dominance was virtually complete but it could
not reach total fruition without the establishment of a capitalist state.
The increasing instability of the early 1870s heightened the urgent need
for its completion. The successful consolidation of capitalist relations in
Fiji, in other words, depended critically on the establishment of a
capitalist state. It is in those terms that Britain's intervention needs to be
understood. British 'benevolence' was not the real reason for
annexation on 10 October 1874, it was the justificatioa
With the installation of a capitalist state, the way was open for
capitalist dominance. Ahead lay 96 years of colonial capitalism based
on sugar and dominated by Australian capital. In the history of class
conflict that was about to unfold, class tensions would be subsumed
even more than ever beneath the politics of race. We say 'subsumed
even more' because class conflict had already begun to assume a racial
form. The contradiction between the chiefly class and the commoners
remained an essentially Fijian phenomenon but the contradiction
between capital and labour had a different racial face — capital was
European, labour Fijian. Soon, however, labour would become
predominantly Indian.
4 Discussions of the early offers can be found in Ward (1948: chapter V);
Legge (1958: chapter 2); and Derrick (1946: chapters XII, XXII).

PART II:
RACE AND CLASS IN THE
COLONIAL ECONOMY
c.1874-1960

Chapter 2
Exploitation in the Colonial Economy
The immediate and most urgent task confronting Sir Arthur Gordon,
Fiji's first substantive governor, upon his arrival in Fiji in 1875 was
the need to establish an effective system of social control. There was
the possibility that the political chaos before cession might develop
again; the absence of regular British troops in Fiji did not help matters,
nor of course the simple fact that Fijians greatly outnumbered the white
population. After all the Maori-Pakeha wars in Aotearoa (New Zealand)
were still fresh in Gordon's mind. Consequently Gordon realized that
in order to govern effectively, indigenous support was vital. Only
through the chiefs could Fiji be 'most peaceably, cheaply and easily
governed' (quoted in Gilhon 1962:7). On this occasion colonial
economic aims conveniently dovetailed with the ideology of British
benevolence.
Gordon was, of course, imbued with the ideology of British
benevolence. He too saw Fijians as emerging from a state of savage
barbarism and incapable of coping with the rigours of modern
civilization. An arrangement therefore had to be devised for their
protection until such time as they were ready for the modern world. But
such an arrangement could only work with Fijian support. As he put it
the more native the native policy is retained, native agency
employed, and changes avoided until naturally and
spontaneously called for... [the less likely is] the Fijian to
perish from the face of the earth (quoted in Heath 1974:87).
This rule was of course a convenient justification for a system of
'indirect rule' whose real purpose was the containment of any potential
indigenous threat to colonial rule. In reality, therefore, protection was
given not so much to the Fijian people but to colonial capitalism.
Nevertheless, Gordon's system of native administration certainly
gave the appearance of protecting the Fijians. Here was a set of laws,
regulations and institutions supposedly designed for the specific
purpose of sheltering the Fijian people from the demands and rigours of
modernity. But the system also created another profoundly misleading
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impression which many writers have fallen for — that it was a
'separate' system of administration. This myth of separateness has
produced a further important myth—that the economic 'backwardness'
of the Fijian race is the result of their economic 'margmality'.
These myths need to be exposed because the system of native
administration was not a 'separate' arrangement but in fact a central part
of the whole machinery of colonial rule. Similarly, Fijians were not
'marginalized:' from the economic 'mainstream' but were very much
part of it Where they differed from the other races was in the nature of
their integration. In most instances and at different historical stages,
their predominant/orms of economic involvement were different from
those of the other races. The forms of exploitation of Fijian labour,
therefore, were often different from those of Indian labour. Behind the
myths of Fijian protection and economic margmality, then, he a reality
of colonial exploitation the nature ofwhich we now examine.
Native administration: neither separate nor protective
We have already noted the regional variations in social structure which
existed in precapitalist Fiji. For Gordon, those differences presented a
major problem. How was he to establish a system of native
administration based on traditional social arrangements if those
arrangements varied so much? To resolve that difficulty, he set about
constructing his own model of the 'traditional' social structure which
he then used as the basis of the system of native administration. As
France (1969:1 10) put it:
It was...necessary to introduce uniformity into the system of
administration, and the indigenous 'institutions of
government', such as they were, would have been too varied
and despotic to have been incorporated into a colonial
administration. The Fijian administration soon established
itself as the new mode of social control which supplemented
and, in some respects, incorporated, mat of the chiefs.
With the enactment of the 1876 Native Affairs Regulations
Ordinance, then, the system of native administration came into being.
Covering virtually every aspect of Fijian life, it provided for a tiered
structure of administrative units. At the bottom level were the villages
(koro), each headed by a village headman (turaga ni koro). Contiguous
villages were grouped into districts (tikina), each headed by a buli to
whom all the turaga ni koro of the district were responsible. Districts
were grouped in turn into provinces (yasana) whose boundaries often
corresponded with traditional ones. With the exception of those of
inland Viti Levu under European commissioners, the provinces were
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headed by Roko Tuis, each of whom was directly responsible to the
governor.
In addition to these administrative units and personnel, there were
district and provincial councils and the Council of Chiefs. District
councils (Pose ni Tikina) were concerned strictly with matters of local
welfare and good order while the jurisdiction of the provincial councils
(Bose ni Yasana) was much wider. The bulis collectively presided over
the former and, similarly, the Roko Tuis collectively presided over the
latter. The Council of Chiefs (Bose Vakaturaga) was composed
primarily of chiefs drawn from all the provinces.
It is important to note that the Council of Chiefs was created by
Arthur Gordon. It was subordinate to the governor and its role was
purely advisory. However, largely through chiefly efforts it soon came
to be regarded as the very embodiment of the Fijian body politic and
was always consulted by the colonial state on matters affecting Fijian
interests. That, of course, greatly facilitated the exercise of colonial rule
but the Council of Chiefs, like other councils, was an alien institution.
As France (ibid.: 108-109) put it:
Although it had been a Fijian habit to discuss matters in
council at a village level, or even at the level of a local group of
villages in time of war, there is no evidence that the councils
set up by Gordon were 'purely native and of spontaneous
growth'. Assemblies of people had traditionally gathered for
the interchange of gifts but social intercourse was limited on
these occasions. The high chiefs rarely met in council until the
imported institutions of government required them to do so.
And of the system of native administration generally:
Whatever outward semblance of a traditional or indigenous
system Gordon's native administration possessed for
European observors, Fijians clearly regarded it as an imported
institution directly under the control of the Governor
(ibid..lOS).
Despite its alien character, the system of native administration
worked wonderfully as a mechanism of social control. With chiefs now
co-opted into the state machinery as junior functionaries, their
traditional authority was complemented with administrative authority.
As agents of social control, they formed crucial links in a chain of
containment which controlled the Fijian masses and allowed the
relatively smooth functioning of a colonial economy dominated by
white capital. The idea, therefore, that it was a separate arrangement
which protected the Fijian masses is nothing more than a
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misconception.1 Yet from that myth it was a short jump to another one
— that the cause of Fijian economic backwardness was their 'economic
marginality'.
Fijian labour: overt and hidden forms of exploitation
Those who advance the dual economy thesis of Fiji argue that, largely
as a result of the system of native administration, Fijians were confined
to a 'subsistence sector' where they languished under unprogressive
traditional practices and were unable therefore to participate adequately
in the 'modern', 'monetary', or 'commercial sector' (see, for example,
Fisk 1970; Belshaw 1964; Watters 1969; Desai 1978). Fijians, in other
words, were marginalized from the economic mainstream and for that
they paid the price of being overrun by their more competitive
European and, later, Indian counterparts.
This too is a myth. Fijians were not marginalized from the
'mainstream' of the capitalist-dominated colonial economy. What
writers have mistaken for Fijian economic marginality was precisely the
concentration of Fijians in particularforms of economic involvement
which not only held out little hope of economic success but also lacked
even the appearance of direct and extensive participation in capitalist
relations. Europeans and Indo-Fijians were not only and extensively
engaged in capitalist activities, they were also seen to be involved. For
the vast majority of Fijians, however, that was not the case. Hence it is
relatively easy to understand why so many writers advanced the
mistaken empiricist argument that Fijians were economically
marginalized. Add to that the heavy concentration of Fijians in villages,
the slow pace of village life, the appearance of Fijian physical
wellbeing, and the smiling Fijian faces, and the argument about the
protection of the Fijians appears to be vindicated. Capitalist exploitation
of Fijian labour is thus obscured, although exploited it certainly was.
Until the indenture period, the burden of capitalist production fell
on Fijian commoners: first the harvesting and processing of
sandalwood and bSche-de-mer, then cotton production, and finally,
with cotton's collapse, the expansion of copra production which for the
first eight years of British rule accounted for the largest proportion of
export earnings (Wilkins 1953:85).
During the colonial period the exploitation of Fijian labour power
was effected through wage work and the appropriation of peasant
produce. Increasingly, however, Fijians became reluctant to take
fulltime wage employment, preferring instead the less demanding and
For versions of this idea see Bums, Watson and Peacock (1960); Mamak
(1978); Norton (1977); Ali (1980); Premdas (1980:30-44).
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less regimented pace of subsistence work. The pressure which this
placed on the labour supply was worsened by the devastating effect
which the measles epidemic of 1875 had on the Fijian population. In the
early months of that year alone, about 40,000 Fijians died (Legge
1958:214).
The pressure to find ways of drawing Fijians into wage work
remained until the colonial state introduced a system of communal
taxation under which villages were required to pay their taxes in kind—
in agricultural produce. That arrangement was preferred over the system
of poll taxes introduced by the Cakobau government in 1871. Gordon
realized only too well that poll taxes would not yield much revenue
when aimed at a 'population nine-tenths of which possess[ed] no
money' (quoted in Samy 1977:45). Fijian labour could now be
exploited through the direct appropriation of surplus peasant
production. The system was, of course, successful. And it was not
overtly coercive. It brought in much-needed export earnings and it
added to the colonial state's coffers. Between 1875 and 1879, for
example, communal taxes accounted for an average 30 per cent of total
state revenue (Wilkins 1953:85). This hidden form of exploitation,
however, was only one of several.
For their subsistence, the vast majority of Fijian wage labourers
relied in part on the unpaid labour of relatives and friends in their
villages. To that extent, the cost of labour power was effectively
subsidized. With free supplies of food and other necessities from the
village, the price of Fijian labour fell and it was possible for capital to
pay Fijian workers less than the full value of their labour power. What
is more, for a very long time (until the late 1940s in fact) there was little
in the way of organized pressure from Fijian workers for higher wages.
Fijian wages, therefore, could be, and were, kept low.
Fijians were also exploited indirectly in exchange relations. Often,
the prices which Fijians paid for their purchases were high, and for the
Fijian masses in particular the burden was especially heavy. But Fijians
sold commodities to capitalist enterprises and often at low prices, which
meant higher capitalist profits. In addition, capitalists benefitted
indirectly when Fijian produce was sold cheaply in local markets.
The earliest set of statistics on Fijian income cover the period 1950
to 1953 (O'Loughlin 1956). They show that 75 per cent of total Fijian
income was derived from agriculture and that only 25 per cent of
agricultural income was cash earnings. It has also been estimated that
cash earnings from domestic sales of subsistence items like root crops,
vegetables, fruit and fish accounted for a mere 4 per cent of total Fijian
income. The low prices which this suggests constitute another hidden
form of exploitation of the Fijian peasantry — the availability of cheap
subsistence goods served to reduce the cost of labour power. The
surpluses of Fijian peasant production, in other words, subsidized: the
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cost of reproducing labour power and thereby allowed capital to keep
wages down.
This predicament of the Fijian masses was exacerbated by the
policies of the colonial state which claimed to have their welfare at
heart. Because Fijians were heavily concentrated in agriculture, their
economic condition might have been greatly assisted had the colonial
state paid special attention to the development of that sector. But the
evidence suggests otherwise. Between 1938 and 1953, for example, the
proportion of state resources devoted to agriculture averaged a mere 4
per cent. Three times as much was spent on the state's repressive
apparatuses (defence and law and order). See Table 2.1.
Table 2.1: Composition of State Expenditure for Selected
Years 1938-53 (%)
1938 1950 1951 1952 1953
Administration 32 25 26 26 27
Law and Order 6 7 7 7 7
Social Services 20 30 32 33 31
Agriculture 3 4 4 4 4
Infrastructure 16 14 15 15 16
Defence 1 5 5 4 4
Public Debt 16 6 5 5 5
Pensions 6 5 5 5 5
Subsidies - 4 1 1 1
Total 100 100 100 100 100
Source: O'Loughlin (1956:49).
In regard to wage work, the plight of Fijian workers in the
goldmining industry brings into sharp focus the harsh realities of
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capitalist exploitation of Fijian labour and further exposes the myth that
British rule served to protect the Fijians.2
Centred around Vatukoula in northern Viti Levu, the industry
emerged in the 1930s and its early rapid expansion was due largely to
the sharp rise in the gold price which came in the wake of world
depression in the late 1920s and early 1930s. Not surprisingly,
therefore, its importance to the colonial economy was quickly
established. Within the space of six years, between 1932 and 1938,
gold replaced copra as the colony's second largest foreign exchange
earner after sugar. The industry retained its prominent status after the
war, averaging 17.5 per cent of total exports between 1946 and 1950.
By the 1950s production costs began to escalate because of the
shifting balance between open-cut and underground mining, a more
complicated milling process and the closure of two mines. With the
viability of the industry coming under increasing stress, more and more
state financial assistance was made available. More importantly, tight
control of labour and labour costs became imperative (Bain 1986:39).
Racial stratification was the basis of labour division, job
classification, occupational mobility, wages and other returns. White
expatriate Europeans were the bosses, local part-Europeans and
Rotumans dominated the skilled and middle-level positions, while
Fijians made up the vast bulk of the unskilled workforce. Fijian wages
were abysmally low. 'Between 1935 and 1948 [they] scarcely rose and
real earnings in fact declined as inflation soared during and after the
war' (i'6id.:40) In addition to their poor wages, Fijian workers laboured
under a harsh work routine and inferior conditions, lived in congested
accommodation and had to bear the ignimony of a system of racial
segregation and discrimination which governed relations both inside
and outside the workplace.
This brief survey of the overt and hidden forms of exploitation of
Fijian labour during the colonial period should put to rest the myths of
Fijian protection and economic marginality, at least as far as the Fijian
masses were concerned. For beneath the outward appearance of an
easy-going, village lifestyle lies a history of racist and capitalist
exploitation of Fijian labour. Unfortunately, the machinations of the
ruling class, which will be discussed in later chapters, were such that
the reality of that exploitation was obscured. The ideology and practice
of racialism perpetrated by the ruling class made a large section of the
Fijian masses see themselves primarily as Fijians rather than as
exploited people who shared with their Indian counterparts similar class
The seminal work on labour relations in Fiji's goldmining industry is
Bain (1987). The account which follows, however, is drawn from a
shorter piece, Bain (1986).
32 Beyond the Politics ofRace
interests. It is to the exploitation of that latter group during the colonial
era that we now turn.
Gordon had faith in Fiji's productive potential but there were
problems tapping it. Fijian labour was problematic and there was a
shortage of capital. Also, Gordon was not overly impressed with Fiji's
white settlers: 'a new set of men' would have to come in before there
would be 'any real prosperity in the colony' (quoted in Moynagh
1981:16). He therefore turned to New Zealand and Australia, and in the
early 1880s there was a considerable infusion of capital from those
countries.
This change brought about the consolidation of the sugar
foundation of the colonial economy and a history of even greater
foreign control, superexploitation and more brutal forms of racism.
Class conflict was about to intensify and a new racial mask was
assumed, the worst victims of which would be the Indian working
masses. The roots of that tragic experience lie in the entry and the
awesome power of King Sugar — the Colonial Sugar Refining
Company (CSR).
Indian labour: indenture and beyond
Without a cheap and adequate supply of labour, a viable sugar
economy would not have been possible and we have already seen why
Fijians were not a reliable source. Labour therefore had to be found
elsewhere and, drawing on his experience in Trinidad and Mauritius,
Gordon embarked on a massive importation of indentured workers
from India which was to last from 1879 until 1916. A total of 60,965
workers was brought in and their presence introduced a racial
dimension which to this day continues to shape the political economy
of Fiji in a most fundamental way.
With indenture, Fijians were increasingly displaced by Indians as
the major racial group at the exploited end of the capital-labour axis.
Hence, once wage labour became overwhelmingly Indian, the major
class contradiction— that between capital and labour— took on a new
racial form.
In addition to cheap labour, sugar capital also needed land. But
inscribed in the Deed of Cession was the principle of the inalienability
of native land and initially Gordon was anxious to respect it, or at least
be seen to respect it. When resident white settlers had pressed him to
ratify 1,683 claims for a total of 854,000 acres of land alienated before
Cession, he approved only 517. Now with the compelling need to
attract new capital in order to increase production, he became
determined that his land policy should not prevent the inflow
ofnew capital, and that sufficient freehold land for plantation
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agriculture should be left in the colony so that the short terms
of native leases would not deter investors (ibid.:l9).
For Gordon, principles were fine as long as they did not stand in
the way of 'progress' and 'development' — and the inalienability of
native land was no exception. Among the early violations of that
principle was the sale of 500 acres to Stanlake Lee & Company and
1,000 acres to the CSR (ibid.). In the years to come more and more
land was made available to sugar capital, most especially to the CSR,
and invariably the hand of the colonial state lurked somewhere in the
background.
But state pampering to the wishes of sugar capital did not always
go unchallenged. Fijian landowners often resisted, sometimes
successfully. In October 1905, for example, the CSR, with the
assistance of the colonial state and one of its Fijian chiefly
functionaries, Ratu Joni Madraiwiwi, tried unsuccessfully to alienate
7,000 acres at the back of Nausori. However, such setbacks were more
the exception than the rule.
From its Australian experience, the CSR knew that the most
profitable area of sugar production was milling and it was precisely in
that area that its expertise was greatest. Hence it was concerned to
concentrate its efforts in milling and hoped that local white planters
already living in the vicinity of its mills would be able to provide an
adequate supply of cane, at least initially. Unfortunately for the CSR
they were unable to do so and consequently CSR was forced to develop
its own plantations on a much larger scale than originally intended.
That, however, did not prevent it from making an early start on shifting
the burden ofheavy production costs on to others.
As early as 1890, the CSR began leasing parts of its estates to some
of its former plantation managers and to local Europeans who in turn
employed Indian labour. In addition, there were farmers who owned or
leased freehold land but subcontracted the sugargrowing work to
others. Effectively absentee landlords, they came to be known as
contractors. By the early 1900s these non-company plantations ranged
in size from 600 to 1,000 acres. By 1914 the plantation system was
well-developed and for the CSR it was a highly attractive system. It
ensured an adequate supply of cane and the company not only
determined the price of cane but also enjoyed considerable control over
cultivation methods, tenancy agreements, rent charges and credit
facilities.
The European planters, of course, became increasingly agitated at
the power of the CSR but, being much the weaker fraction of sugar
capital, there was little they could do about it. Their weakness was
clearly demonstrated by their inability to withstand the first major crisis
in the industry— the end of indenture in 1916.
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As knowledge of the brutality ofplantation life spread, international
pressure against the indenture system intensified and in 1916 the last
shipload of workers left India for Fiji. Local planters were more
dependent than the CSR on indentured labour and agitated for its
retention without success. For its part, the Company responded to the
potentially serious labour shortage by simply accelerating a process of
restructuring started back in the mid- 1890s. The smallfarm system
dominated by Indian tenant farmers was about to replace the large
plantation as the backbone of the industry.
From 1894 the CSR began leasing land to Indians who had
completed their indenture. By the standards of the time the lots that
were leased were comparatively small — between 100 and 200 acres.
Thirty years later, however, the average farm size fell to between 8 and
12 acres. Those with farms of over 100 acres became large canefarmers
and it was they, together with those who took over from Europeans as
contractors, who formed the embryo of the Indian kulak class, i.e., the
large and rich Indian canefarmers.
There was also an increasing number of Indian canefarmers who
leased native land. That, of course, introduced a potential source of
friction between the two races. But it was the presence of a rich Indian
kulak class which most increased the likelihood of more Fijian
resentment of Indians. Among the local white plantation owners, on the
other hand, racialist feelings were already very strong because Indian
farmers were seen as direct competitors who threatened to do them out
of business. As Gillion put it
This rise of the Indian canefarmer was a pointer to the future
of Fiji....To the planters, the unindentured Indian was a
potential competitor, who picked the eyes out of the land
available for leasing and, with his frugality and industry, was
a threat to cane prices.
It is not surprising, therefore, that
....as early as 1903 there was unrest among planters who
believed that the CSR Company intended to replace the
European planter with a small Indian farmer who could accept
a lower price for cane, and some wanted a law passed to
forbid Indians to produce except as paid labour (Gillion
1962:100).
It was not to be. The CSR pressed on with the settlement of Indians
as tenant farmers, recognizing, as the general manager put it, that 'the
only means by which the position could be rendered really secure
would be to make the industry independent of immigration by
permanently attaching to it the people introduced for plantation work'
(ibid.'.m).
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The company experimented with several settlement schemes as it
searched for the optimum farm size and in 1925 decided on a range of
between eight and twelve acres. By the early 1930s, settlement on that
basis was completed and the smallfarm system became firmly
established as the foundation of the sugar industry (see Table 2.2).
However, the change in structure did not lessen the exploitation of
producers.
Table 2.2: Cane Acreage by Farm Type 1925—1944
Year Total
(Acres)
Company
(%)
European Tenant
(%)
Contractors
(%) (%)
1925 64,396 52 7 10 31
1930 78,250 22 2 36 40
1935 87,738 5 1 52 42
1940 91,624 3 - 52 45
1944 89,059 3 - 51 46
Source: Shepard (1945:38).
During the indenture period, CSR profits hinged on the long
working hours — 50 hours per week— and the task system, whereby
set pieces of work had to be completed within specified periods of time.
When the industry was hit by an economic crisis in the mid- 1880s,
enforcement of indenture contracts also became much more rigorous.
A labour shortage in India meant a labour shortage for the CSR. To
make matters worse the sugar price on the London market fell by 38 per
cent between 1883 and 1884. Neither the company nor the colonial state
could do anything about either development and when the company
complained about its high costs and threatened to withdraw from Fiji if
they could not be contained, the state responded sympathetically. As
Gillion put it (ibid.:79), the colonial state was 'reluctant to put
difficulties in [the Company's] way'. The state's class bias was clearly
shown. The workers did not matter. Their wages remained abysmally
low.
The wage rates in 1887 were 7s.6d for males and 4s.4d for
females; it took 32 years for them to double (Narsey 1979:85). That
company workers were exploited much more intensely than their white
counterparts in Australia is suggested by the wage differential ofone to
seven (/Wrf.:88). But within Fiji similar differences along racial lines
also existed. Black workers were paid far less than their white bosses
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(the wage differentials of 1921 are shown in Table 2.3). Racism was
absolutely central to capitalist profit.
Table 2.3 Yearly Pay for Black and White CSR
Employees, 1921
White - Artisans £156 -£185
Clerks £144 - £300
- Overseers £200 - £250 (plus house - £500)
- Managers £300 - £400 (plus house - £500)
Black labour, whether
of Indians or Fijians,
including food £40
Source: Chappie (1921:161-163).
With such low wages, a decent standard of living for the workers
was impossible. Ahmed Ali has estimated that in 1921 the annual
income for a family of four was a deficit of £1 1. 1 ls.4d. He concluded
that
a cane labourer with a wife and two children at the best could
eke out an existence and at the worst live under deprivation.
This of course assumes that each man had only two children,
and ignores the tendency of Indians to have large families;
those with more than the average accepted here would have
had considerable difficulty (Ali 1980:91).
The appalling conditions of work and of plantation life generally
exacted a terrible toll on the workers. Suicides were common and the
Indian mortality rate frightfully high. Between 1902 and 1912, for
example, there were 926 suicides, and between 1909 and 1914 an
average of 8 per cent of all adult immigrants from India died within five
years of arrival in the country — and of those 70 per cent were aged
between 20 and 30 years (Narsey 1979:88).
Because of a harsh work pace, physical brutality, sickness, low
morale and a general air of misery, it was inevitable that the level of
work performance should fall below that which the CSR preferred. Of
course, the company had its own methods of dealing with 'sub
standard' performance but the state did not just sit by idly either. Placed
at the service of the exploiter was the state's legal machinery, the
centrepiece of which was the insidious and highly repressive Master
and Servants Ordinance of 1 888.
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The overall criminal conviction rate for Indians was very high,
fluctuating between 59 per cent and 81 per cent from 1889 until 1910,
but conviction rates for labour offences were even higher, ranging from
73 per cent to 92 per cent over the same period (ibid.:90). Also, the
major types of labour offence are revealing: unlawful absence, failure to
complete tasks, refusal to work, and want of ordinary diligence. Clearly
the legal apparatuses of the state were very useful for the defence of
private profit
In the small farm sector, the exploitation of Indo-Fijian labour took
two forms. The first was company control over cane prices. We have
already noted that by the mid 1920s the white planters were being
quickly squeezed out of the industry largely because the cane prices
paid by the CSR were insufficient to maintain expected white living
standards. But low cane prices were also paid to the Indian farmers.
Betraying yet again its deep-rooted racism, the Company's attitude was
that if 'white planters could not be forced to accept, or could not be
expected to accept, low prices for cane.. .Indian farmers would'
(ibid.: 105). What is more, precisely the same attitude was taken by the
colonial state, as the following official statement shows:
the price offered by the company (CSR) though not sufficient
to enable European planters to produce sugar cane at a profit is
sufficiently high to enable Indian farmers to extract a good
livelihood from the cultivation of cane and the company has
thus been able to maintain its normal level of output of
manufactured sugar (quoted in ibid.:l06).
A second form of exploitation had to do with the various types of
control that the Company was able to exert over sugar production:
regulation of cultivation practices, surveillance by company overseers,
legally binding agreements with stipulations on the tending and
harvesting of cane and the varieties of cane to be grown, control over
the use of fertilisers and other means of production through the use of
hiring arrangements, control over tenancy agreements, and finally
control of credit (see Moynagh 1981; Narsey 1979). Of these, the last
two were particularly important.
Tenancies could always be terminated by either party giving one
year's notice, but the CSR inserted into its tenancy agreements a clause
which allowed Company termination of the contract without notice 'in
the event of legislation being passed limiting its freedom of action in the
manner of buying crops...or otherwise affecting the conditions under
which it carries on its operations' (quoted in Narsey 1979:109). This,
of course, considerably strengthened the company's position vis-a-vis
the farmer. At a more general level it underlined the power of the CSR
because the clause effectively signalled to the colonial state a
determination to defend company interests against offending legislatioa
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With regard to the provision of credit, the CSR understood well its
importance as a method of control. With limited funds to finance their
consumption and production expenses, farmers found it extremely
difficult to escape this instrument of control, and all the more so
because Company interest rates were far lower than the exorbitant rates
charged by predatory Indian storekeepers and moneylenders (Moynagh
1981:129).
With these forms of exploitation and control, then, it is not
surprising that the CSR was able to reap immense profits. As Bruce
Knapman said of the early years:
Between 1883 and 1913, when sugar colonies in the West
Indies went into decline because of a 57% drop in the world
sugar price, Fiji's sugar export revenue increased nearly
sixfold (Knapman 1988:158. Also see Knapman 1987).
Narsey has estimated that between 1914 and 1923 the company
made 'superprofits' of about 13 million pounds (1979:98). Compared
with a mere 3.7 million pounds profit for its Australian operations
during the same period, the results of the Fiji operation clearly show
just how important Fiji was for the CSR. Little wonder, therefore, that
the company's historians were able to make this observation: 'In Fiji
during the 1914-1924 period, CSR enjoyed the most spectacular
monetary success in its history' (quoted in ibid.). But the burden of that
success was primarily borne by the Indian masses. Low wages and
cane prices locked them into lives ofhardship and misery.
They received little help from the colonial state. The farmers, for
example, mounted major strikes in 1921, 1943 and 1960 in support of
demands for better returns, but each time they failed. Each time the
CSR refused to raise the price of cane, the colonial state sided with it.
In those and other struggles, the Indian masses suffered much the
same kind of fate which befell their Fijian peasant counterparts earlier
on. A common feature of their suppression was the way in which they
were compromized by the bourgeois character of their own political
leaders. We turn therefore to the early struggles and the containment of
the peasants and workers.
Chapter 3
Struggle and Containment
Since all but one of the high chiefs who signed the Deed of Cession
were from the eastern part of Fiji, it is not surprising that the roots of
the Fijian anticolonial snuggles are to be found in the western regions.
Fijian peasant struggles
The hill tribes of the interior were renowned for their fierce
independence. When local white capital, using Cakobau as a
figurehead, sought to create a central authority in 1871, they resisted.
But the armed forces of the Cakobau government were able to subdue
them only to a degree, and their spirit of independence resurfaced in
1876 when they resisted colonial rule. On that occasion, however, after
a costly military campaign, they were finally subjugated.1
Of all the early instances of rebellion against colonial rule, this was
the bloodiest and most brutal. The hill tribes of Viti Levu clearly
threatened the viability of the colonial administration, and 'severity in
dealing with the leaders of the rebellion was considered essential for
long-term peace' (Legge 1958:215). Very importantly the colonial state
made a deliberate effort to prevent its campaign appearing as 'a punitive
campaign against natives by a "white" Government'. Apart from its
general direction, therefore, the details of strategy and the execution of
the assault 'were left largely to natives' (ibid.:215-2l6). Fijians were
pitted against Fijians, the hill tribes were conquered and the colonial
state won the 'Little War in Fiji'. Legge's summary of the whole affair
is telling:
[Gordon's] desire for native assistance in the war was to
secure their support for the new Government's system of law
and order, and at the same time to prevent the growth of a
continuing hostility on the part of the defeated tribes. So
For discussions of this campaign, see Legge (1958: part 2); Burns
(1963); Samy (1977); Norton (1972).
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successful was he from that point ofview that it was possible
at the close of hostilities to leave a small force of merely 1SO
native constables in the district (ibid.-2l6).
With the suppression of the hill tribes, the execution of their
leaders, and the pacification of the district, Fijian resistance to colonial
rule subsided. The violence of this episode in Fiji's history issued a
warning to potential agitators that they would incur the wrath and
repressive might of the colonial state. The warning was apparently
effective for when indigenous resistance to colonial rale surfaced again
the level of physical violence needed to suppress it was far less than
that meted out to the brave ofthe interior.
The next instances of anticolonial struggle were the Luve ni wai and
the Tuka movements.2 The few writings on these movements have
emphasized their cultic or millenarian aspects but it is quite clear that at
root they were reactions against colonial authority, for behind all the
ritual and religious paraphernalia lay an anti-colonial struggle.
A youth movement, the Luve ni wai (Children of the Water)
originated in the Colo area in inland Viti Levu. In one district, members
resolved to emancipate themselves from British rule and adopted an
authority structure mat mimicked the colonial one. But apart from this
particular form of open challenge, it was the unmistakeable anti-
authority precepts of the wider movement that caused the colonial state
concern. Many members were incarcerated for insubordination and a
special Ordinance No.3 of 1887 was invoked to cope with disturbances
emanating not just from the Luve ni wai but also from a larger and
potentially more threatening movement— the Tuka.
Existing during the same period as the Luve ni wai, the Tuka
movement originated in Ra but soon spread throughout the west It was
formed in 1885 by a Ra commoner and self-styled prophet, Dugumoi,
who later took the name Navosavakudua. The name Tuka means
'immortality' or 'the promise of immortality'. With its inspiration
drawn from Fijian legend, it is not surprising that many have seen it
primarily as a revivalist religious movement. But even the recognized
authority on the Tuka, the Rev. W. Sutherland, said in 1910 that the
movement, 'apparently harmless and simple at first ...was of a
distinctly political nature and hostile to the Government'.
The advent of the missionaries, followed by settled
Government, took away all that the native had to live and
struggle and fight for in earlier times... It was inevitable
For discussions of the Tuka and the Luve ni wai see Sutherland (1908-
1910:51-57); Clammer (1976: chapter 6); Norton (1972: chapter 5);
Worsley (1970: chapter 1).
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therefore... that spasmodic efforts should be made to revive
old customs and possibly regain power (1908-1910:56).
The order of the world, Navosavakudua prophesied, would soon
be overturned so that the whites would serve the natives and the chiefs
would serve the commoners. To prepare for the millennium when
commoners would reign supreme, he set up a quasi-military
organization consisting of soldiers, sergeants, scribes, rokos and bulis,
the last two being the names of positions in the colonial native
administration. At the senior level of the hierarchy were officials known
as 'destroying angels'.
No doubt the biblical overtone reinforced the movement's religious
character, but the adoption of official titles used in the colonial
administration, together with the overtly military nature of the
organization and the hint of a power struggle, all point very clearly to
the anti-colonial and anti-chiefnature of the movement
Here, then, was a movement of Fijian peasants rebelling against
those whom they saw as their oppressors — the white functionaries of
the colonial state and their subordinate chiefly agents. The latter were
doubly oppressive because they not only continued to exact material
tribute from their traditional subjects but they had also joined forces
with the white rulers.
Once the date of the millennium was fixed and preparations got
underway in earnest for the overthrow of the white men and their
collaborators, the movement was stopped by the colonial state— again
with chiefly assistance, in this case a chief from Bau (ibid.; also see
Clammer 1976:113; Norton 1972:227). Navosavakadua's lieutenants
were imprisoned while he was sentenced to hard labour and later
banished to the island ofRotuma three hundred miles away. He died in
exile but enthusiasm for the movement continued. A resurgence of
activity occurred in 1892 but was successfully suppressed.
Navosavakadua's village was burned, the members of his tribe
banished to the island of Kadavu for ten years, and a force of armed
constabulary stationed at Nadarivatu, 'sufficiently strong to impress the
inhabitants that the forces of the gods of the Nakauvadra were less
powerful than the authority of the King" (Sutherland 1908-1910:56).
The movement soon declined and by the end of World War I it had
died.
However, the Tuka was followed by a larger movement, the Viti
Kabani. The activities of its leader, Apolosi Ranawai, himself a Tuka
disciple, opened another chapter in the history of indigenous peasant
struggle against colonial rule. Of all the early instances of indigenous
struggle, this was the most important in the sense that it was the first
clear expression of organized struggle by the Fijian peasantry against
not only colonial rule but also the underlying system of exploitation
which it served— capitalism.
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An adequate understanding of Apolosi's movement is only possible
against the background of major changes brought about by Governor
Everard im Thurn. Unlike his predecessors who suppressed the Luve ni
wai and the Tuka movements, im Thurn actually facilitated the
emergence of the Via' Kabani.
For im Thurn, Gordon's native policies were no longer
appropriate. He believed it was time for Fijians to join the modern
world and learn to stand on their own feet Of all the early governors,
im Thurn stands out as the only one to have departed significantly from
the pattern of colonial administration that had been set by Gordon. The
maverick governor sought to proletarianize the Fijians and in so doing
heightened the possibility of further indigenous reaction against colonial
rule.3
The situation in Fiji at the time of im Thurn's arrival appeared
different to him from that which existed in the early years of Gordonian
rule. With the Fijian population in rapid decline, the threat of its
extinction loomed large. Moreover, Gordon's ^protective' and
paternalistic administration seemed to im Thurn to have done little to
prepare Fijians for the rigours of modern society. Above all else, it
discouraged the development of 'individualism' — not individualism in
Fijians generally but rather in commoners. The commoners, he felt, had
to be rescued from chiefly oppression. As he said:
...the term xFijian' includes two distinct classes, whose
interests are to a greater or lesser extent opposed, viz: the
chiefs and the commoners — what is the gain to one is often
the loss to the other. To me their interests seem to be as
distinct as those of patrician and plebeian, or of noble and
serf... if [commoners] try to accumulate property, it is taken
from them (quoted in Chapelle 1970:53).
In chiefly lala im Thurn recognized the source of commoner
oppression by chiefs. But commoners, he said, were burdened by a
'double series of demands'. The first was the chiefs personal lala
(tribute exacted by virtue oftraditional chiefly privilege) and official lala
(tribute exacted by virtue of his status as a state official). Official lala,
he argued, should be retained because it was payment for services
rendered by state functionaries. But there was no longerjustification for
personal lala. The practice should cease:
I do not overlook the fact that the chiefs were probably the
heads of the commune and therefore, as being then responsible
For discussions of im Thurn's policies, see Chapelle (1970); MacNaught
(1982: chapter 3); France (1969: chapter 9); and Legge.(1958).
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for the administration of the affairs of the commune, entitled to
payment or lala. But the British Government in instituting its
'Native System' substituted this for the system of rule by 'the
chiefs', so that the administrative function of these 'chiefs' is,
or ought to be, gone, and with it the chiefs' right to lala is, or
ought to be, cancelled (ibid.:56).
The major effect of this position was that chiefs who were not
employed by the colonial state would effectively lose all lala. The
intended effect of his attack on personal lala 'would be the creation in
the ordinary Fijian of that individuality which would...be the only thing
to save him and his race from extinction' (ibid.). For im Thurn the time
had arrived for the Fijians to be drawn out of their sheltered existence
and prepared for modern life. Reward and gain would henceforth be the
result of individual effort and not birthright. In other words, traditional
chiefly privilege would have no place in the new order. Chiefs and
commoners had to become equals and if differences emerged between
them it would be the legitimate result of hard work and individual merit
Im Thurn was not concerned with hard work as such but with hard
work of a particular kind — hard wage work. He sympathized with
commoners because in the traditional, precapitalist system they laboured
hard but had little to show for their efforts; under the 'modern' (i.e.,
capitalist) system, he intimated, they would. It was of course highly
unlikely that Fijians would succeed as capitalists, so the real thrust of
the governor's plan was to turn Fijians into wage workers, to
proletarianize the Fijian people.
Steps were therefore taken to repeal offending legislation,
especially Ordinance No.3 of 1877, so that refusal to pay personal lala
would no longer be an offence. Enactment of new legislation was
delayed, however, because of the lengthy time involved in re-drafting
regulations. But rather than sit idly by, im Thurn pressed ahead with his
campaign by confronting the chiefs directly. In his opening address to
the Great Council of Chiefs on 10 October 1905, he prefaced his
remarks with statements about patriotism and then proceeded to
castigate the chiefs:
I know also that some of you think only, or chiefly, of
yourselves, of your lala, and your sevu, your Ikerekere] and
your other exactions from your people. These of you are
unpatriotic, and it is these of you who are killing your people
(ibid;.51).
Having introduced ideas of patriotism and selflessness, the governor
turned to his main theme, individualism.
The response of both chiefs and commoners to his intervention was
sufficiently positive that he later sketched the outlines of a wholly new
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approach to native affairs based on freedom of choice and action. Im
Thurn announced his intention to make legislative changes that would
allow greater freedom of movement for Fijians who wished to take up
paid employment (ibid.:51). But it was on the matter of land that his
initiative had the greatest impact
The governor believed that Fijian advancement could never be
secured so long as Fijians were hamstrung by a system of land tenure
that was not based on individual ownership. Accordingly he enacted
four ordinances to correct the situation. However, as it turned out the
main beneficiaries were not Fijians but white capital. Between 190S and
1909 'some 20,000 acres of Fijian land was sold to white settlers, in
addition to a larger area leased' (Burns 1963:138). The principle of the
inalienability of native land was given yet another majorjolt
From distant London, a shocked Arthur Gordon, now Lord
Stanmore, launched a stinging attack on im Thurn's major detour. The
Fijian retention of land was central to the appearance of benevolence
that surrounded British rule and in particular the system of native
administration. That appearance was now threatened by im Thurn, and
in the end Gordon won the day. In 1909 the ordinance which permitted
the sale of Fijian land was repealed and the system of native
administration effectively swung back to its former Gordonian path.
Though the attempt to proletarianize the Fijian peasantry failed, im
Thurn's experiment had important consequences. His attack on the
chiefly class and his apparent sympathy for the commoners increased
the possibility of further open struggle by the Fijian labouring classes.
Apolosi Ranawai, whose association with the Tuka movement had
strengthened his opposition to colonial rule, was undoubtedly
encouraged by what im Thurn had said and apparently sought to do.
But Apolosi was not a peasant, he was a worker. So it is not altogether
surprising that when he organized the Viti Kabani movement, his aim
was to free his predominantly peasant followers from not only colonial
rule but also capitalist exploitatioa
With the collaboration of some European businessmen in Suva,
Apolosi Ranawai, a thirty-six year old carpenter, formed the Viti
Kabani (Fiji Company) in 1913.4 Like its predecessors, Apolosi's
movement had a religious character. However, its basic goal was a
New Era 'when the burdens of taxation, enforced communal labour,
and dominance by chiefs and whites would be eliminated'.
A major vehicle for the liberation of oppressed Fijians was to be the
exclusively Fijian Viti Kabani. Its basic purpose was to buy and sell
Fijian agricultural produce so that control of Fijian economic activity
For discussions of Apolosi and the Viti Kabani, see MacNaught (1978,
1982: chapter 3); Chapelle (1975); Couper (1968).
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would remain in the hands of the producers. As a memorandum from
the company stated:
The cause [or the beginning] of this thing is through the
Europeans here in Fiji swindling us, the price of all our things
are different... Their swindling us will never cease (quoted in
Couper 1968:269).
By 1914 the movement had spread west to the Yasawa Islands and
in the opposite direction to eastern Viti Levu and beyond to Lau and
Vanua Levu. In Rewa the movement was particularly strong; at a
meeting in Draubuta village in January 1915 between 3,000 and 4,000
people attended. Resolutions were passed which give an idea of the
movement's ambitions. Fijians were to enter into contracts with the
company 'with the idea of keeping our lands in our own hands and all
the produce therefrom'. Company stores would be built in every
locality and would have no dealings with Europeans. Further, there
would be a native shipbuilding yard in each province and the company
would have its own police and church (ibid;.270).
Although there is general agreement that the movement was not a
commercial success, it did pose a serious threat to the established order.
Europeans (and the few Chinese) who acted as middlemen in the
marketing of Fijian agricultural produce were threatened with a
substantial drop in business. Also, the authority of the colonial state
was undermined as Apolosi's followers were ordered not to comply
with any of the dictates of the system of native administration. The
movement had its own village officials and it was they, rather than the
rokos and bulis, whom the faithful were urged to obey. Not unnaturally
the chiefly class saw this movement of 'young upstarts' as an affront to
their authority and status. Significantly, mat feeling was much greater in
the east than in the west Although the movement spread to most parts
of Fiji, it was in western Viti Levu that support for it was strongest. It
is also significant that the colonial state recognized a marked tendency
among the people there to develop to an increasing degree along
'individualistic lines' (Norton 1972:231). Im Thum's influence was
showing through.
The regional character of the movement underlines the way in
which colonial capitalism exacerbated uneven development in the
country and it is not surprising that Fijian opposition to the Viti Kabani
was strongest among the eastern chiefly class. That opposition played a
critical part in the suppression of the movement In that task the central
Fijian figure was Ratu Sukuna, an Oxford-educated high chief who
later became the most senior Fijian state functionary and 'the statesman
of Fiji'. It was he who articulated Fijian opposition to the Viti Kabani
most clearly.
46 Beyond the Politics of Race
The anti-chief character of the movement was not lost to Sukuna
and it is only to be expected that his assessment of Apolosi's followers
should reflect his chiefly background and belief that commoners were
little more than imbeciles, quite incapable of deciding what was in their
best interests; in his own words, 'speaking generally, the more
backward the people the more pronounced is the hold of the Viti
Company' (Sukuna, letter to the Secretary for Native Affairs, March
1917, in Scarr 1983). In a letter to the Secretary ofNative Affairs on 12
March 1917 Sukuna declared that Apolosi's activities
confront the Government with facts and tendencies alarming in
regard both to native life and Native Administration and create
grave responsibilities which must be faced. In character those
activities are undoubtedly corrupt and degrading, assuming a
political character for the purposes oflow gain (ibid.:51).
He charged Apolosi with 'belittling and interfering with constituted
authority', 'trafficking with racial feelings for position of gain', and
perpetrating 'a crime of the worst kind'. His 'sordid and unpatriotic
doings', Sukuna went on, 'deserve the last punishment... [and] the
remedy is at hand by striking at the root of the evil, that is, by deporting
Apolosi under ordinance in of 1887' (ibid.:5T).
Apolosi was duly exiled to Rotuma. The colonial state could hardly
have done otherwise, as strong pressure was being exerted not only by
the eastern chiefly class but also by capital. When the anti-white theme
of Apolosi's propaganda intensified, Europeans rebuked the governor
for not taking action against him (Norton 1972:229).
On his return from exile in 1924, Apolosi again took up the cause,
and the wider his influence grew the more concerned capital, chiefs and
the colonial state became. Further suppression inevitably followed,
taking similar forms to those adopted earlier restriction of native
gatherings, imprisonment, and deportation. In 1940 Apolosi returned
from a second exile in Rotuma but was sent back again. After
consultations between the governor and the east-dominated Council of
Chiefs (90 per cent of the council were eastern chiefs), he was
subsequently banished to New Zealand 'lest security be endangered in
the event of a Japanese invasion' (ibid.:232). With the absence of its
leader, the movement went into decline, but even after his death in 1946
veneration of the man continued for a long time.
The Viti Kabani movement holds a very special place in the history
of Fiji's working classes. It was a struggle against colonial rule and,
more importantly, against capitalist exploitation. Also, it brought into
sharp focus the regional cleavage between eastern and western Fiji and
demonstrated very clearly the way in which colonial capitalism
aggravated regional inequalities.
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Through Governor im Thurn, the colonial state had sought to draw
Fijian labour and land more directly within the ambit of capitalist
relations. But the attempt at proletarianization and complete land
privatization failed, and with the return to Gordon's native policies the
myth of Fijian protection and marginality was salvaged. The setting up
of the Fijian administration in 1946 would further strengthen the
institutional facade of the myth and make the liberation of the Fijian
working classes even more difficult. Their predicament would soon be
touted by the Fijian chiefly class as the problem of 'Fijian' economic
backwardness rather than the economic backwardness of the Fijian
working classes.
But the creation of the Fijian administration was important for
another important reason. It marked a turning point in the process of
Fijian class formation. Attacks on the system of native administration
threatened the official positions of chiefs within the colonial state and to
their struggle for survival we now turn.
Chiefs strike back
The co-optation of Fijian chiefs into the colonial state machinery
through the system of native administration marked the beginning of (to
borrow Mamdani's (1976) term) an indigenous bureaucratic
bourgeoisie. To ensure a continuing place for chiefs within the colonial
state, however, two conditions had to be met: first, that the cost of
running the system of native administration did not strain the state's
finances; and second, that the main purpose for which chiefs were
hired— to facilitate the task of social control — remained important.
By 1913, both had been called into serious question. As a result the
system ofnative administration and the nascent indigenous bureaucratic
bourgeoisie came under increasing threat. But the chiefs fought back
and for three decades they waged a battle against the colonial state, a
battle which grew in intensity until it culminated in victory in 1944
when they assumed control of the newly-formed Fijian administration.
The 'main class of collaborators' now turned on the colonial master.
In 1877 a review of the system of native administration had
produced some changes but an economic recession in Britain in the
1890s caused the British imperialist state to urge more cost-cutting
measures. The call from London provided additional ammunition for
those in Fiji who had felt for some time that the system of native
administration had 'outlived its usefulness' (Samy 1977:44) and
therefore should be dismantled or at the very least pruned back
Another review was therefore conducted in 1912 and again, despite
various changes, the system remained largely intact. In September
1913, however, the secretary of state for the colonies joined the chorus
of criticism within Fiji and asked that consideration be given to a
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possible reduction or abolition of the system and that responsibilities be
devolved to state officials.
A committee appointed to consider the matter agreed that there
should be more decentralization of authority but recommended that the
Native Department be allowed to continue for a while. Nevertheless the
pressure for abolition was strong, particularly within the local white
community whose leading spokesman Henry Scott had this to say:
The continued separate existence of the Native Office is no
longer necessary nor desirable... [it] has had a fair trial and I
do not think that even the adherents to the system of that
department can suggest its administration has been a success.
To my mind efficiency and control is sadly wanting— more
effective local administration in the provinces is what is
required. It would lead to expedition of work instead of as at
present the constant reference to the Native Department in
Suva of minute detail. To perpetuate the present Native
Department and its method of administration would in my
opinion be a grave mistake (quoted in Burns 1963:134,
emphasis added).
The emergent indigenous bureaucratic bourgeoisie saw the writing
on the wall — their interests as a class were coming under increasing
attack. In communicating their concern to the governor, however, they
couched their case not in terms of their threatened class interests but in
terms of a threat to the interests of Fijians as a race. The Roko Tuis of
Tailevu, Cakaudrove and Bau— eastern provinces all— wrote:
We Fijians are the most numerous class in the country and
own the greater part of the land... We do not think it at all
reasonable that we should be considered as of no account or
that our department should be belittled... We feel sure that
were the Department to be abolished we should not receive the
same consideration as we now do... We beg that our
Department be maintained (quoted in Khan 1975:27).
To no avail, however. In the same year the process of
decentralization began and the Legislative Council agreed in principle to
abolish the Native Department. Two years later, in 1917, it was
abolished.
Further reviews and reorganizations of the native administration
followed in the 1920s and 1930s and as power shifted more and more
from Fijian to European officials the fledgling Fijian bureaucratic
bourgeoisie became increasingly agitated:
the Fijian leaders were not at all happy.... There was a feeling
of unrest and anxiety... Fijian chiefs, as Rokos, were
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[previously] treated as senior officers of the Government....
[N]ow the same Rokos became junior officers of the
Government. They were controlled by District Commissioners
and District Officers [and the latter] were, invariably, young
and inexperienced (ibid. :30).
To press their case, the disgruntled chiefs alleged deterioration of
native welfare as a result of neglect by Europeans under whose care
fijians were now being increasingly put (McNaught 1974:5). But the
state did not yield. Costs had to be cut and the axe fell on the chiefs.
The attack on the embryonic Fijian bureaucratic bourgeoisie was
facilitated by the fact that the repressive machinery of the colonial state
was becoming more firmly established. In relation to social control,
therefore, chiefs became rather more dispensable. But their
dispensability was certainly not total. Support of the chiefs, especially
eastern ones, in the suppression of the Viti Kabani movement
demonstrated that very clearly.
But there was another reason for the continuing importance of
chiefly support. Fijians were now taking up paid employment in greater
numbers and many were settling in the urban areas. Chiefly authority
could be useful for controlling urban Fijians. It was clear that the
colonial state still needed chiefs — and the chiefs themselves knew it
Accordingly the struggle for the survival of the nascent Fijian
bureaucratic bourgeoisie did not end and victory came finally with the
formation of the Fijian administration. A further reorganization in 1948
strengthened the autonomy of the Fijian Administration from central
government. A Fijian treasury was introduced to control provincial and
district finances and the Fijian Affairs Board, comprising Fijian
members of the Legislative Council, was established to control
administrative affairs and make regulations (Cole et al. 1985). The
Fijian bureaucratic bourgeoisie had finally ensured its survival and in
the years ahead its chiefly members would be joined in increasing
numbers by commoners, particularly educated ones.
At the apex of the Fijian administration was the Council of Chiefs
but its operating arm was the Fijian Affairs Board. The conservatism of
the board 'reflected its domination by a political elite of chiefs linked as
a multiplex group by kin or affinal ties, and by associations in the
Council of Chiefs and Legislative Council' (Norton 1972:223). Fijian
members of the Legislative Council served as senior bureaucrats in the
Fijian Administration and often also held office in other state
apparatuses. As we shall see below, the Fijian bureaucratic bourgeoisie
was on the rise. No such success resulted from the struggle of the
Indian working classes.
so Beyond the Politics of Race
Indian worker struggles
Indenture began in 1 879 and worker unrest in the sugar industry began
around the mid 1880s. There were strikes on CSR estates at Navuso in
February 1886, at Koronivia in the following May and again in
February 1888, and also at Labasa in April 1907. In April 1887 130
Indian labourers from Nausori marched to Suva 'to complain of being
overworked and underpaid' (Gillion 1962:48-49, 83-89, 155). But it
was not until the early 1920s that the first major struggle was mounted.
During the early 1900s the indenture system came under increasing
attack as the international community became more and more aware of
the inhuman treatment of Indian workers in Fiji. A central figure in the
unfolding drama was CF.Andrews whose untiring efforts served to
focus the spotlight on the intransigence of the CSR. But in terms of
local leadership, it was Manilal Maganlal Doctor who was most
responsible for harnessing the welling resentment of the Indian
labouring classes and giving it political direction.
The Indian lawyer from Mauritius arrived in Fiji in 1912 with
something of a record of concern for Indian rights. His first five years
in Fiji were spent providing legal assistance to Indians and occasionally
writing against indenture. But from 1916 onwards he threw himself
much more vigorously into the cause, concentrating his activity in the
southeastern corner of Viti Levu. He had a leading role in the formation
of the Indian Imperial Association of Fiji and he convened numerous
meetings during which Indian grievances were discussed and action
planned.
At a meeting in Suva in December 1919 a set of demands was
drawn up for presentation to the colonial state. It included calls for an
end to indenture and for an equal political franchise for everybody,
Indians included. By the time Indian labourers in the Suva Public
Works Department struck on 15 January in the following year, political
awareness among Indians in and around Suva had reached new heights.
The strike had to do with economic issues — low wages, the
twelve-hour working day, rising prices and so on. But capital and the
state saw it as a political and racial conflict. That they specifically
collaborated to suppress it is suggested, for example, by the fact that the
state enlisted the legal aid oftwo of capital's leading spokesmen, Robert
Crompton and Henry M. Scott who later became the CSR's legal
adviser in Fiji.
The strike heightened political awareness not only among the
strikers but throughout the Indian community generally. Indians were
simply stunned by the manner in which the strike was put down —
prosecution, the use of Fijian and European policemen and
reinforcements from Australia and New Zealand, and state manipulation
of Indians who betrayed the workers' cause. All this hammered home
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to the strikers that the task ahead would be a daunting one. This was
further underlined by the treatment meted out to Manilal, the leading
'political agitator'. Invoking one of the earliest pieces of repressive
legislation, the Good Order Ordinance of 1875, the colonial state
banished Manilal from Fiji in 1920.
The strike did not spread to the sugar areas. Poor communication
facilities meant that cooperation between Suva workers and their
counterparts in the canefields was difficult. Consequently, the kind of
political consciousness and organization that developed in Suva did not
surface in the sugar plantations. Nevertheless, trouble was brewing
there.
Retrenchment by the CSR following the 1920 drop in the
international sugar price, together with the increasing restiveness of
Indian workers at low wages, led to a six-month strike in 1921. Led by
Sadhu Bashishth Muni, the strikers presented to the CSR a list of
sixteen demands, most of which had to do with work and living
conditions. But a call was also made for 'the release of those innocent
strikers [of 1920] who are rotting in Suva Goal' (Ali 1980:79).
Of course the CSR branded the strike 'political'. The colonial
state's first response was to appoint a commission to investigate the
workers' grievances but the workers refused to recognize or cooperate
with it and it was eventually withdrawn. However, their victory was
more apparent than real.
As we have already seen, during this period the CSR was reaping
immense profits and at no stage of the dispute did it deny its ability to
pay higher wages (ibid.:%3). Yet it refused to do so and persisted with
the claim that the strike was purely political and racial. By this time the
transition to the smallfarm system was well underway and those who
were most threatened by that development were the white planters.
They were much less able than the CSR to sit out a prolonged strike,
and the more prolonged the strike the more likely they could be
squeezed out of the industry and so leave more room for Indian
smallfarmers. With help from the local press, they pressed the colonial
state to end the strike. But it did not, even though it believed that the
company was the culprit and quite capable of meeting the strikers'
economic demands. What is more, the state was even impressed with
the strikers' peaceful and orderly conduct (ibid.:S2, 95). But the state
refused to end the strike because it 'could not afford to fight the
Company which held the economic wellbeing [sic] of Fiji in its hands'
(ibid. :97).
Non-action by the state eventually resulted in the defeat of the
strikers. The CSR adopted delaying tactics by shifting the burden of
decision-making to its Sydney headquarters. To make matters worse,
three 'reverends' — Amos, Jarvis and Long — collaborated with the
company, secured Fijian scab labour and even dissuaded Fijians from
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supporting the Indian strikers. For their efforts, they were amply
rewarded by the company. As for the strikers, their ability to maintain
pressure weakened considerably. Without resources to sustain the
struggle further, and with no prospect of a favourable settlement in
sight, dejection followed and in August, six months after it began, the
strike ended.
The major significance of the strikes of the early 1920s is that they
brought to the fore for the first time the hidden but fundamental
contradictions of the capitalist-dominated colonial economy. The 1920
strike in particular did so with such clarity and force that capital and the
state had to resort to violence in order to suppress it. But more
importantly, the strikes reinforced the racial mask of class conflict.
Never before had the country seen the direct use of Fijians against
Indians on such a large scale. State and capital feared that Fijian
sympathy for Indian workers might make the upheavals more
generalized. By dissuading Fijians from supporting the strikers and by
ranging Fijian policemen and special constables against them, the ruling
class manipulated the basic antagonistic relationship between capital and
labour so as to make it appear racial. It is no coincidence that around
this time 'the argument began to be heard that European dominance was
necessary to protect the Fijian against the Indians' and that the Deed of
Cession was 'a request for protection, not just by Britain, but by the
European settlers as well' (Gillion 1977:60-61, emphasis added).
A historic process of class realignment had begun. Labour had
mounted the first serious challenge. Capital could not cope by itself.
But neither could its dominance be guaranteed by the state. Henceforth
Fijian support would be vital and to coax Fijians into an alliance, the
carrot (or the stick, depending on how one sees it) was the argument
that they too were being threatened by the advancing Indians.
Persuaded, the chiefly class entered into an alliance which proved to be
capital's salvation. But for those who toiled, the prospect of better times
now looked even dimmer.
The 1930s were a period of relative calm in the sugar industry but
the outbreak of World War II plunged it again into crisis. The main
Allied bases in Fiji were located in northwestern Viti Levu and stationed
there were some 70,000 Allied troops, so it is not surprising that the
economic effects of the war were felt most keenly in this sugar-
dominated regioa
As prices and the cost of sugar production soared, the burden on
farmers weighed progressively heavier, but sugar wage workers also
felt the pinch. In June 1943 600 millworkers in Ba and Lautoka went
on strike in support of demands for higher wages. In July the farmers
struck for a higher cane price. The millworkers got a wage increase but
the cane price was another matter altogether. In the face of the CSR's
refusal to raise the cane price, the farmers offered to sell to the state 'if it
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would, through a price fixing board, be responsible for the payment of
a fair price, but [it] still would not agree to any general formula that
would imply that its intervention had put an end to the existing cane
purchase agreement' (ibid.AM). Instead it appointed the Jenkins
Commission to investigate the dispute. The Commission recommended
against raising the price of cane. Understandably, the farmers rejected
all the findings of the Jenkins Commission. Nevertheless, it was only
the combined effect of two other developments which eventually ended
the strike.
One was an address in January 1944 by Ratu Sukuna to farmers in
Nadi in which he delivered a message from the governor advising them
to return to work. He added a contribution of his own. Failure to return
to work, he threatened, might produce difficulties for renewing their
leases. His threat finally broke the back of the strike and the farmers
returned to the fields.
The other development which caused the strike to end was the bitter
rivalry between the two canegrowers' associations, the Kisan Sangh
and the Maha Sangh. We will look at the details of that rivalry later,
here it suffices to make two points. First, because of the rivalry, the
strike had already begun to crumble before Sukuna made his threat.
Secondly, behind the rivalry lay the machinations of an emergent Indian
commercial bourgeoisie. By putting their interests as capitalists ahead of
the interests of their farmer cousins, they divided the farming
community and opened the way for the strikers' defeat. Indian farmers
were victims of bourgeois Indians.
Defeated, the farmers could only hope that the 1944 Shepard
investigation into the economics of the sugar industry, which had been
proposed late in the previous year, might recommend more favourably
than the Jenkins Commission. They were to be disappointed yet again.
Although their real incomes had clearly fallen, the Shepard Report
recommended that the cane price remain unchanged (Narsey 1979:113).
This sorry defeat of the canefarmers was repeated in 1960 after another
strike. They would have to wait until 1970, when the CSR could no
longer count on a compliant state, to record their first significant
victory.
Caught as they were in the vice-grip of capital, receiving little
support from the colonial state and subjected to the worst forms of
white racism, the vast majority of Indians had to endure enormous pain.
They could do nothing to alleviate their poverty and misery. Nor did the
vast majority of Fijians remain unscathed. True their suffering was not
as deep or as extensive as that of their more unfortunate Indian
counterparts, but they were exploited nonetheless. In short, those who
bore the brunt of colonial capitalism were the labouring classes. It is not
the case that all Fijians and all Indians were badly off; some fared
reasonably well.
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By 1944, class differentiation within the Indian community was
also well advanced. Within the canefarming community, the vast
majority of farmers were small tenant farmers; but there had also
emerged a kulak class of large farmers who hired Indian wage labour,
contracted work to Indian farmers, or simply leased their farms to other
Indians.5 Hence there was much scope for capitalist farmers to exploit
their own kith and kin. And they did, often because the leases of their
tenants were much less secure than those of farmers tenanted to the
CSR. The irony is that some of the leading Indian political figures
belonged to this landlord class. A.D. Patel is one example. In 1947 the
gross rental from one of his leases was four times as high as that of
similar CSR leases (Moynagh 1981:280 note).
While the majority of Indians remained in the sugar industry upon
completion of their indenture contracts, many branched out into other
activities. Some took up wage employment elsewhere while others set
up small businesses, principally in the wholesale and retail trade and in
public transportation. Often those businesses were family concerns but
increasingly they hired wage labour. Of the Indians who came to Fiji as
free immigrants, especially in the early 1920s, many established
themselves as agriculturalists, shopkeepers, artisans and professionals,
notably lawyers. Education was clearly seen by most Indians as crucial
for social advancement. From an early age Indian children were taught,
and imbibed, the virtues of discipline, sacrifice and hard work. Their
academic success paid off as they came increasingly to preponderate in
the civil service and the professions — teaching, medicine, dentistry,
accountancy, law and so on.
As a result of these developments there appeared within the Indian
community a class of small capitalists, a commercial bourgeoisie, and a
professional class. For a long time, however, these bourgeois classes
conducted business primarily within their own racial community.
Consequently, the Indian working classes, particularly the poor farmers
and wage earners, were exploited not only by white capitalists but by
capitalists of their own race as well. And it was precisely this kind of
class conflict within the Indian community which further compromised
the plight of the Indian working masses. Nowhere is that more
poignantly illustrated than in the historic struggle for Indian political
rights.
The process of class differentiation within the Indian community is
discussed more fully in Sutherland (1984: 1 14-1 19).
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Political representation: racialism entrenched
Immediately after cession, the interim governor, Sir Hercules
Robinson, established the Executive Council. Composed entirely of
Europeans, it was a temporary arrangement which ended a year later
when Gordon proclaimed the charter of the colony.
The charter established an Executive and a Legislative Council;
initially the latter consisted of four official and four unofficial nominated
members. Ofthe four unofficial members, three were representatives of
the white planters and European commercial community. But two
aspects of Gordon's administration irked local white capital: the
preservation of Fijian land rights and the unavailability of sufficient
native labour to work European plantations. Moved by that resentment,
they agitated for constitutional reform and demanded an enlarged
Legislative Council which would have both nominated and elected
members. In their own words, that would 'enlarge the powers and
constitutional rights of the white population'.
The upshot of their sustained pressure was the Letters Patent of 21
March 1904 which provided for an expanded legislature consisting of
ten official members, six elected Europeans and two nominated Fijians.
By this time, of course, many indentured workers had completed their
contracts but they were still denied political rights.
Further constitutional reform in 1916 increased the size of the
Legislative Council from eighteen to twenty-one. Now there were
twelve Fijian nominated members and, for the first time, one Indian
nominated member. Such token representation propelled the frustrated
Indians to intensify their campaign for elected representation.
They were assisted by people like Manilal Doctor and the strike of
1920 which further exposed the terrible plight of Fiji Indians. Although
a delegation from India to investigate their condition was promised, it
did not arrive until 1922 because of the machinations of capital and the
state. Early in 1922 the acting governor reported to London that the idea
of an equal franchise for all races was firmly opposed by both Fijian
and European opinion. Later that year, J.J. Ragg, a leading European
hotelier, sought to ensure that Fijian opposition stood firm. He wrote to
a chief and suggested that he
endeavour to permeate the whole of the Fijian race with the
fixed idea that the granting of the franchise and equal status to
the Indians in Fiji would mean the ultimate loss of all their land
and rights, and later their final extinction from the face of the
earth (quoted in Gillion 1977:74).
The threat of Fijian extinction was born not only of Indian demands
for political equality but also of rising Indian numbers. In 191 1 Fijians
accounted for 62 per cent of the total population and Indians 29 per
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cent. By 1936 the figures had changed to 50 per cent and 43 per cent
respectively.6 The gap between the two major races was narrowed
rapidly and by 1946 Indians outnumbered Fijians. Fijian concern about
demographic trends is therefore understandable, but for capital, which
was predominantly European, it provided the perfect cover behind
which to contain labour, which was predominantly Indian. For capital,
then, the strategy was clear — to contain labour, contain the Indians
and reinforce the racial divide.
Nevertheless, mounting internal and external pressure in the 1920s
made it clear that there would have to be some accommodation of Indian
political aspirations. But the burning question concerned the form it
might take. Indian demands for a common electoral roll had
strengthened considerably but the ruling class stoutly resisted. As
Gillion observed:
It was obvious...that with the Indian population increasing in
numbers, education and wealth, and in Fiji's plural society,
where people were likely, for the foreseeable future, to vote
along racial lines, a common roll without reservation of seats
for each race would have led eventually to an Indian majority
in the Legislative Council, and that, of course, is why it was
unacceptable to the other communities (Gillion 1977:139).
So it was that under the constitutional reform of 1929, the system
of communal representation was retained. What is more, Indians were
given just three seats. Understandably, in September 1929, in the
campaign leading up to the elections, the contest for Indian seats was
uneventful and unexceptionable. Not so for European seats.
J.R.Pearson, the Secretary for Indian Affairs, listened to campaign
speeches by Henry Scott and Henry Marks in which they launched
bitter attacks against the Indian community. In his words:
I. . .was amazed at the way racial prejudices were worked upon
and cheers raised from the audience at successive jibes against
the Indians. The general attitude was that Indians were not
wanted except as labourers and small farmers and must be kept
in their place. If they did not like it they could clear out and
make room for a more docile set of plantation workers (quoted
in ibid.A32).
But the fight for a common roll was not yet over. In November
1929 Vishnu Deo moved in the Legislative Council that Indians be
granted a common franchise with the other members of the community.
Of course the motion was overwhelmingly defeated and thereupon the
Bureau of Statistics, Government of Fiji, Current Economic Statistics
January 1973, p.4.
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three newly-elected Indian members resigned their seats in protest. A
similar attempt was repeated unsuccessfully three years later. However,
by then a major rift had developed within the Indian community.
Following the trend in India, Muslims demanded separate
representation. Although the demand was not met, the rift was
effectively exploited by the colonial state to break the back of the
common roll struggle (see Gillion 1977: chapter 7; Ali 1980: chapter 4;
Meller and Anthony 1967:16).
As we have noted, hidden beneath the representational struggle was
the fundamental contradiction between capital and labour. But there
were other secondary contradictions as well. One was the intra-capitalist
rivalry between European and Indian capital, particularly in the
commercial sector. To the former, any political development which
might strengthen the emerging Indian bourgeoisie had to be resisted.
Another secondary contradiction was the antagonism between Indian
capital and Indian labour, a clear expression of that was the growing
indebtedness of Indian workers and farmers to often-unscrupulous
Indian moneylenders. It was common for Indian shopkeepers and
moneylenders to charge up to 60 per cent interest on loans (Moynagh
1981:129). The Indian working classes shared a common political
interest with their bourgeois cousins but were also exploited by them.
Force of circumstance permitted these opposing Indian classes to
join together to fight for the political rights they were all denied. But
that forced alliance severely compromized the class interests of the
Indian masses. The rising Indian bourgeoisie was economically
stronger, better educated and more articulate, so it was no accident that
they monopolized the leading positions in the wider struggle for greater
political rights. But in those positions they, like the ruling state-capital-
chief alliance, defined the struggle as a racial one. The fundamental
contradiction between capital and labour had already assumed a racial
form; the bourgeois Indian leadership made it even more so.
In view of the intense racism against Indians, it is understandable
that Indian leaders saw the political struggle as a racial one. But to
concede this is not to exonerate them entirely. The fact is that they were
not prepared to wage the struggle as one between capital and labour. To
do so would have risked their bourgeois class interests: A.D. and S.B.
Patel were lawyers; B.L. Hiralal Seth a canegrower, Tahir Singh a
'rich' canegrower; Vishnu Deo an accountant and commission agent
who drew much of his business from the Gujerati community;
M.N.Naidu, V.M. Pillay and Sadhu Kuppuswami were merchants, and
GMGopalan and A.D. Sagayam were doctors (Gillion 1977:107, 111,
134).
We do not necessarily question the commitment of these
individuals. The point simply is that they saw the struggle as a racial
one. As members of an emerging bourgeoisie they could not afford to
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redefine it as a class one. The vast majority of Indians belonged to the
working classes and for their leaders to have fought the struggle as a
class one would have required them to commit 'class suicide',
something they were unwilling, perhaps unable, to do. Consequently
their labouring cousins were the larger losers.
To the ruling class, all this was quite immaterial. Indians were
Indians and there was no way that the demand for a common roll would
be agreed to. Although Indian members of the Legislative Council
continued to advocate it, by 1932 the battle had effectively been lost.
In 1936 an attempt was made to revert to a wholly nominated
system of representation and out of the ensuing struggle emerged the
compromise of 1937 which introduced parity of racial representation in
the Council. In addition to sixteen official members, there were 5
members for each of the three major races. For the Europeans and
Indians, three members were to be elected from separate electoral rolls
while the remaining two were to be appointed by the state as unofficial
members. The five Fijian members were to be appointed by the
governor from a list of ten names submitted by the Council of Chiefs.
That arrangement lasted until 1963. In the intervening period the
question of constitutional development was debated periodically but in
die main such debates were variations on old themes:
an unofficial majority, extension of the franchise, the Muslim
demand for a separate elected seat, the combined opposition of
the Europeans and Fijians to changes leading to a common
roll, and their desire to maintain the communal roll system
(Meller and Anthony 1967:16-17).
The relative political quiet after 1937 was shattered by a momentous
debate in the Legislative Council in July 1946. The country was poised
at an historical crossroads. The pressure of the wartime economy was
beginning to lift and recent changes in metropolitan colonial policy
forced important policy changes in Fiji. More importantly, the balance
of class forces in the country had changed significantly. We will
discuss this in greater detail below but essentially the situation was as
follows: sugar capital was still dominant; the chiefly class was much
stronger with the consolidation of the Fijian bureaucratic bourgeoisie,
and labour was now much better organized even though its early battles
had been costly; local white capital, on the other hand, was in a shaky
position and in postwar economic structuring it saw its salvation. In the
next chapter we examine the way it sought to engineer a process of
economic reorganization towards the development of that industry in
which it saw its future to lie— tourism.
An integral part of that wider strategy was the debate of July 1946.
The ruling class had been troubled by labour and labour was
predominantly Indian. With the economy now entering a new phase,
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local white capital sensed that the time was ripe to reaffirm the capitalist
path, consolidate the hegemony of the ruling class, and put the Indians
in their place — yet again. Such an ideological offensive could only
help local white capital's quest to shore up its flagging position.

Chapter 4
Postwar Reorganization: Preparing for the
Neocolonial Economy
The immediate causes of the pivotal Legislative Council debate can be
traced to the 1943 canefarmers' strike which had been branded by the
chiefly elite 'a stab in the back'. When the call went out for men to
enlist for military service, Indians were not very forthcoming. Their
reluctance, however, was perfectly understandable, consumed as they
were with the daily struggle for a decent standard of living, especially
in the face of high wartime inflation. In any case, why should they
want to fight for the British ruling class which was partly responsible
for their material hardships? Also, it was quite reasonable that they
should be indignant that they would not be paid the same as Europeans
if they did choose to enlist.
But the ruling class saw things differently and the Indian
contribution to the war effort came in for criticism, not least from Fijian
leaders. Fijians were praised for their patriotism while Indians were
condemned for their 'disloyalty'. Moreover, their activities during the
1943 strike were seen as positively selfish and unhelpful. During the
Legislative Council debate on the strike, for example, two leading
chiefs, Ratu Sukuna and Ratu E. Cakobau, accused Indians of trying to
hold the country to ransom and offered Fijian scab labour to cut the
cane if the state undertook to buy it (Gillion 1977:184-185).
However reasonable Indian objections to military service might
have been, European and Fijian leaders saw only that they were not
prepared to fight. Their patriotism and courage were therefore suspect,
and their case for equal political rights further undermined. Mayer
(1973:70-71) described the situation in this way: '[in terms of the
political realities], equal citizenship... called for equal sacrifice'. In a
sense he was right but what he did not say was that the view he
expressed was part of a ruling ideology which was totally blind to the
enormous sacrifices which Indians had made since 1879 — and, what
is more, were simply expected to continue to make. For the racists or
members of the ruling class it was perfectly consistent that Indians be
exploited in the canefields. That had nothing to do with political
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obligation. For all the misery they suffered, Indians still had an
obligation to fight alongside and in defence of their oppressors!
The resulting legacy of mistrust and hostility was something which
Indians could not help. Had they been more formcoming when the call
for enlistment went out, their struggle for political equality might have
been successful. But it is difficult to see how, after years of intense
anti-Indian feeling, matters could have suddenly improved. Also, had
they fought, it would probably have been the lives of Indian workers
rather than Indian capitalists mat would have been sacrificed. And on
return, the survivors would have simply gone back to the canefields
and, as usual, made even more sacrifices for the economy. Critics may
say that this is pure speculation but the harsh realities of the Indians'
past experience lend it a great deal of support.
In any event, racist feelings against the Indian community were
strengthened considerably during the war and were given vehement
expression by representatives of the ruling class in the Legislative
Council in July 1946. That historic debate also served as an occasion
not only to reaffirm the virtues of capitalism but also to shore up the
flagging position of the weakest fraction of the ruling class at that time,
local white capital.
Catharsis in the chamber: Indian is bad, capitalism is
good
On 16 July 1946, A.A.Ragg, European member for the Southern
Division and a member of a prominent hotelling family, tabled a motion
which triggered a debate of enormous significance but about which
little is known.1 His motion read:
That in the opinion of this Council the time has arrived — in
view of the great increase in the non-Fijian inhabitants and its
consequential political development— to emphasise the terms
of the Deed of Cession to assure that the interests of the Fijian
race are safeguarded and a guarantee given that Fiji is to be
preserved and kept as a Fijian country for all time.2
The debate is discussed briefly in Gillion (1977:195-197) and in Norton
(1972:93-97).
Fiji Legislative Council Debates, 1946, p. 163. (Henceforth the
Legislative Council Debates will be refen'ed to as Legco).
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As he spoke to the motion, the underlying racist motives became
more and more evident; the whole thrust of his delivery was directed
against the Indians.
Although highly provocative and inflammatory, his speech was a
success because the European member was able to play upon
understandable Fijian concern about their political and economic
position. But lest he be branded a racist, Ragg was quick to make the
point that his representations were not due to any desire to belittle the
Indians; as he went on to say, he did not have an axe to grind. But that
pathetic attempt to soften the impact of his attack was unconvincing. In
fact, he anticipated that the Indian members of the council would take
strong exception to his views — which they did. Vishnu Deo in
particular responded very strongly and his suspicions about the real
motives of the motion were not wide of the mark, as we shall see
presently.
Ragg's broadside against the Indians represented nothing less than
a assault motivated by a desire to consolidate the historically-forged
alliance between white capital, the colonial state, the chiefs and the
newly-emergent Fijian bureaucratic bourgeoisie. The justification for
the attack took the form, first, of invoking the supposed commitment of
the Deed of Cession to the paramountcy of Fijian interests and,
secondly, reiterating the point mat the Fijian race was still locked in a
political, social and economic backwater. These arguments provided for
Ragg a point of departure which was unchallengeable and set the stage
for an anti-Indian offensive and the glorification of the ruling alliance of
which he was a part
The Indians, he argued, were introduced to assist in the commercial
development of the colony but that, he went on, was 'mostly at the
expense of the Europeans'. No mention was made of the immense
profits which European capital derived from Indian labour. Then came
the claim mat the 'aliens' had 'been granted equality in the political field
with Europeans' and that they enjoyed 'complete freedom of action and
enterprise throughout the colony' (sic). Yet in spite of that, they
displayed singular ingratitude and audacity: 'their contribution to the
war effort was lamentable' and they even attempted to use the war as a
bargaining instrument to further their (political) demands 170).
But perhaps most importantly, Ragg continued, Indians had 'no
responsibility under the Deed of Cession'. In the end that was the
crucial argument. What the debate was all about was the need to
implement both the letter and the spirit of that hallowed document And
in that task, Europeans had a major part but the Indians none at all.
Hence, on the basis of that obligation, Europeans could claim a
legitimate right to remain in the country. They were, as Ragg put it,
'co-trustees with the Imperial Government in the Deed of Cession in the
care that should be given to the native race'. To ensure that the point
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would not be missed, he again reminded the chamber that 'the duty of
trusteeship devolves upon Europeans and in this duty the Indians have
no part'.
But what of Fijians? The original owners of the land, Ragg noted,
'had placed their fate fully and freely (sic) in the hands of the British
Crown' and had always displayed unstinting loyalty to it. It was
necessary therefore to tike steps to protect them from the Indian threat
and beyond that to secure their overall advancement. But, he added,
there were obstacles within Fijian society itself: the Fijian communal
system; its institutionalized form, the Fijian administration; and, of
course, the Fijian's lack of 'character'. On the last matter, Ragg's
words speak for themselves:
...character is just what the natives have not. We who work
for and among them know, too painfully, how deficient in all
manly qualities they are. Courage, honour, firmness, pure
ambition, truthfulness, unselfishness — these and kindred
qualities are all too rare....they mean well, but being deficient
in character they are weak and the victims of circumstances
(ibid.).
That such open affrontery passed unchallenged testifies to the
dominance of white capital within the ruling class. Ragg slighted the
Fijian communal system and the Fijian Administration and he heaped
scorn on Fijians for their 'lack of character'. And this after they had so
recently displayed selfless courage in the field of battle. Yet not a single
Fijian member of the council rose to defend his people against the
disparaging and utterly racist remarks that had been meted out with
such arrogance and disdain.
Ragg was a master of manipulation. Behind his anti-Fijian remarks
lurked a much larger design— the containment of class pressure by
deepening racial antagonism. And his Machiavellian artistry is
demonstrated by the way he likened the Fijian 'communal' system to
'socialism and communism'. That was truly a masterstroke because it
allowed him to exploit to great advantage the deep ideological bias
against communism which permeated every level of Fijian society. The
comparison served both as a rationalization for his attack on indigenous
society and as a springboard from which to launch his case about the
superiority of capitalism. His grasp of the particularities of Fiji politics
was oustanding. So too the dexterity and finesse with which he
manipulated them for political gain.
Realizing that political consciousness among the Indian labouring
classes was on the increase, he could not afford to appear too blatant a
spokesman for white capital. His case for the superiority and
desirability of capitalism could not take the form of open praise. A
cover was needed and the perfect one was provided by the church.
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Consequently he set about applauding the policy of the Wesleyan
Mission in Fiji which, he said, had been 'to promote individualism
among the natives'. His target audience, of course, was the Fijians and
knowing full well that they were predominantly Methodist he sent out
the message that if the church was promoting individualism, then surely
it must be a good thing.
Having lambasted Indians for their greed, ingratitude and political
precociousness, berated Fijians for their personal deficiencies and
backward form of social organization, and castigated the colonial state
for persisting with policies which obstructed the development of
individualism among Fijians, the stage was now set to present the
European as the saviour. The pace of indigenous development had been
hindered by the sorts of factors he had just outlined and because Fijians
were not yet able to stand on their own feet the continued support and
guiding hand of the white man, Ragg intimated, was clearly essential.
Moreover, Ragg was convinced, it was only the white man who could
provide the necessary support. The Europeans, after all, had made the
greatest contribution to the country over the last 150 years.
[Europeans] colonised and transformed Fiji from a barbarous
country into a civilised one; they instituted a stable
government; they are responsible for the economic
development of the Colony. They gave their best in the two
wars; they have been the mainstay of Government during
times of internal trouble (ibid.).
Ragg's strategy worked perfectly. With the enticement of Fijian
support as his major objective, he juxtaposed Fijian deficiency and
Indian evil with European benevolence, valour and virtue. At root, he
argued, the problem was an Indian one and Fijian salvation depended
critically on European support. In other words, the fundamental
contradiction confronting Fiji was racial and not class. At the level of
appearance, of course, it was a fairly accurate picture of Fiji society and
was well received by various European, and more importantly Fijian,
members of the Council. To be sure, the argument Ragg advanced had
been prevalent in Fiji for a long time but the significance of his delivery
lies in the fact that he successfully reinforced it at a crucial historical
juncture.
The country was at a turning point: the balance of class forces had
changed significantly, and largely to the disadvantage of local white
capital. As the ruling class set about making the transition to a
peacetime economy, there was much discussion about the best way
forward. Also, because self-government for the colonies had recently
been proclaimed as policy by the newly-elected Labour government in
Britain, the country's constitutional status was thrust back onto the
political agenda.
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The confluence of these events, set against a historical background
of political agitation by Indians and, more importantly, the struggles
waged against capital by the Indian labouring classes, had opened up a
threat, however slight, to the ruling class, but more particularly to local
white capital. The latter, as we shall see, was greatly concerned at being
electorally swamped by Indians and part-Europeans. Ragg had stated
that his motion to the council was put forward in view of the great
increase in the 'non-Fijian' inhabitants and its consequential 'political'
development. The adjective non-Fijian was clearly intended as a
camouflage. Fortunately, however, in the ensuing debate, that
smokescreen was penetrated and the underlying motives exposed.
Essentially, then, Ragg's initiative in the council represented a
marshalling of forces, an attempt to consolidate the interests he
represented. He recognized very clearly that the most effective way to
defend those interests was to exploit racial antagonisms. His strategy
was a shining example of ideological manipulation. By equating things
European, and to a lesser extent Fijian, with good and things Indian
with evil, he reinforced the whole ideology of racialism. Here was the
politics of race at work and the only question that had yet to be settled
was the tactical one about how the supposed Indian threat should be
dealt with. Concrete measures had to be found to contain the Indian
ogre but who was to lead the way in that highly sensitive task? The way
that Ragg tackled that question showed him up as the shrewd political
calculator that he was.
Ragg was of course concerned that Europeans avoid as much as
possible situations where they might lay themselves open to charges of
racism. For them to take the initiative, therefore, was politically risky.
Hence he sought to shift the burden onto other shoulders. In fact the
groundwork had already been laid: he had projected the image of the
European as the guardian of native interests and therefore duty-bound
to raise the alarm about Indian domination. All that now remained was
to plant the idea that responsibility for taking concrete initiatives to deal
with the threat rested in other quarters. Once taken, of course, the
Europeans would follow.
Fijian initiative was what he sought but if similar action were to be
taken by the colonial state then so much the better. He appealed to
Fijian leaders to 'go out among their people and awaken them to the
reality of the situation'. He then turned to the governor and urged him
to rise up against the common foe:
Take up the cudgels for the Fijian people who have so loyally
done their duty to the King and Empire and you will erect in
the minds of a grateful and increasing Fijian people a
monument more lasting than brass and, you, Sir, they will
remember always as their saviour and their friend (jbid:\lT).
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Stirring stuff indeed, and although his original motion was
eventually amended to appear innocuous, there can be no doubt that the
spokesman for white capital had scored a major victory.
The First Native Member, Ratu G. Tuisawau, seconded Ragg's
motion and hot on his heels came the Third Native Member, Ratu T.
Vuiyasawa, who said:
This motion as it stands concerns the future well-being of my
people, who are likely to be overwhelmed or swamped by this
Colossus of Indian domination in this Colony. This
problem...must be solved before it is too late...I support the
motion (ibid.).
Ratu G. Toganivalu began his contribution to the debate by saying
that he would be failing in his duty if he did not support the motion.
Ratu E. Mataitini echoed the sentiments of his Fijian colleagues but, in
addition, lavished Ragg with praise:
I support this motion because to my knowledge it is the first
time for many years that someone has had the courage to table
and speak on a motion of this kind (ibid.: 178).
With such solid backing from the Fijian members, and also from
European members like W.GJohnson and H.B.Gibson, victory could
hardly have eluded Ragg. Johnson captured the thrust of the arguments
which came from the representatives of local white capital:
...the European people and the Fijian people see today fairly
clearly that within the space of a few years it is inevitable that
the Indian people will have a vast numerical superiority and
that the time may come when they will try to take power unto
themselves in this Colony, and then we will be faced with the
unhappy state of affairs that is occurring in Palestine today
(ibid.:l15).
He went on:
[The Europeans'] association with the Fijians in the past is one
which has been almost completely acceptable to the Fijians and
the Fijians have never regretted that association created in
1874; and if they could turn back time and have the
opportunity of re-considering their position they would not do
otherwise than follow in the same footsteps that their
forefathers took then (ibid.).
The 'ever-present fear' of 'eventual Indian domination' had a
demographic basis. During the debate, Ragg put the Fijian and Indian
populations at 119,000 and 130,000 respectively, a difference of
14,000. But according to the latest estimates, which in fact had been
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tabled before the council only a week before, the figures as at December
1945 were 115,724 and 117,256 respectively, a difference of only
1,500. Despite the fact that Ragg clearly exaggerated the difference, the
point remained that Indians had outstripped Fijians. Moreover, the
population growth rate for Fijians was much lower than that of Indians.
That being so, Ragg was well-placed to mount his attack. What, then,
of the counter-offensive?
The blatantly racist character of Ragg's assault did provoke a
defence of sorts from a few European members of the Council but it is
significant that those who spoke out were all expatriates, not locals.
The Commissioner of Labour, for example, had this to say of the
Indians:
[They] are a frugal, thrifty, industrious people who can be
called the very sinews of our economy. The Fijians owe much
of their advancement and security to the material wealth that is
derived from the efforts of other races of the colony
(/Wd.:197).
The acting secretary for Fijian Affairs concurred:
...it is a self-evident fact that the progress which the colony
has made since Cession would not have been possible if the
Indians had not been brought in to satisfy the cry of the
plantation owners for more and more labour, and if the present
Indian population were suddenly to vanish...our prosperity
would burst like a pricked bubble and we should leave the
Fijians in no better state than that in which we found them
(ibid;.m).
And as for Ragg's basic argument that the major problem facing the
country was the increasing Indian population, the acting director of
Medical Services believed it quite mistaken. The problem was not the
racial aspect of the population increase but simply the increase in overall
numbers:
the major problem facing Fiji at the present time is not a
different composition of one component in numbers as
opposed to other racial components of the population. It is not
that at all. It is the absolute increase of the population,
whatever its racial composition (ibid.: 183).
That these arguments seem to have carried some weight is
suggested by the fact that the original motion was eventually amended.
In particular, the offending reference to the political consequences of
the increase in the non-Fijian population was deleted. In its amended
form, the motion now read:
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That in the opinion of this Council the time has arrived to
emphasise the terms of the Deed of Cession to ensure that the
interests of the Fijian race are safeguarded (ibid:2l4).
What about the response from Indian members? K.B.Singh
described Ragg's motion as 'mischievous' and asked why the state did
not care to take action against Ragg under the Sedition Ordinance for
'setting one section of the community against another'. The Indians, he
went on to say, had not in the past interfered with the rights of the
Fijian people and he claimed that it was not the Indian but the European
community who had 'kept the Fijian down'. To back that up, he
pointed to European monopoly of freehold land and white racism in the
colonial civil service.
Similar sorts of arguments were later made by B.M. Gyneshwar,
A.R. Sahu Khan, A.D. Patel, and Vishnu Deo. Without exception,
however, they all employed racial categories. K.B. Singh, for example,
spoke of 'European' capital, 'Indian' labour and 'Fijian' land;
A.D.Patel made reference to 'Fijians' spending their money in
'European' or 'Chinese' concerns; and Vishnu Deo spoke of
'European' vested interests. Here were representatives of a people who
were exploited first and foremost by capital and yet they persisted with
racialist perceptions. A major reason for that, as we suggested earlier,
is that they were themselves bourgeois and, therefore, would not
jeopardize their own interests by adopting a class perspective. For
them, Ragg's attack was simply an instance of racial prejudice, nothing
more. The pervasiveness of racialist thinking was here given its finest
expression.
Not once during the entire debate was reference made to the
activities of the CSR, Burns Philip Limited, Morris Hedstrom Limited,
the Emperor Gold Mines or any other capitalist enterprise. But there
was one allusion to capital. KB. Singh claimed that Europeans were
fearful of 'Indians who have come to a state where they are competing
with European merchants'. That was a most telling statement
Of all the fractions of capital to lash out at, why did he single out
the European merchants? Precisely because it was with white
commercial capital that the emerging Indian commercial bourgeoisie
was in greatest competition. What is more, the connections between the
latter and Indian council members were close. Patel was a Gujerati
lawyer with strong ties with the Gujerati commercial community.
Vishnu Deo was an accountant. K.B. Singh belonged to the Arya
Samaj. And Sahu Khan was an Ahmadiyya. (The Arya Samaj and the
Ahmadiyya are the unorthodox sects of the Hindu and Muslim
communities respectively, and prominent in the leadership of each were
wealthy individuals.)
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With those sorts of connections, therefore, it was never likely that
the Indian members would pursue the matter of capitalist exploitation of
the Indian working classes too far. To have done so would have meant
running the risk of compromising not only their own interests but also
those of Indian capitalists to whom they were connected. It was
perfectly acceptable to point to the racial aspect of intra-capitalist
rivalries but to expose the exploitative side of capitalists generally
would be highly detrimental.
It is not surprising, therefore, that the whole thrust of the Indian
counter-offensive was that Ragg's attack was basically an assault on
Indians as a race. Ragg adopted a racialist approach; they responded in
like manner. Clearly, all the fractions of capital shared a common
interest in maintaining a racial definition of politics.
There is one final but crucial aspect ofthe Indian counter-offensive.
Vishnu Deo, who spearheaded the Indian response, argued that the real
reason behind Ragg's motion was to settle the question of the electoral
system. That was an issue on which the Indian members could speak
with some authority; they had fought a long battle over it. But more
significantly, it was an issue which did not pose a fundamental threat to
Indian bourgeois interests.
In 1943 Alport Barker proposed that municipal corporations be
constituted through an elective system and in August of that year a
Select Committee consisting of four Europeans (including Barker as
chairman) and Vishnu Deo investigated the proposal. The committee's
report was submitted to the governor in the following October but was
not tabled before the council until the following year.3 The major
recommendation was that there should be a common electoral roll for
municipal elections, and in May 1946 the European Electors
Association issued a memorandum headed 'Common Roll Principle
Adopted in Municipal Bill'. However, when the governor opened the
July 1946 session of the council, he made this statement:
In the light of comments received and after further careful
consideration of the matter, it has been decided not to proceed
with the Bill as published in draft, for...it is not proposed to
have a common roll, but instead, the communal roll system
(Legco 1946:172).
To the Indian members, this smacked of collusion between the
colonial state and the white community. But why the change of heart?
The immediate reason, as Deo pointed out, was that on the basis of the
franchise qualifications set out in the majority report of the Select
Constitution of the Suva Town Board: Report of a Select Committee,
Suva, Legislative Council Paper No 13 of 1946.
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Committee, Europeans would probably dominate the Suva Municipal
Council but not the Lautoka one. This was a situation they wished to
avoid— after all, Lautoka was in the major sugar region. But there was
another reason.
The day before the debate, the Fiji Times and Herald carried a
report on the colonial debate in the House of Commons during which
the secretary of state for the colonies, Mr George Hall, outlined the
newly-elected Labour government's colonial policy:
. . .it is our policy to develop the colonies and all their resources
in such as way as to enable their people speedily and
substantially to improve their social and economic conditions
and as soon as may be practicable to attain responsible self-
government (Fiji Times 15 July 1946).
With self-government for the colonies now on the political agenda,
the question of the electoral system took on renewed urgency. Pressure
could now be applied from London for Fiji to adopt the British electoral
system based on a common roll. The prospect of such pressure being
exerted was heightened by the fact that the Labour government openly
professed its socialist leanings.
The governor' s reaffirmation of the system of communal rolls on
12 July 1946 was therefore very welcome but there was still a degree of
uncertainty. With an election due in the following year, Ragg called
upon the Labour government to make an 'unequivocal statement' of its
intentions (Legco 1946:172). The numerically superior Indians had to
be kept at bay and support from London would help. But then came the
crunch.
According to Vishnu Deo, even with the communal electoral
system, there was no guarantee of European electoral success — and
the Europeans realized it Why? Because they could no longer count on
the unquestioning loyalty of part-Europeans:
...the European members...fear the part-Europeans. The part-
Europeans are organising themselves...They know what
benefits or advantages they have received from the members
they have so far been electing. They know also that the
members so far elected...seek to enfranchise civil servants.
Why? Because they fear that the part-Europeans will not have
that confidence in them and they will not be returned unless
they counterbalance the half-caste votes with the European
votes in the Civil Service (ibid.:l90).
The population census in October 1946 put the European and part-
European populations at 4,594 and 6,129 respectively, so Deo was
correct— even with the communal system of representation, European
political power could no longer be guaranteed. For Deo, therefore, the
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whole purpose of Ragg's motion was to whip up anti-Indian sentiment
and to project the image of the European as the defender of both the
Fijian and the national interest. In that way, continued part-European
electoral support might be secured; after all, part-Europeans had blood
ties with the Fijians.
Despite the defeat of the common roll struggle in the early 1930s,
the representatives of local white capital had been willing to test it out.
But as soon as it became evident that their interests would suffer under
that system, they retreated and immediately sought to justify and
entrench its opposite, the system of communal rolls. That was a very
crucial development because it meant that any future attempts to
resurrect the call for a common roll — and there were some— would
not have much chance of success.
The debate of July 1946, then, was essentially a response by
fractions of the ruling class to underlying class tensions which were
greatly aggravated by the racial aspects of demographic change and the
impact of World War II. Changes in metropolitan colonial policy
threatened to worsen those tensions even more.
Within the ruling class, the position of local white capital was the
most shaky. Masters of the politics of race, the representatives of local
white capital engineered the debate to defend their class interests by
playing on the Achilles heel of the class struggle in Fiji, its racial form.
Ably led by Ragg, they played on the threat of Indian political
domination with devastating effectiveness and their victory on the
common roll issue cemented the racialist rules of the electoral game.
The Indian political leaders played right into their hands because
they too regarded the struggle in racial terms. In so doing they
safeguarded their own class interests and those of other bourgeois
Indians. Of course, the ultimate losers were the vast majority of those
they supposedly represented — the Indian working classes. Severely
disadvantaged by a political system which saw them as Indians rather
than workers, they were compromised even more by a bourgeois
leadership which was unwilling to represent them as labouring people.
In sum, the catharsis of July 1946 strongly reinforced the ideology
and politics of race. At the same time it reaffirmed the capitalist
development path and, very importantly, helped to shore up the
uncertain position of local white capital. The way was now clear for
that fraction of the ruling class to consolidate its position even more. A
major process of restructuring to lay the foundations of a neocolonial
economy was about to occur. Local white capital was intent on steering
the course of events towards the development of that sector which they
thought had the greatest potential for them— the tourist industry. State
planning would soon be introduced for the first time and in that they
saw the key to their strategy.
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Restructuring towards tourism
In a major departure from the earlier principle that its colonies should
be self-sufficient, Britain announced in February 1940 that it would
now assume a more direct responsibility for colonial development and
it passed the Colonial Development and Welfare Act. To facilitate
development projects, imperial funds would now be made available on
a much more extensive scale, but in order to qualify for assistance
under the act, colonies were required to submit development plans.
That set the scene for state planning in Fiji and local white capital
intervened in the planning process to strengthen the industry in which it
thought its future lay — tourism. Here was the chance they were
looking for to restructure the economy. The foundations of the second
pillar of Fiji's neocolonial economy had been laid some decades earlier
but it would soon be galvanized.
By the early 1920s a few local Europeans were well-established in
the hotel business. Although relatively small, the tourist traffic was
steady and hoteliers felt a need for more coordination and planning.
Accordingly, in May 1923 the White Settlement League, an
organization dominated by Suva businessmen, formed the Suva Tourist
Board which in 1925 was renamed the Fiji Publicity Board and Tourist
Bureau.
It was the first organized attempt at constituting a tourist industry in
Fiji. Foreign capital had a significant interest in the nascent industry but
the burden of ensuring its early survival fell largely on local tourist
capital. The early years were hard. Persistent requests to the colonial
state for financial assistance yielded little. For the state, tourism was
simply not a priority area and it continually resisted pleas for increased
funding. The continuing tussle, which subsided during the war,
intensified in the late 1940s. By then, tourist capital's fortunes had
begun to change for the better.
It was common knowledge in business circles that the Colonial
Welfare and Development Act of 1940 was intended primarily to
provide assistance towards capital schemes, and for local tourist capital
that was crucial. Direct state assistance to the fledgling tourist industry
might still be low but at least the state could now be pressured into
providing the improved infrastructure that would be necessary if
tourism was to grow. What better way to achieve that than to intervene
directly in state planning.
In May 1944 the governor appointed the Postwar Planning and
Development Committee to make recommendations about the future
direction of the country. Included in the committee were H.H.Ragg,
W.GJohnson, and A. Barker (who was chairman of the Suva Town
Board and a director of the Fiji Times). The committee's report was
74 Beyond the Politics of Race
submitted to London in October 1946 and was rejected for its excessive
emphasis on social services. After a critical review it was resubmitted
only to be rejected again in February 1948. London then called for a
new plan to follow several specific guidelines, one of which was an
emphasis on projects of 'definite economic value'.
For that task, a Development Revision Committee was formed. It
was larger than its predecessor and, significantly, local European
representation was increased from three to five. Submitted in
November 1949, the committee's report was accepted. It conformed to
the guidelines laid down and, in particular, as Table 4.1 shows, to
'productive projects'.
Although the authors of the report noted that Fiji's wealth lay in
agriculture, they paid little attention to the country's two major crops,
sugar and coconut They justified that on the grounds that both were
doing well and therefore did not require assistance. Sugar and copra
prices were high at the time but the main beneficiaries were the CSR
and the few local Europeans who owned large coconut plantations. The
plight of the working classes which actually produced the crops
mattered little to the committee. So rather than setting funds aside to
improve the lot of those who produced the country's wealth, the
committee chose to divert state funds to other schemes.
Table 4.1: Planned Sectoral Allocations: 1945 and 1949
1945 1949
(%) (%)
Production and development of
natural resources (economic schemes) 12 36.05
Social services 59 25.35
Communications and general 29 34.25
Reserve - 4.35
100 100.00
Sources: Report ofthe Development Revision Committee 1949, p.5;
Report ofthe Economic Review Committee 1953, p.2.
The two largest allocations included under the heading 'Production
and development of natural resources' were for feeder roads
(£455,000) and the proposed Navua hydroelectric scheme (£566,000).
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These are clearly infrastructural expenditures and should therefore have
been included under 'Communications and general'. If we reclassify
those two items, then the allocations in Table 4. 1 look quite different A
comparison of the two sets of figures appears in Table 4.2
Table 4.2 Original and Reclassified Development Plan
Allocations 1949 (%)
Original Reclassified
Production and development of
natural resources
Social Services
Communications and general
Reserve
Total
36.05 12.02
25.35 25.35
34.25 58.28
4.35 4.35
100.00 100.00
The reclassified figures clearly show that the committee's
statements about agriculture were not matched by any real commitment
to improve the material circumstances of the vast majority of the
labouring masses in that sector. A clue to the real thinking behind the
report is its statement that 'many private enterprises in the colony had
ambitions for expansion' (Report of the Economic Review Committee
1953:10). The influence of representatives of local white capital —
H.E.Snell, W.Gatward, A.A.Ragg and P.Costello— was beginning to
have impact. Without an adequate infrastructure, local white capital's
ambitious plans would be frustrated. Consequently, fully 58 per cent of
all planned allocations were set aside for such infrastructural projects as
a hydroelectric scheme, an international airport, roading, port facilities
and the upgrading of the country's main telephone exchange. The push
was on but for what specifically?
The committee did make recommendations for the establishment of
'secondary industries'. Industrial expansion, it argued, was generally a
function of agricultural growth but agriculture was still at a stage where
there was little or no opportunity for further industrial development.
However, if the situation changed it was 'expected that private
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enterprise would take advantage of the circumstances'A Why private
enterprise? Because 'government, by the nature of its organisation, is
not fitted to take direct part in industrial undertakings' (ibid.). On the
other hand, private capital could not be 'driven' into industry; it could
only be 'attracted': 'our duty is to advise how conditions can be created
which will attract private capital' (ibid.).
Advise it did, and fortuitously in the one area local white capital
pinned all its hopes:
The tourist industry is one which can be of considerable
economic value to the Colony...We understand that the [Fiji
Visitors Bureau] has been asked to place before Government
specific proposals for increasing this industry, and we
consider that Government should consider ways and means of
assisting the industry (without necessarily taking part),
particularly in questions of finance (ibid.:l4).
The future of the country, the report argued, would rest in large
part on a tourist industry controlled by private capital. Hence the push
by local capital paid off and the colonial state endorsed the importance
of tourism and its 'great future'. Ironically, developments over the next
few years show that the 'great future' would belong not to local white
capital but to foreign capital.
A hurricane in 1952 and an earthquake in 1953 caused extensive
damage to tourist establishments. Local capital had been concerned for
a long time to obtain more hotel accommodation; the natural disasters
simply heightened the urgency. But requests for state finance were
continually turned down Private attempts were made to attract foreign
capital instead but again without success. Consequently in 1956 the
matter was resubmitted to the colonial state. In that year the Fiji
Publicity Bureau became the Fiji Visitors Bureau (FVB) and its
chairman, W.G.Johnson, sought and received state help to seek
financial assistance from the Commonwealth Development
Corporation. Yet by the end of 1957 nothing had materialized; even the
FVB's own attempts to secure foreign capital produced nothing.
Two points were abundantly clear: foreign capital would be
necessary for the development of tourism; and conditions in Fiji were
not yet sufficiently attractive to draw in that much-needed capital.
Incentives therefore had to be provided. Even the governor admitted
that 'there is a need for some positive stimulus to investment' (Legco
1957:188). Heartened, the FVB made submissions to the colonial state
Report of the Economic Review Committee, Legislative Council Paper
No 12 of 1953, p.6.
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about the kinds of incentives it preferred and in December 1958 the
Legislative Council debated the Hotels Aid Bill.
However, the bill was unacceptable to local white capital because
its minimum levels of expenditure to qualify for state concessions were
too high. The Financial Secretary explained:
What we need urgently is something really big, a major step
forward in hotel accommodation...and we believe that the
figures we have put into the Bill will be required (Legco
1958:592).
The colonial state was clearly intent upon a scale of expansion
which only foreign capital could undertake, and if foreign capital was to
be enticed, then competition from local capital would have to be kept to
a minimum. To ensure that, concessions would be made more
accessible to foreign than to local capital. The colonial state's bias
towards foreign capital, already evident in the sugar industry, was now
beginning to show in relation to tourism.
The reaction from local capital was immediate and strong.
Representatives like H.B.Gibson argued, correctly, that the bill
discriminated against local entrepreneurs and cautioned about the
danger of a tourist industry monopolized 'by just a few'. The state
relented and lowered the minimum expenditure levels. The amended bill
was passed as the Hotel Aid Ordinance of 1958. Two years later the
levels were reduced further with the passage of the Hotel Aid
(Amendment) Ordinance of 1960.
This second success owed much to the support given local capital
by the Burns Commission. On the matter of direct financial state
assistance for hotel expansion the Commission did not suggest
preferential treatment for local capital. Nevertheless, it saw no reason
why applications could not be made to the Agricultural and Industrial
Loans Board 'which would judge the merits of any individual proposal
for loan finance for hotels against proposals from other industries'5 Its
advice was heeded by local capital, for as we shall note later, in the
1960s and early 1970s by far the largest loans given by the Board were
for tourism projects.
The Burns Commission's recommendations on other facets of the
tourist industry are also important because they formed the basis of
subsequent state policy: the upgrading and tarsealing of the Suva-Nadi
road, liberalizing licensing laws, declaring Nadi and Suva duty-free
Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Natural Resources and
Population Trends of the Colony of Fiji (Burns Report), Suva,
Legislative Council Paper No 1 of 1960, p. 103.
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ports, improving passenger facilities in and around Nadi airport and the
Suva wharf, and raising the state subsidy to the Fiji Visitors Bureau.
Local white capital welcomed the 1960 ordinance and the
recommendations of the Burns Commission and continued to harbour
hopes of dominating the industry it had so assiduously sought to
cultivate. But the dream was soon shattered. 'With the capitalist postwar
boom came a sharp increase in international tourism and the growing
Fiji tourist industry soon attracted international capital.
The Fiji Visitors Bureau had been a member of the Pacific Area
Travel Association (PATA) since 1951. In 1958, in conjunction with
the United States Department of Commerce, PATA commissioned the
services of an American firm, Checchi and Company, to undertake a
survey of the tourism potential in the Pacific and Far East regions.
Concluding that tourism in those regions was far below its potential,
the Checchi Report called for a quadrupling of tourism between 1958
and 1968. For international capital, it was a vital signal and,
pertinently, the report painted a glowing picture of Fiji's tourist
potential and specifically recommended that 'money [be] pumped into
the Fijian economy from outside'.6
Later we shall see that the report's glowing prognosis about the
future of tourism in Fiji could in fact have been much brighter. As it
turned out, the performance of the Fiji tourist industry greatly
surpassed the expectations of the report. It is not surprising, therefore,
that tourism in Fiji soon came under the control of foreign capital. The
industry which local white capital strove so hard to develop and
dominate was soon lost to foreign competitors.
By the 1960s, then, the process of economic restructuring that
began immediately after the war was all but complete. But for those
who had initiated that class project, it was in vain. And local white
capital's shaky position was soon undermined further. Over the fifteen
years or so during which economic restructuring took place other major
developments also occurred. Of particular importance was the
increasing strength of organized labour. Two major strikes in 1955 and
1957 demonstrated labour's growing willingness to defend its position
through organized struggle. At the same time, however, the strikes
alerted capital and the colonial state to the need for greater control. If
foreign capital was to be enticed into the tourist industry, labour would
have to be contained. With the oilworkers' strike of 1959, therefore,
the task of class containment took on a new urgency.
The strike of '59 marked a turning in Fiji's history. Coming at the
end of restructuring, it represented a fundamental threat to the
6 The Checchi Report was published as H.G. Clement, The Future of
Tourism in the Pacific and Far East (Washington, DC: US Department
of Commerce, 1961).
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neocolonial economy — more so since it was followed by a
canefarmers strike in 1960. The future trajectory of neocolonial Fiji had
just been mapped out and the ruling class would not permit it to be
jeopardized by labour. To better appreciate the significance of the
strikes and also of their suppression, we need first to survey briefly the
rise of organized labour.

Chapter 5
Turbulence at the Turning Point
The rise of organized labour
The first union in Fiji, an association of European teachers at Methodist
mission schools, was formed in 1924. Four years later a Suva
Teachers Association was formed and in 1931 the two amalgamated
into the Fiji Teachers' Union. However, later native Fijian teachers
broke away and established their own Fijian Teachers' Association, a
split that has persisted to the present day.
In 1937 Ayodhya Prasad, a North Indian school teacher who
arrived in the colony in 1926, founded the Kisan Sangh (Farmers
Union). Securing CSR recognition of the union, however, turned out
to be a much more difficult task than Prasad had anticipated. The irony
is that Prasad misguidedly believed that the most effective way forward
was to collaborate with the company.
At first the CSR ignored the union, hoping that it would somehow
go away, but men decided to defeat the union while it was still in its
infancy; better to annihilate the fledgling enemy than to let it develop
strength. The colonial state, however, viewed the CSR strategy as
potentially disruptive, and refused to allow the lifeblood of the
economy to be subjected to such risk. Hence it prodded the CSR into a
more conciliatory posture. On 30 May 1941 the union was recognized.
Prasad believed that only by cooperating with the company would
the farmers secure concessions that would raise their real income
(Moynagh 1981:160). Nonetheless some farmers remained distrustful
of the CSR. Long term reconciliation of grower and company
interests, they felt, was impossible and the Kisan Sangh's collaborative
approach was inherently contradictory. In the end farmer interests
would be compromised. The atmosphere of distrust and apprehension
soon produced a rival canegrowers' organization.
Prominent among the Kisan Sangh's concerns was the high level
of farmer indebtedness. To solve the problem it established a
cooperative store through which members could purchase goods fairly
cheaply. This development had important consequences for the two
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fractions of capital which had the greatest and most direct impact on
farmers and caneworkers— the CSR and the Indian merchant traders.
For the CSR, the development was welcome. The Kisan Sangh
would now spend more time on its cooperative venture and less on
trying to increase the price of cane. Relieved of much pressure, the
company gave moral and financial support to the cooperative
(ibid.:163). But for Indian merchant traders the cooperative represented
a fundamental threat to their profits. Most of their dealings were with
farmers and caneworkers, and the high prices and interest rates they
charged were the very reasons for the formation of the cooperative.
Trader business practices were considered unscrupulous and it was to
rescue rural Indians from the clutches of rapacious Indian traders that
the Sangh set up the cooperative.
By this time also a major cleavage had developed within the Indian
community between those of north Indian and those of south Indian
origin. Its real basis was differences in wealth. North Indians, resident
in the country longer, tended to be more prosperous and have a greater
stake in the existing order. Their substantial support for the Kisan
Sangh, and in particular its strategy of collaboration, is therefore easy
to explain. As Moynagh put it:
They had more to lose than South Indians from a strategy of
confrontation that [in the past had] failed, and yet they stood to
gain from concessions won through co-operation (ibid.A60).
South Indians, in contrast, were generally less well-off. Indian
merchants played on this substantial difference when they planned their
defence against the threat posed by the Kisan Sangh's cooperative. In
alliance with south Indians, and through the leadership of the Gujerati
lawyer A.D. Patel, the Indian commercial bourgeoisie set about
undermining support for the Kisan Sangh. On 5 June 1941 they
formed a rival organization, the Akhil Fiji Krishak Maha Sangh. Its
leader, Swami Rudrananda, was south Indian.
In terms of class organization, farmers were now deeply divided.
They had to contend with class enemies on two fronts— the CSR and
their capitalist cousins. Two years later during the canefarmers strike of
1943, the bitter rivalry between the Kisan and the Maha Sangh greatly
weakened the farmers' position and helped destroy the strike.
Bourgeois Indian leadership had again compromised Indian labour.
At Lautoka on 3 April 1938 the Mazdur Sangh (Workers' Union)
was formed but it was not registered until 9 December 1944 when its
name was changed to the Chini Mazdur Sangh (Sugar Workers'
Union). Lacking both numbers and the influential leadership of the
farmers' associations, the Chini Mazdur Sangh remained a minor force
for a long time but as the first organization of industrial workers it
served as a model for later unions.
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The early 1940s were a lean period for the newly-born trade union
movement. In part this was due to the war but a major reason had to do
with antagonisms between the movement on the one hand and
Australian capital and the colonial state on the other.
Because of growing concern in Britain about the welfare and
aspirations of its colonial subjects, a committee was appointed in 1930
to consider the whole question of labour policy in the colonies.
Despatches were sent out in that year urging all colonies to introduce
legislation giving legal rights to trade unions. In Fiji the call was
ignored for twelve years.
By the mid 1930s Australian dominance in the Fiji economy had
extended beyond the sugar sector into gold-mining. Australian capital
was therefore in a powerful position to resist the introduction of
'enlightened' labour laws, which it did. Not surprisingly, by 1944
there were only three trade unions in the country. By 1949, however,
the number had risen to fifteen. Why the sudden increase?
The pressure in Britain for the enactment of 'enlightened' labour
laws in the colonies was greatly increased with the passage of the
Colonial Welfare and Development Act of 1940 which said that support
for development projects was conditional upon the existence of trade
union legislation. This was something which the colonial state in Fiji
could not ignore, even if capital might have wanted to. The first test
was the Kisan Sangh's application for recognition by the CSR. As we
have already seen, the Company had to be prodded by the state into
recognition. But the major consequence of that development was that it
established the principle of free collective bargaining and led to the
passage of the Industrial Associations Ordinance and Industrial
Disputes (Conciliation and Arbitration) Ordinance of 1942. The way
was now clear for other unions to emerge and over the next five years
to 1947 they increased in number five-fold.
Enactment of the ordinances did not mean that the colonial state's
underlying antagonism towards labour had changed fundamentally. As
Jay Reddy (1974:62) put it, the colonial state 'did not always share the
Colonial Office policy of encouraging trade unionism'. Despite the
liberal appearance of the new legislation, the state encouraged the
formation of some unions merely 'as a matter of administrative
convenience'. Others it repressed by victimizing their members and by
refusing to recognize their legal status, and to others still it 'displayed
an attitude of indifference' (ibid.). That being so, the trade union
movement grew very slowly over the next few years. Of course the
nascent movement confronted other problems — inadequate resources,
organizational deficiencies, and a relative scarcity of effective and
experienced leaders. Consequently, many of the early unions were
shortlived.
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In spite of all that, the unions which did survive were generally
able to consolidate themselves sufficiently to provide the essential
substructure for the establishment of a continuous link between
workers and their organizations. Initially such unions were strongest in
the sugar-milling, mining, stevedoring, seafaring and public works
sector. As numbers grew, the movement gained in strength.
Nevertheless it was still quite vulnerable. Mohammed Ramzan (later to
become minister for Labour in the Alliance government) described the
problems and fragility of the early years in this way:
Joining unions meant inviting trouble, intimidation and
victimization... Employers could not tolerate trade unions as
they were construed as a challenge to their authority —
something which was unbearable to them. In those early days
leadership too was scarce and difficult to come by and unions
had very little resources to work with. Those who accepted
any positions of responsibility in unions were invariably
ostracised to the extent of dismissal. Their prospect of future
employment was doomed and their names were whispered
around to employers for black listing ... Those were the early
days of the struggle — a struggle for self respect and
recognition. It was a struggle for workers' dignity... This
battle for... survival was by no means an easy one and to
make matters even more difficult even the Government of the
day was against trade unionism (FTUC 1976:4).
Survival therefore became dependent upon size and a national
organization was clearly necessary. Soon one emerged. In August
195 1 the minister of state for the colonies, Mr Dugdale, visited Fiji and
met a union delegation led by Pandit Ami Chandra. It is significant that
the meeting was held in Lautoka and that of the five unions represented
at the discussions four were based predominantly in northwestern Viti
Levu — the Chini Mazdur Sangh, the Fijian Mineworkers Union, the
Fiji Airport Employees Union, and the Fiji Public Works Department
Employees Union (ibid.:39). Since the industrial working class was
concentrated in that region, worker organization was most highly
developed there.
After their meeting with Dugdale, the representatives of the five
unions signed a document which included this statement:
We, the representatives of various unions assembled here
today agree to form a Federation of Unions with the object of
promoting and safeguarding the interests of the working class
generally (ibid.).
The document was subsequently ratified by the respective unions
and on 29 September 1951 the Fiji Industrial Workers Congress, the
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movement's first umbrella organization, was formed. When the Fiji
Timber Industrial Workers' Union at Nadarivatu joined the Congress
soon after, the affiliated membership of the national organization
represented about one third of existing unions. The congress was
modelled on its British counterpart and in 1954 changed its name to the
Fiji Trades Union Congress.
As Table 5.1 shows, the number and intensity of trade union
strikes did not increase significantly until the mid 1950s. The
movement was still in its infancy and had not yet developed sufficient
strength and confidence. Furthermore, the country was still recovering
from the effects of war. But by 1955 things began to change.
Strikes by goldminers at Vatukoula in 1947 and 1955 and by the
Sugar Employees Union (the Chini Mazdur Sangh) in northwestern
Viti Levu in 1957 were very disruptive. Never before had strike activity
reached such major proportions. The colonial state reacted with the
Industrial Disputes (Arbitration andInquiry) Ordinance of 1958.
Table 5.1 Strike Activity 1949 - 1960
No of Workers Workdays
Year strikes involved lost
1949 1 55 110
1950 3 544 1,651
1951 1 275 425
1952 2 797 1,825
1953 3 262 594
1954 2 55 100
1955 7 1,488 10,457
1956 2 542 142
1957 3 4,922 20,825
1958 1 294 388
1959 6 1,738 5,529
1960 15 4,692 12,017
Source: Reddy (1974:111).
Although formed in 1948, the Fiji Mineworkers Union had not
won recognition from the Emperor Gold Mines. Consequently, the
employer did not deal with the predominantly-Fijian union. Instead, it
dealt with a provincial committee of traditional leaders which had been
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set up at the mines. The committee, Kevin Hince says, did not act as a
bargaining agent but served merely as a 'tenuous link between
management and workers' (Hince 1971:374). So it is not surprising
that the company's position was always considerably stronger than that
of the union. For its part, the colonial state always supported the
company because of what it perceived as the company's vulnerability to
industrial disturbances. As late as 1953 it continued to turn its back on
the union (ibid.:375).
Consequently when the union struck in 19SS, it meant business.
Wages had to be raised and recognition given. Over 10,000 workdays
were lost and the power ofthe union was amply demonstrated. But the
union's victory strengthened the resolve of mining capital and the state
to tighten the screws on labour. This was the first time that the gold
mine had suffered such a major loss and because it occurred when the
price of gold had fallen, the loss in revenue for both mining capital and
the colonial state was magnified further. Clearly labour had to be
restrained. This was underscored two years later when three strikes by
sugar workers produced a total loss of 21,000 workdays, more than
twice the loss resulting from the Vatukoula stoppage.
The state moved quickly and in 1958 passed the Industrial Disputes
Ordinance. Unlike the earner ordinance, that of 1958 did not provide
for a state-instituted conciliation machinery, instead it made recourse to
compulsory arbitration easier. Hence the time between a dispute and its
settlement was greatly reduced. But there was another major
innovation. The ordinance provided for boards of inquiry to investigate
the consequences of worker demands on the wider economy.
Alongside their own merits, worker demands had now to be assessed
in terms of the 'national interest', what the economy was capable of
withstanding. Inevitably union militancy was increasingly blamed for
inflation, unemployment, loss of revenue, and so on.
'National good' could be made to appear imbued with moral force,
a kind of unchallengeable morality which workers were impervious to
or simply unwilling to abide by. Either way, workers appeared the
villains. Such arguments had the added advantage of being buttressed
by legal sanction; now the law insisted that the wider economic
conditions of the country should not be put at risk.
The legislative changes of 1958, then, came about because of the
growing strength of the trade unions and their attempts to improve the
conditions of their members. But in 1959 and 1960 the ordinance
proved ineffective against two strikes which violently shook the very
roots of colonial capitalism in Fiji. We look at these strikes shortly but
first we must consider one further feature of the early years of the
labour movement— the ubiquitous problem of racialism.
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Racialism in organised labour
For a long time, racialism militated against the unity and strength of the
labour movement. The historical dialectic between race and class in the
wider society found expression within the movement and produced
scars and divisions which did not begin to heal until the late 1960s.
Struggles within the movement during its infant stages mirrored and in
turn accentuated the racial character of wider social tensions.
The history of racial fragmentation within the trade union
movement dates back to the formation of the Fijian Teachers
Association in 1934. But racial splits only began to afflict the nascent
movement in a significant way in the immediate postwar years. Four
reasons have been given for that. One is that there were skill
differences which took the visible form of race (ibid.:376). For
example, the Seamen's Union, registered in 1946, contained a specific
racial exclusivity clause designed to exclude Europeans and part-
Europeans who typically held higher rankings than Fijians. Those
excluded responded by forming their own (shortlived) Masters, Mates
and Engineers' Union. Skill differences were also instrumental in the
formation of the Fiji Sugar Skilled Workers' Union (later reorganized
as the Fiji Sugar Tradesmen's Union). Part-Europeans especially were
heavily represented in it and their continued influence is suggested by
the fact that as late as 198 1 they still commanded the three top positions
of president, vice-president and general secretary.
A second explanation has to do with employment patterns
(ibid.:367-377. Also see Reddy 1974:150). Since Indians were
concentrated most heavily in the sugar sector, they inevitably
dominated both the membership and the leadership of unions such as
the Chini Mazdur Sangh. The same was also true of the North Western
Public Works Employees' Union, registered in 1947 and forerunner to
the Fiji Public Works Department Employees' Union. Fijians, on the
other hand, predominated in the Fiji Goldminers' Union and the Fiji
Stevedores' Union. Through this early pattern of racial concentration,
elements of racial competitiveness and exclusiveness increasingly crept
into the movement in the 1950s and early 1960s. This was particularly
true of the Fijian Commercial Workers' Union (formed in 1948), the
Public Works Fijian Workers' Union (1953), the Fijian Domestic
Restaurant and Allied Workers' Union (1960), the Suva and Lautoka
Municipal Council (Fijian) Workers' Union (1960), the Fijian
Engineering Workers' Union (1962), and the South Pacific Sugar
Workers' Union (1962). Two significant points emerge from this: first,
most of the racially exclusive unions were formed by Fijians; and
secondly, many of the stronger and longer established unions were
dominated by Indians. That situation 'led in some cases to a certain
disenchantment of the Fijian minority based in part on language
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barriers, accusations of favouritism and a feeling of inability to achieve
primary Fijian goals' (ibid.:37T).
Related to the sense of marginality, Reddy argued, is a third reason
for racial exclusivity. Fijians were 'unwilling to accept non-Fijian
leadership that lacked the authority and respect of the traditional chief
(Reddy 1974:151). His argument is a powerful one if the early
experiences of the Fiji Miners' Union are anything to go by. As Hince
(1971:375) has also argued, traditional authority continued for a long
time to play a decisive role in that union and the evidence suggests that
management exploited this state of affairs in order to undercut the
growth and the influence of the union. Indeed it was not until after the
1955 strike that the union came into its owa While Reddy's argument
has substance, the crucial point is not so much the absence of Fijian
chiefly authority and leadership but simply the absence of Fijian as
opposed to non-Fijian leadership.
A fourth explanation is the considerable pressure from the Fijian
chiefs, colonial administrators and politicians to organize along racial
lines. Chiefs feared a weakening of their authority and colonial
administrators saw weak unionism as the corollary of racial division.
With a racially fragmented trade union movement strikes would be less
common, more easily broken and politically less dangerous (Reddy
1974:151-152).
Although these explanations are valid, they need to be understood
in a broader historical context. Racial division in the organized labour
movement was, first and foremost, a product of the way in which
capitalist relations came to predominate in Fiji. Until the establishment
of the sugar industry, the need for wage labour arose mainly in the
copra and cotton plantations. There labour was predominantly Fijian,
and hired primarily on a casual or part-time basis. With the onset of
sugar production the working class assumed a particular racial character
that subsequently served to keep it divided. The needs of sugar,
plantation and mining capital, together with the changing pattern of
labour availability at particular historical junctures, combined to
produce occupational and geographical concentrations of labour along
broadly racial lines. It is hardly surprising that labour organizations
followed a similar pattern. This was enormously advantageous for
capital simply because race threatened the unity of organized labour, as
was instanced in the turbulent days of December 1959.
The 1959 strike is also indicative of another major development—
the process of restructuring which permitted the development of
tourism. It is significant that the 1959 strike involved oil workers; a
tourist industry could not be viable if fuel supplies were threatened.
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Workers united: the strike of '59
Despite the rising cost of living, oilworkers in Fiji received no wage
increases between 1955 and 1959. In August 1959 the general
secretary of the Wholesale and Retail Workers' Union wrote to the
Shell Oil Company and Vacuum Oil Company to ask for wage
negotiations. The companies adopted delaying tactics and on 10
October the union filed a log of claims for improved working
conditions and an increase in the minimum wage from £3.0.6d to £6
per week. The oil companies refused and made a counter offer of only
£3.10.0 per week which the union rejected. Union attempts to keep
negotiations open were met with company intransigence. Worker
frustration and resentment grew and on 5 December the union gave
notice that a nationwide strike would take effect two days later.
The strike lasted from 7 to 12 December and Suva was the main
theatre for the drama.1 Early on the first day of the strike, an angry
crowd of between 100 and 150 people tried to prevent the delivery of
oil to the Electricity Power House in Suva. But union leaders, acting
under the misapprehension that such action would contravene the
Essential Services (Arbitration) Ordinance of 1954, allowed the
delivery to proceed. The incident created considerable tension and by
the end of the day the proclamation ofemergency regulations under the
Public Safety Ordinance of 1920 was considered.
On the next day tensions increased further as a result of a
confrontation between picketers and riot police and a hostile statement
by the colonial state. Released through the state-controlled Fiji
Broadcasting Commission (FBC), the statement accused the union
secretary, James Anthony, of flouting 'recognised industrial practices'
and claimed that the union was behaving irresponsibly. The fact that the
union had sought negotiations for a long time was totally ignored. So
too was the extent to which union leaders had gone to abide by the law
and to ensure that fuel supplies to essential services were not disrupted.
Instead, the state declared that the strike should never have taken place,
that workers should return to work and enter into negotiations, and that
if negotiations were not successful then the assistance of the Labour
Department should be sought
On the next day union officials sought permission to have a
statement of protest broadcast over the FBC but were refused. At the
same time the oil companies began distributing fuel under police
The following account of the strike is drawn from reports in the Fiji
Times and the report of the official investigation conducted by A.G.
Lowe. See A.G. Lowe, Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the
Disturbances in Suva, December 1959 (Suva, Legislative Council Paper
No 10 of 1960), referred to hereafter as the Lowe Report.
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protection and the inevitable confrontations followed, beginning with
one at Niranjan's petrol station in Walu Bay and later at Burns Philp's
and Morris Hedstrom's stations. As crowds grew, more police
reinforcements arrived. Between 1 pm and 2 pm buses queued for
petrol, and unrest and expressions of anti-European feeling became
more frequent. Bus drivers were urged by the crowd to go on strike,
more placards began to appear and the likelihood of violence increased.
Sometime in the afternoon the union secretary sent a telegram to the
oil companies complaining that they wished to 'crush the workers'
right to strike'. The companies, he felt, were using scab labour and
supplying petrol for nonessential general use. By 3 pm a growing
crowd at the bus station had become agitated and two incidents
triggered off violence. A group crossed Rodwell Road and invaded
Burns Philp's store. At the other end of the bus station on Harris
Street, Mr Patton of British Petroleum (South West Pacific) Limited,
was stopped, abused with anti-European language, seized by the collar
and compelled to get out of his car. Attention then turned to bus
passengers and when a police party arrived, Mr Patton managed to get
away and the crowd dispersed.
More was yet to come; by 4 pm the bus transport system broke
down completely, James Anthony was refused permission to address a
public meeting, more European and police vehicles were stoned, the
FBC refused to broadcast a union statement of protest, and instructions
were issued for the preparation of public safety regulations. A crowd of
between 3,000 and 4,000 people gathered in an area opposite the
Phoenix Theatre (known as the 'hard standing') expecting to hear
James Anthony speak. In that highly-charged atmosphere, a squad of
riot police arrived and called upon the crowd to disperse. Instead the
crowd chanted, 'We want a meeting'. In response tear smoke grenades
were thrown into the. crowd. Thereupon people scattered in all
directions and retaliated with stones. A baton charge achieved little
because by then most of the crowd had moved down Rodwell Road.
Suva was about to witness a scale of destruction that would only be
parallelled in the 1987 Coup. Leave for all regular members of the Fiji
Military Forces was cancelled, the reservists in the Second Territorial
Force Battalion were called to active duty, and a curfew was imposed.
Day 4 of the strike saw the promulgation of emergency regulations
but they did not deter the strike leaders from calling a meeting of about
3,000 people 'consisting almost entirely of Fijians and Indians' at
Albert Park just two hours later. Significantly, two leading chiefs, Ratu
Edward Cakobau and Ratu George Cakobau, addressed the meeting
and appealed for calm and reason. At a similar meeting next day union
leaders asked the strikers to return to work and await the result of
attempts which by then were being made to resume negotiations.
Anthony had written to the Fiji Industrial Workers' Congress asking
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that it mediate in the dispute. At 1 pm on the following day he learned
that the Congress had agreed to mediate and that terms had already
been worked out for a return to work. Physical exhaustion had
compelled him to rest, and he was not present at the negotiations.
Consequently the 'successful' mediation of the dispute was brought
about largely through the efforts of two traditional chiefs, Ratu
Kamisese Mara and Ratu Meli Gonewai the president of the union.
Eventually the dispute was referred to arbitration and
representations made by Maurice Scott, advocate for Shell Oil
Company. Invoking the sentiments of the 1958 Industrial Disputes
Ordinance, he argued that due regard ought to be given to the
implications of wage demands for the wider economy. The oil
companies, he said, had not pleaded inability to pay. But they had to
keep in line with economic progress and the ability of other commercial
enterprises to pay. The union's demands, he claimed, would mean the
'complete collapse of industry in Fiji and therefore the ruination of the
country and its people' (Fiji Times 28 January 1960). More
specifically, companies would either go out of business, cut down
staff, or resort to mechanization and thus reduce employment With that
kind of threat, it is hardly surprising that union demands were not met.
It had asked for £6 per week, the companies were prepared to pay
£3.10.0 and the arbitral tribunal awarded £4.11.6. Because it fell
roughly halfway between the two positions, the award appeared fair.
But that fairness was more apparent than real; after all, the companies
had implicitly conceded that they could actually pay more.
Unlike the two major strikes which preceded it, the oilworkers'
strike did not involve workers drawn predominantly from one racial
group. The 1955 goldminers' strike involved mainly Fijian workers
and the 1957 sugar millworkers' strike mainly Indian workers. But
with the oilworkers' strike, Fijian and Indian workers came together
for the first time in the country's history to fight a common cause. The
union leaders acknowledged that there were differences separating
Fijian and Indian workers but decided that because they shared
common 'economic interests' their differences ought to be 'put into
cold storage'. Working class solidarity had for the first time
transcended racial boundaries and the ruling class was unable to play
upon racial sentiment in order to divide the workers.
Nevertheless, for the ruling class, the strike was seen in racial
terms:
There was a very pronounced anti-European feeling
throughout the disturbances....This manifested itself by anti-
European abuse hurled at Europeans and by the stoning of
European-driven cars....Both Fijians and Indians were
responsible. . . .When rioting broke out the damage which was
caused to premises was confined entirely to European
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premises and to offices such as the Labour Office and the
District Government offices, both of which were then in [the]
charge of Europeans....The fact that the Police were
Europeans also had an influence on the minds of those who
were responsible for the show of anti-European feeling and it
is important to remember that the oil Companies are European-
owned and were. . .deliberately chosen for strike action (Lowe
Report:27-28).
Charles Stinson, whose store was also damaged, agreed: the
destruction was 'centred near all European businesses'. He then listed
various establishments which had been attacked — Carpenters, Burns
Philp, Mouat's Pharmacy, Corbett's Butchery, Boots the Chemist,
Steeles, the British Council, Fiji Trading Company and Morris
Hedstrom. About 86 per cent of the damage caused by the strike was
inflicted on 'European' property.
The commission of inquiry which investigated the strike gave this
explanation for the destruction:
The evidence suggests that the anti-European feeling was
probably engendered by the fact that the Europeans own the
largest shops and have, at least, an appearance of wealth and
that the lower paid workers felt that such large shops were
indicative of considerable profits whereas many workers'
wages were low (ibid. :28).
The tentative and qualified nature of this explanation is
understandable. After all, the commissioner could hardly be expected to
say directly that capitalist exploitation was the root cause of the strike.
But at least he was prepared to concede that the workers' anger had
something to do with disparities in wealth. The real target was not
Europeans as such but capitalists. In this case, it just so happened that
the dispute was with European capitalists. Moreover, workers did
recognize that the real enemy was capitalism because Indian and
Chinese businesses were also attacked (ibid.: appendix IX).
Significantly, establishments of the colonial state suffered damage too.
The strikers were not fools. They knew whose side the state was on.
The strike of '59, then, was a major convulsion. Never before had
workers ignored their racial differences and come together on such a
scale to shake the capitalist system to its very roots. Here was
organized working class pressure in its most developed form to date
and the ruling class knew it. The readiness with which it resorted to
violence to suppress the strike showed very clearly that it was simply
not prepared to tolerate threats against capitalist interests and, more
particularly, the newly-laid foundations of the neocolonial economy.
Had the strike been allowed to succeed, then workers might have taken
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heart and mounted similar strikes in the future which would seriously
undermine the development of the industry which was to be the other
major prop of the neocolonial economy— the tourist industry. Having
successfully suppressed the strike, the task now was to ensure that it
did not reoccur. But before that process of legislative and institutional
containment could begin, another strike threatened the capitalist-
dominated economy— the canefarmers' strike of 1960.
Convulsion in the canefields
The sugar industry expanded greatly in the 1950s and by the time its
ten-year cane agreement came up for renegotiation the CSR was
concerned about overproduction and sought to restrict output. Two
possibilities were suggested: either a tonnage quota could be imposed
on each farm or quotas could be introduced on an acreage basis
whereby the CSR would buy cane grown only on defined areas. Both
proposals were rejected by the farmers, who argued that the CSR had
a moral obligation to buy all cane because it had urged farmers since
1957 to increase the cane acreage (Moynagh 1981:205). The CSR also
proposed cost-cutting measures, including the suggestion that the
growers' share of sugar proceeds be reduced when sugar prices were
high. Needless to say, these were also rejected by the farmers.
After protracted negotiations, the colonial state collaborated with
the CSR in March 1960. 'It is gratifying', the company recorded, 'that
our views on the situation and method of handling it seem to be finding
acceptance by Government' (quoted in ibid).
The farmers tried to present a united front by bringing farmer
organizations under one umbrella, a Federation of Canegrowers. But
the old rivalries stretching back to the 1930s persisted. Always more
moderate than the Maha Sangh, the Kisan Sangh was amenable to
compromise. Hence the farmer unity which many were so keen to
achieve again proved elusive. The catalyst for the final break came in
May 1960.
Until then the Federation had remained firm and united in its
demands: that the company take all of the 1960 harvest, that a new
pricing formula be worked out which would split the net sugar
proceeds between the farmers and the company on a 70/30 basis, and
that the pricing formula be included in a renegotiated, long-term
contract But in May the governor proposed an economic investigation
into the sugar industry. The farmers rejected the suggestion and
A.D.Patel in particular expressed grave misgivings. An inquiry would
only delay matters and weaken the farmers' bargaining position. He
remembered precisely the same situation during the 1943 strike and
was anxious to avoid a repetition. Farmers were now highly suspicious
of the governor.
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On 27 June three local members of the Executive Council, Ratu
Mara, AJDeoki and J.N.Falvey, met the governor who advised them to
encourage the growers' representatives to accept a commission of
inquiry. To Patel such political meddling threatened to turn local
opinion against the farmers. A commission of inquiry would be
presented to the public as a reasonable course of action and if the
farmers rejected it, they would be seen to be unreasonable. A month
later the Kisan Sangh broke away from the Federation and together
with three Fijian canegrowers' associations — the Nadroga, Ra and Ba
Fijian Canegrowers' Associations — accepted an interim agreement
with the CSR. J.N. Falvey had acted as adviser to the Fijian
associations. The agreement required the CSR to take 199,000 tons of
the 1960 crop and stipulated that crushing should stop once the figure
had been reached. A deduction of eighteen pence per ton for burnt cane
was also incorporated, the intention being that these funds be used to
reimburse the farmers worst affected by strike action. For those who
remained in the Federation, the agreement represented a complete
betrayal and they would have no part of it. They decided to fight
alone.2
On 4 August four cane farms in Ba were burned, and with rumours
of intimidation gaining currency, the repressive forces of the state were
mobilized. The Public Safety Regulations which had been passed
during the oilworkers' strike were still in force and on 9 August a
proclamation calling out the whole of the Territorial Force was signed
by the governor. Police reinforcements were sent to the sugar regions,
including Labasa where crushing was due to commence on 1 1 August.
In the meantime, the strike began to exact a heavy economic toll. Shop
sales had fallen off since June. Now the retail trade worsened and a
growing incidence of petty theft of food and other items was reported.
By the end of August reports of cane burning and threats of
violence increased considerably and through the pages of the Fiji Times
the representatives of the ruling class urged the colonial state to take
stronger action against the 'disruptive forces' in order to end the strike.
Soon afterwards an official statement noted the gravity of the situation
and the deterioration in race relations. An expansion of the Special
Constabulary was also announced. However it was not enough for the
ruling class. The Fiji Times called for firm and decisive action, and
when the Fijian Ex-Servicemen announced their readiness to prove
their loyalty by helping to preserve law and order, the national daily
heaped praise on them.
On 4 September about 9,000 farmers gathered in Ba and were
addressed by, among others, A.D.Patel, S.M.Koya, James Anthony
The following account of the 1960 canefarmers' strike is drawn largely
from reports in the Fiji Times.
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and Mohammed Tora. A resolution was passed giving the governor
three days in which to review two proposals which had been submitted
to him earlier. The first was that the farmers who had not agreed to the
July 24 agreement would sell their cane to the government; the second
was that the governor should decide on the percentage of cane to be
harvested by those farmers on an area basis. The second proposal also
carried the proviso that the allocation for each farm should be
determined on an equitable basis between farmers but bearing in mind
also that no farmer's allotted area of cane should be left unharvested.
However both proposals were rejected, the first for 'legal and other
reasons' and the second simply because it was unacceptable.
The Ba 'ultimatum', as the Fiji Times called it, also carried the
rider that if the governor did not respond to their requests, farmers
would burn their cane. The governor first responded by amending the
Public Safety Regulations and extending the powers of the
commissioner of police. He also drew the pubSc's attention to the law
relating to setting fire to land and on national radio appealed to farmers
to stop burning cane. At the same time, it was reported that the
governor had signalled the British Far East Army Headquarters in
Singapore for troops to deal with the strike. The report was not without
foundation, as the following official response to it suggests:
There has never been any question of seeking outside
assistance until all local resources were fully utilised, but as a
precautionary measure it had to be considered whether any
additional assistance could conceivably become necessary (Fiji
Times 20 September 1960).
By the end of the first week of September some 21,733 tons of
cane had been burned, a little more than half being on CSR estates. A
week later another 1,631 tons were burned. Tensions rose higher and
parallels were soon drawn with the 1943 strike, then labelled a 'stab in
the back'. When B.D.Lakshman moved in the Legislative Council that
a sugar board be established to control the sale and purchase of cane,
and also that there be an inquiry into the sugar industry, opponents of
the strike launched a blistering attack on A.D.Patel. J.N.Falvey
praised the Fijian farmers and blasted Patel for his 'outrageous personal
vanity' and claimed that a very serious rift between the Fijian and
Indian communities had arisen because of the crisis.
Essentially, Falvey was trying to personalize the whole dispute and
at the same time make it appear racial. History was repeating itself and
to reinforce the myth others also condemned the strike's racial
character. Vijay Singh, a representative of the Kisan Sangh, announced
that the Indian community was now 'bitterly divided as never before'
and claimed that A.D.Patel was responsible. Ratu Penaia Ganilau made
a statement representative of elite Fijian opinion:
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At the three provincial councils I attended [in July] it was quite
clear that members were very concerned about the effect of the
dispute on the economy of the Colony. As a result they passed
resolutions offering their services to the Government Fijians
have since come out in hundreds. About 1,000 are now
harvesting cane in the Western District Members of the RSSA
[Returned Servicemen's Association]...came out in thousands.
When I was in the Western District this week I was told that
one of the non-cane-cutting leaders had said that for every
thousand the RSSA put up he could put up 5,000 cane
farmers. That, I thought, was fighting talk (Fiji Times 1
October 1960).
Here was a marshalling of forces which Patel's group was unable
to deal with and inevitably the strikers had to succumb. In October
Julian Amery — the secretary of state for the colonies '— arrived. He
met Patel and his associates, urged that harvesting be resumed 'for the
good of the Colony', and advised that they present their case to the
commission of inquiry which would be set up. The farmers agreed and
the strike ended.
It has been alleged that Patel's attitude to the strike stemmed from
his eagerness as a Gujerati to prolong the dispute so as to increase
fanner indebtedness to Gujerati shopkeepers. It has also been argued
that by adopting a militant posture he expected to increase his popular
support and thereby help his political career (Moynagh 1981:206).
Moynagh argues, however, that both of these suggestions lack
credibility (ibid.). And he may well be right Nevertheless, it is difficult
to believe that pressures from the Indian bourgeoisie, to which he
belonged, coupled with his unquestionable political ambition, never at
any stage informed his calculations. Be that as it may, the main reason
for ending the strike was simply the realization by Patel and his
followers that the balance of forces was stacked against them. To have
prolonged the strike further would have meant more hardship for the
striking farmers whose chances of success were minimal. Six months
of struggle against awesome odds had taken a heavy toll. Now they
looked forward with anticipation to the findings of the commission of
inquiry headed by Sir Malcolm Trustam Eve. But from the lessons of
their history they should have expected disappointment.
The Eve Report was a major victory for the CSR. It established a
method of production control which was acceptable to the CSR, it
provided for the establishment of an administrative machinery to
oversee the industry— an independent chairman, the Sugar Board and
the Sugar Advisory Council, and it decided on a sugar proceeds-
sharing formula which 'gave CSR some protection against rising costs
[but] provided no such protection for the growers' (ibid.:2l6. Also see
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Narsey 1979:113-114, 117-118). All in all, the enquiry was an astute
political exercise, for under the guise of impartiality, it was 'distinctly
favourable to the company' (Moynagh 1981:216). The farmers who
toiled and laboured lost out again.
True to form, the Fiji Times praised the report's 'dispassionate
impartiality' and pointed to 'its value as an important contribution to the
wellbeing of the Colony'. It applauded the state's intention to
implement Eve's recommendations and stressed that this was the 'time
for action':
The sugar industry, and the whole Colony, is waiting for the
Government to create the machinery of administration and
control which the Commission has recommended as a basis
for peace and progress.. .A repetition of the selfish,
irresponsible, destructive antics shown in the past will bring
disaster (Fiji Times 26 October 1961).
In the following December the Sugar Industry Ordinance of 1961
was passed. It provided for a Sugar Board consisting of an
independent chairman, vice-chairman and accountant. All three were
also to be members of the Sugar Advisory Council along with
representatives of government, the CSR and the growers.
As a mechanism of control, the ordinance was highly effective. In
addition to giving extensive powers to the independent chairman, it also
excluded lawyers and politicians from the Advisory Council, in other
words people like A.D.Patel and S.M.Koya. Also, the range of
possible offenders under the provisions of the Ordinance became
extremely wide. According to Section 13(1):
any person who, before the Independent Chairman has given
notice of the issue of a Certificate regarding a dispute, does
any act or makes an omission the doing or omission of which
hinders or is calculated to hinder orderly planting or growing
or harvesting or cane, transport of cane to a mill, crushing the
cane, making sugar at a mill, or transporting or storing of
sugar, shall be guilty of an offence and shall be liable to
imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years.
This provision was certainly effective in restraining farmer activities.
Not until 1977 did it need to be invoked in a court case — against
Mohammed (now Apisai) Tora. The same was true of the ordinance as
a whole, and it was not until 1987, in the aftermath of the coup, that the
sugar industry again faced anything like the crisis of 1960.
Nevertheless the boom of the 1960s owed much to the containment of
workers outside the sugar sector. In the aftermath of the oilworkers
strike of 1959, there followed also a programme of legislative and
institutional control. This culminated in the formation of the Tripartite
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Forum in 1976, in which labour was co-opted into a formal and
restraining arrangement with capital and the state. For this to be
possible, however, organized labour had first to be won over to the
ideology of 'joint consultation'. That was the colonial state's next task.
Ideology of consultation: towards containment by co-
option
Two months after the oilworkers' strike, the Burns Commission
submitted its report. It accepted that there was a need for the condition
of wage earners to be 'substantially improved' but claimed to have
found no evidence that such could be achieved through a redistribution
of income. Moreover, it said that there was 'little evidence that
deliberate exploitation by employers [was] the order of the day'. For
workers, therefore, the way forward lay in 'responsible' trade
unionism. Three months later, in May 1960, the deputy labour adviser
to the secretary of state for the colonies visited the country and gave his
blessing to the commission's recommendations. But by then the trade
union movement had split racially.
In March, Ratu Meli Gonewai broke away from the Wholesale and
Retail Workers Union and formed the Fiji Oil Workers Union. In the
same month George Suguturaga led a breakaway from the Fiji
Municipal Workers' Union, called the Municipal Native Workers'
Union, and open only to Fijians, part-Fijians and Pacific Islanders.
Suguturaga was also instrumental in forming a Fijian Docks
Construction Union from the Building Workers' Union. Two other
Fijian unions were created in 1960: the Fijian Domestic Restaurant and
Allied Workers' Union and the Fijian Engineering Workers'Unioa
Secessionism clearly undermined the unity of the trade union
movement and was roundly condemned by established unions.
Employers were accused ofhaving 'fostered and encouraged' the racial
splits and workers were urged to refrain from becoming 'tools of the
employers' (Fiji Times 23 April 1960). The colonial state was
deliberately 'noncommital'. The governor told a trade union delegation
that splits could and would occur if union leaders did not behave
'responsibly'. Only in August 1962 did the state modify its position,
and declared that breakaway unions were 'in principle' undesirable. Its
change did not imply sympathy for trade unions. Instead it reflected a
new and less objectionable form of labour control, 'joint consultation'.
The architect of the new approach was John Amputch. A Fiji-born
Catholic Indian, Amputch became the first local commissioner of
labour in April 1960, the very moment when the unity of the trade
union movement was undermined by racial splits led by Fijians. His
background is significant. Beginning his career as an apprentice with
the CSR in 1927, he later joined Morris Hedstrom Limited. Working
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his way up the retail firm, he acted as Vacuum Oil Company's
representative in northwest Viti Levu and later became Morris
Hedstrom's branch manager for Nadi and Tavua. In 1944 he joined the
colonial civil service as a labour officer. In 1952 he was seconded to
the Labour Department in Trinidad for six months and in the following
year went to England for a Colonial Office training course for labour
officers. Before his appointment as labour commissioner, he twice
acted in that capacity. With that kind of background, it could hardly be
expected that his attitude towards trade unions would be anything more
than a moderate one.
In May 1960, A. Deoki raised the matter of breakaway unions in
the Legislative Council. He accused the colonial state of encouraging
union splits, continuing to pursue a policy of divide and rule, and of
assisting big business not workers. Characteristically he was rebuked
for his 'wild and mischievous' allegations. Ratu Mara described his
speech as 'rather provocative' and Ravuama Vunivalu and Semesa
Sikivou were also antagonistic. But the whole matter was out in the
open. Deoki had pointed to the weakening of organized labour and state
collusion in the affair.
Yet Deoki 's analysis was that of an Indian, a Christian, a lawyer
and respected member of the community. This was not a trade unionist
talking, much less a communist It is difficult to imagine that his
condemnation of the exclusion of Indians from the breakaway unions
did not have any impact on Amputch, the newly-appointed labour
commissioner, who was himself an Indian and a Christian. Could he
afford to be seen to associate with a development which, on the one
hand, so openly discriminated against workers of his own race and, on
the other, neatly served the interests of capital? Tactfully he responded
by seeking out a middle position by postponing decisive action until
conditions were propitious.
By June such conditions began to emerge. Mr E. Parry, the
visiting deputy labour adviser from London criticized union splits. In a
speech to the British Council Youth Club and the Viti Club, he said that
he had seen more breakaway unions in Fiji than in any other place.
Significantly, he explicitly extolled the virtues of closer relations
between labour and capital as a basis for sound industrial relations
policy (Fiji Times 6 June 1960). It is highly probable that Amputch
already thought along these lines. But since the case was now being
publicly made by a senior British official, Amputch was now presented
with a way out of his dilemma. If an institutional arrangement could be
devised which brought representatives of labour and capital closer
together, then the anti-Indian tendency within the trade union
movement might be contained, or at the very least blunted. Moreover,
such an arrangement would not fundamentally complicate the task of
defending the interests of capital.
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To realize this most attractive option, there had to be a
demonstrable willingness on the part of both labour and capital to be
party to the arrangement and more importantly to make it work. Also,
there had to be umbrella organizations on each side from which
representatives could be drawn. The Fiji Trade Union Congress was
already in existence but no equivalent organization for capital existed.
After the traumatic events of December 1959, capital did not stand
idly by. Developments in the early months of 1960 were watched very
closely. By the end of May, one half of all the strikes for the whole
year had already occurred and capital saw the need to take defensive
measures. Furthermore, the opportune moment for decisive action was
fast approaching: splits were reappearing among the canefarmers and
the unity of the trade union movement was under threat. So with
organized labour in relative disarray, the time was ripe for a
marshalling of forces. On 14 June 1960 the Fiji Employers
Consultative Association (FECA) was formed. Against a labour
movement plagued with division, capital now stood united and
confident, and from the list of foundation members it is clear that the
association was dominated by foreign-owned companies.3
With the FECA now in place, the way was clear to implement the
ideology of 'joint consultation'. In October, Amputch told the Suva
Rotary Club that joint consultation between management and staff was
essential: 'In all fields of life, it is necessary for people to understand
each other. This applies to racial well-being as well as to industry' (Fiji
Times 21 October 1960). In trying to sell the new approach to
industrial relations, the commissioner of labour also tried to heal the
racial rifts within the trade union movement
With the ideology of joint consultation now broached, capital
moved to reinforce it. In December, J. Grundy, the director of the
FECA, advised capital of its obligations:
Fiji Times and Herald; Colonial Sugar Refining Company; Emperor
Gold Mining Company; W.R. Carpenter and Company; Burns Philp
(South Seas) Company; Morris Hedstrom Limited; Carlton Brewery
(Fiji) Limited; Millers Limited; Qantas Airways Limited; Carreras
Limited; Unions Soaps Pty Limited; Pacific Biscuit Company; Suva
Motors Limited; Island Industries Limited; Pacific Shipowners Limited;
Fiji Airways Limited; Fiji Pastoral Company Limited; Fiji Tobacco
Company; G.B.Hari and Company; Joong Hing Loong Company, and
Roadbuilder Limited. (Source: Kuruduadua, The Fiji Employers
Consultative Association, p.15.)
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Failure of the employers to form and join employers
associations, particularly in a territory such as Fiji where there
is a developing political consciousness, is obstructive and
selfish. If they do not do so the Government is hindered in the
framing of its labour legislation, industrial relations are
impaired, and in the long run a state of imbalance will be
created. This would be detrimental not only to the employers,
but to the workers and the general economy of the country
(Fiji Times 17 December 1960).
As more and more employers heeded his advice, the membership
of the FECA grew. The successful marshalling of capitalist forces
meant even more concerted effort to put the ideology of joint
consultation into practice. Capital and the colonial state now hammered
home the message 'consultation, not confrontation', and the success of
the exercise became evident fairly quickly. Just one year after the
turbulence of 1959/60, the level of strike activity fell sharply and stayed
relatively low for the rest of the decade. There were strikes but they did
not match the magnitude nor the intensity of the turbulent struggles of
1959 and 1960.
The difference is not altogether unexpected because the turmoil at
the beginning of the decade threatened to undermine the process of
restructuring which began fifteen years earlier and which laid the
foundations of the neocolonial economy. By the late 1950s, the way
had been cleared for tourism and the ruling class was determined that
the country's new direction would not be undermined by the
increasingly assertive working classes. The suppression of the
oilworkers in 1959 and the farmers in 1960 testified to that resolve. But
violence is costly and the ruling class subsequently turned to the policy
of containment by consultation and co-optation. With the neocolonial
economy saved from the union challenge, the ruling class looked
forward to reaping the benefits of its strategy in the boom of the 1960s.

PART m:
CONTRADICTION AND CRISIS IN
NEOCOLONIAL FIJI 1960-1989

Chapter 6
Capitalist Consolidation, Racial Tension and
Decolonization
In the first decade of the neocolonial economy, the basic structure of
class exploitation remained the same. Sugar capital gained from the Eve
Commission, the repressive 1961 Sugar Act ensured control of the
producers, and sugar remained the main agricultural crop. But in the
non-sugar sector, as we shall see, attempts were made at
diversification. More importantly, in terms of the class struggle, there
were attempts to draw more Fijians into capitalist agriculture,
particularly through agricultural settlement schemes. The failure of
those attempts, coupled with the continuing lack of Fijian success in
commerce and industry, particular in tourism and related areas,
produced a wave of Fijian discontent about their economic
'backwardness' generally and the failure of Fijian businesses in
particular. Indigenous agitation for greater involvement in business
therefore grew but by the end of the 1960s had still to produce results.
The reasons lay in the historically-evolved, subordinate integration
of Fijians into the capitalist-dominated, externally-oriented economy.
The largest section of the Fijian population, the peasants, remained
confined mainly to productive activity geared towards subsistence
needs and traditional obligations. A much smaller group had taken jobs
as blue or white collar workers and an even smaller group, consisting
mainly of chiefs, had emerged as a Fijian bureaucratic bourgeois class
within the colonial state. But a Fijian capitalist class was non-existent
The strongest fractions of the bourgeoisie in Fiji still comprised
foreign sugar, commercial and financial capital — the CSR, Morris
Hedstrom Limited (later taken over by the Carpenters Group), Burns
Philp Limited, Colonial Mutual Life Assurance Company, Bank of
New Zealand, Australia and New Zealand Bank, and Bank of New
South Wales (later Westpac Banking Corporation). The local fractions,
mainly European and Indian, were concentrated in the professions,
secondary industry, hotelling, the wholesale and retail trade,
transportation and, finally, in agriculture as large farm or plantation
owners. Indian peasant farmers of course produced most of the sugar
and most of the local rice, as well as cash crops for local markets.
Apart from areas like mining and stevedoring, Indians made up the
bulk of the small but growing industial working class. They also
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predominated in white collar jobs, particularly in the civil service, and
in the professions, especially teaching, medicine and law.
By 1960 the process of economic restructuring which began some
fifteen years earlier was virtually complete and the tourist boom which
lay ahead would soon give shape to the structure of the neocolonial
economy. The former prominence ofthe primary sector would decrease
as tourism touched off a major expansion of the secondary and tertiary
sectors. The major beneficiaries of that growth would be foreign capital
and to a lesser extent the local bourgeoisie, the most visible of whom
were the Indians simply because of their numbers. As more and more
Indian businesses sprung up, the mistaken impression of Indian
economic domination was reinforced, an impression which was, and
remains, strong among Fijians. But there were other grounds for
maintaining that view. In most professions and trades, in the civil
service, and in the mid upper levels of the private sector, Indian
representation and performance was generally superior to that of
Fijians. The same also applied to academic performance.
Taken in the context of a long colonial history of racist, and in
particular anti-Indian, ideology and practice, this virtually ensured that
Fijians' perceptions about their conditions and aspirations would be
based largely on comparisons with 'Indian' achievement and success.
It is clear, however, that the real yardstick against which Fijians
measured their disadvantage was not 'Indian' success but bourgeois
Indian success. They looked with envy not at Indian canefarmers,
ricegrowers, labourers and junior clerks but at Indian wholesalers and
retailers, manufacturers and industrialists, builders and constructors,
financiers, transport operators, accountants, lawyers, engineers,
scientists, senior civil servants and so on. However, the predominance
of race over class at the level of everyday life ensured that Indian class
differences mattered less than the fact that Indians were Indians.
Our argument, therefore, is that the struggle for 'Fijian'
advancement which emerged in the 1960s had to do primarily with
Fijian anger at their underrepresentation in the bourgeois class. Most of
all, it stemmed from Fijian concern at the absence of an indigenous
bourgeoisie. That, fundamentally, is what the cry for Fijian 'economic'
advancement was all about. In this chapter we develop this theme,
noting that with a rapidly growing neocolonial economy there was little
chance of a Fijian capitalist class emerging. We also note how, from
the mid 1960s onwards, the Fijian struggle changed tack when Fijians
realized that in political power they possessed a potentially more
effective means by which to constitute flieir own bourgeoisie. initially
reluctant to accept independence from Britain, Fijian leaders changed
their tune once it became evident that independence was firmly on the
agenda. A Fijian bourgeoisie would be more likely to develop with
Fijian state power.
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Fijian economic aspirations in the 1960s were linked closely to
developments in the national economy, particularly in the tourist
industry; both were in turn intimately linked to developments in labour
relations. We begin therefore with an overview of the first decade of
Fiji's neocolonial economy.
Class containment and economic growth
Early progress in the development ofjoint consultation was hindered to
a degree because recognition of trade unions was not compulsory. In
1961 the state tried to persuade companies to recognise trade unions,
arguing that recognition was 'fundamental both to enable trade unions
to perform their functions effectively and for collective bargaining to
begin' (Annual Report of the Department of Labour 1961:7). But
capital, now better organized, was in a strong position to resist, which
it did. Moreoever, the trade union movement was divided and unable to
exert pressure on capital. Without complusory recognition, labour
remained at a disadvantage and that disadvantage persisted until 1976
when a Trade Union Recognition Act was finally conceded.
In the meantime, the legislative screws on the trade union
movement were tightened. Three important pieces of industrial
legislation were passed in 1964. The Trade Union Ordinance, which
replaced the Industrial Association Ordinance of 1942, imposed new
controls on trade unions. Section 31, for example, provided new
conditions of eligibility for executive officers in trade unions. These
had to do with criminal records, literacy standards and length of service
in the trade or occupation concerned, and confined holding executive
office to only one union.
Further controls were imposed under the Trade Disputes
(Arbitration, Inquiry and Settlement) Ordinance. For example, whereas
twenty-one days advance notice had to be given in respect of strikes
affecting essential services, now twenty-eight days advance notice was
required. Also, the new disputes legislation now relied 'for its efficacy'
on 'punishment for breach of contract' (Annual Report of the
Commissioner ofLabour 1964:12). The third piece of new legislation
was the Employment Ordinance which established the Labour Advisory
Board, which was representative of capital, labour and the state. Its
duty was to advise the state on 'matters connected with employment
and labour' and also on 'any questions referred to it by the Minister of
Labour'. A Labour Advisory Board had been in existence since 1947
but not until now was the agency formally constituted as an established
pan of the state's industrial relations machinery (Kangwai n.d.:4).
With these legislative and institutional arrangements in place, the
state could give greater practical effect to its new ideology of joint
consultation. Industrial relations would now hinge on 'co-operation'
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and 'responsible trade unionism', not 'confrontation' and 'militancy'.
It could hardly have been otherwise. Labour had been beaten into
submission after the upheavals of 1959 and 1960, racial divisions
within the trade union movement had undermined labour unity, and the
new labour laws of 1964 strapped the workers into yet another
straitjacket. Physical repression, racial unionism and ideological
softening paved the way for co-optation. With organized labour
successfully roped into formal arrangements biased in favour of capital,
the management of industrial relations became easier. Class
containment had become easier. Class relations were now more
formalized, more institutionalized, more routinized. Therein lie the
immediate origins oftripartism in Fiji, a development which culminated
in the formation of the Tripartite Forum in 1976. It is not surprising
that industrial strife in the 1960s did not approach the level nor the
intensity of upheavals at the beginning of the decade (see Table 6.1).
Table 6.1 Strike Activity 1960-1970
No. of Workers Workdays
Year Strikes involved Lost
1960 14 4,692 12,017
1961 8 1,319 4,711
1962 n.a. n.a. n.a.
1963 5 263 343
1964 4 1,531 3,516
1965 4 194 331
1966 2 35 101
1967 12 1,421 7,308
1968 17 2,438 4,110
1969 27 1,521 4,526
1970 8 887 752
Source: Reddy (1974:111).
Against the general pattern of industrial calm in the 1960s, the
levels of strike activity in 1967 and 1968 stand out as significant
exceptions. Their origins lay in the provision of more fiscal incentives
for the tourist industry under the 1964 Hotels Aid Ordinance. Within a
year the tourist boom was underway. Not unexpectedly, workers in the
industry agitated for better wages and conditions.
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The dismissal of three workers at the Korolevu Beach Hotel in
1965 provoked a strike in support of demands for recognition and
iimproved conditions of work. The company refused, fie workers
walked off their jobs and were subsequently sacked. Soon afterwards
twenty-seven luxury units at the hotel were burned. A strike affecting
workers at the Skylodge and Mocambo hotels later that year was
followed in 1966 by a strike by airport workers. The hidden
contradictions of the growing tourist industry were beginning to
surface.
When the Airport, Hotel and Catering Workers struck against
Qantas Airways in 1967 and 1968, the very existence of the tourist
industry seemed to be threatened. Consequently the reaction against the
strikers was much stronger than previously. The union and its
president, Apisai Tora, were roundly slammed by Qantas, hotel
groups, the Fiji Visitors' Bureau and the colonial state alike (Fiji Times
6 April 1968; Annual Report of the Ministry of Labour 1968:9), and
the Ministry of Labour described the outcome of the 1968 dispute in
this way:
It is interesting and perhaps salutary to note that the disruptive
tactics employed by the union in pursuit of its unrealitic claims
achieved no more for its members, and in some cases even
less, that the more moderate policy and the use of collective
bargaining procedures adopted by the majority of the other
unions (ibid.).
Here was a subtle warning to workers generally, and to those in
the tourist industry in particular, of the need for a ' co-operative ' and
'responsible' attitude. Any threat to the industry would not be treated
lightly. The boom in international capitalism, and the resulting sharp
increase in international tourism, was benefitting the Fiji economy.
Capital and the colonial state were both adamant that its spin-offs
should not be jeopardized by workers. Claims for better wages and
working conditions were fine so long as they were 'realistic'.
Despite the hiccups of 1967 and 1968, the containment of labour in
the 1960s was generally successful and a relatively stable industrial
environment contributed to the rapid economic growth. Between 1963
and 1969, the Gross Domestic Product rose from $94 million to $141
million; annual growth rates leapt from 4.1 per cent to 8.4 per cent.
Much of this growth was due to the massive increase in tourism which
quickly rivalled sugar as a major earner of foreign revenue. In 1963
sugar accounted for 60 per cent of gross foreign exchange while
tourism accounted for a mere 7.5 per cent. By 1969 those figures had
changed to 38 per cent and 27.9 per cent respectively and they
remained around these levels into the 1980s.
110 Beyond the Politics of Race
Table 6.2 Gross Foreign Exchange Earnings from Sugar
and Tourism for Selected Years 1963 to 1980
Total All Exports Sugar as % Tourism as %
Plus Tourism ($mil) ofTotal ofTotal
1963
1966
1969
1972
1975
1978
1980
47.9
47.5
73.8
102.9
211.2
252.5
427.6
60.1
45.7
38.0
33.3
44.8
33.0
40.7
7.5
17.9
27.9
32.0
32.7
34.1
28.5
Sources: Bureau of Statistics, Fiji Tourism andMigration Statistics
1979180, p.56; and Britton (1979:390).
By the 1970s the precise nature of the neocolonial economy had
become clearer. Proportionately, the size of the primary sector shrank,
whereas the distribution and several related sectors grew and the state
sector expanded greatly. This pattern would remain fairly constant
thereafter, establishing the hallmark of the neocolonial economy. Much
was said about the need for diversification and indeed attempts were
made to diversify but so far they have failed, at least in terms of
productive activity. For as Table 6.3 shows, it is the financial and state
sectors which have recorded the largest growth.
Beneath the economic bouyancy of the 1960s, hidden pressures
built up. The external orientation of the economy was worsened by a
bourgeoning tourist industry which relied heavily on imports.
Consequently a trade surplus of nearly $4 million soon turned into an
evergrowing deficit which rose from $3 million in 1964 to $28 million
in 1970. (By 1980 it stood at $153 million, and in 1985 $237
million.1)
Bureau of Statistics, Overseas Trade Fiji, 1981, p.ll; and Bureau of
Statistics, Current Economic Statistics, April 1987, p.53.
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Table 6.3 Sectoral Composition of GDP for Selected
Years 1963-1984 (%)
1963 1968 1973 1978 1980 1984
Agriculture, forestry, fishing 41 26 21 23 23 19
Manufacturing 12 1S 10 12 12 9
Building and construction 5 5 6 7 9 6
Mining,quarrying,electricity
gas and water 3 3 3 1 1 4
Transport and communication 7 5 8 9 10 9
Distribution (incl. tourism) 10 13 23 18 17 18
Finance and insurance 8 12 14 13 12 13
Government and other services 14 21 15 17 16 22
100 100 100 100 100 100
Sources: Bureau of Statistics, Annual Statistical Abstracts 1969,
p. 137 and 1970171, p.7; Current Economic Statistics,
February 1975, February 1980, January 1984, April 1987.
The high cost of imports contributed to rising inflation. Alarmed,
the state commissioned an investigation into the upward price trend in
1964. The Turner Report's recommendation of a prices and incomes
policy was not implemented, with the result that the inflationary spiral,
after a temporary lull, picked up again. By the end of the decade
inflationary pressures refuelled class tensions, and even the relatively
docile trade union movement became increasingly agitated. The number
of strikes rose from a low of 2 in 1966 to 12 in 1967, 17 in 1968 and
peaked at 27 in 1969.
However, with the prospect of independence being achieved in
1970, workers rallied behind the call for cooperation and nation-
building and the number of strikes fell to 8. Once the euphoria of
October 1970 passed, the underlying class tensions soon resurfaced
and forced the six-month old Fijian-dominated postcolonial state to
introduce price controls in April 1971. The intensifying contradictions
of the first decade of neocolonial Fiji were about to burst forth.
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Fijian discontent: aspirations and disadvantage
Having sketched the broad outlines of the structure and underlying
class tensions of the neocolonial economy, we are now better placed
for a clearer understanding of the origins and persistence of the cry 'Fiji
for the Fijians'.
'Fijian economic backwardness' has usually been explained in
terms of such factors as 'subsistence affluence', preference for the
'leisurely' village lifestyle, lack of entrepreneurship and capitalist
discipline, the persistence of communalistic as opposed to
individualistic values, pressures from traditional obligations, and
academic underachievement. While these factors cannot be dismissed,
they need to be understood in the context of a deeper structural cause,
the form of Fijian incorporation into the capitalist-dominated economy.
There is, however, one other particular factor which is often mentioned
and which requires scrutiny: lack of capital. This has always been a
major obstacle to Fijian economic advancement and the record of state
assistance is itself telling.
We have already commented on the 1948 reorganization of the
Fijian administration, and in particular the formation of the Fijian
Affairs Board. Reorganization ensured the survival of the Fijian
bureaucratic bourgeoisie, and strengthened its position within the ruling
class. The power base of this chief-dominated bureaucratic bourgeoisie
was of course the predominantly-peasant Fijian population whose
persistent economic disadvantage had to be addressed if its continuing
loyalty was to be maintained. In other words, the Fijian bureaucratic
bourgeoisie had to use the greater autonomy and resources now
available to it to alleviate the economic condition of the Fijian labouring
classes.
To some extent such a strategy necessitated the Fijian bureaucratic
bourgeoisie sacrificing at least some of its class interests, unless of
course the Fijian administration could be presented as an institution
working for the advancement of the Fijian 'people' rather than for the
enhancement of the Fijian bureaucratic bourgeoisie's class interests.
The charade worked but with the obvious result that its economic
experiments to rectify the economic disadvantage of the Fijian masses
failed.
In 1956 W.G. Johnson, a local European member of the
Legislative Council, proposed an agricultural resettlement scheme for
Fijians in which individual farmers would be given long-term leases of
native land, a loan, and agricultural advice. Three years later, his
suggestion was commended highly by Oskar Spate who had been
commissioned to investigate the 'economic problems and prospects of
the Fijian people'. Among its advantages, Spate claimed, was the
strengthening of 'individual independence' and, more importantly, 'a
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withering away of the communal system' (Spate 1959:21). He believed
the root causes of Fijian economic backwardness lay with the
communal system and the Fijian Administration, both having been
'designed for non-economic ends' (ibid.:5). As he put it:
Any system which bases itself primarily on the maintenance of
the traditional structure must...reconcile itself to seeing much
of its economic effort stranded on the reefs of hierarchy and
particularism (ibid.:T).
At the same time the Burns Commission was 'enquiring into the
natural resources and population of the colony', and its 1960 report
blamed the colonial state for the Fijian economic problem:
We do not blame the Fijians for this so much as the
Government and the Legislature for so long adopting a
paternalistic attitude and for still giving high priority to
fostering, at this period of the 20th century, 'the continuance
of the Fijian communal system and the customs and
observances traditionally associated with that system (Burns et
al. 1960:38).
The Commission had no doubts about what should happen to the
Fijian Administration:
[It is] an unnecessary expense which Fiji cannot afford. In a
colony of this size a double administration is wasteful of
manpower...We [are] definitely of the opinion that the Fijian
Administration should not continue for any longer than is
absolutely necessary (ibid.:3l).
Not surprisingly the Commission's recommendation for the
gradual abolition of the Fijian administration was rejected by the
Council of Chiefs but its suggestion that the initiative for improving the
Fijian economic condition should come from the colonial state won
official approval. Before considering its specific proposals, let us
briefly consider another very significant proposition put forward by the
Commission.
It argued that there was little point in trying to get Fijians involved
in industry because they lacked 'entrepreneurship' and, very
significantly, capital. We would agree that most Fijians lacked capitalist
entrepreneurship but that is perfectly understandable, given the nature
of their integration into the capitalist-dominated economy. Much the
same can be said about the Fijian lack of capital. How could they
acquire capital when they were denied access to capital-accumulating
opportunities? Furthermore, as Table 6.4 indicates, the very colonial
state that was supposed to advance Fijians economically in fact pursued
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financial lending policies which benefitted non-Fijian borrowers much
more than Fijian ones.
Table 6.4 Agricultural and Industrial Loans Board Loans By
Race 1952-1961
European Indian Part Chinese FijianEuropean
Year No. Av.Size No. Av.Size No. Av.Size No. Av.SizeNo.Av.Size
£ £ £ £ £
1952/3 5 7,433 59 1,457 1 15,000 1 7,500 9 266
1953/54 5 5,230 44 805 3 4,323 2 1,650 10 195
1954/55 10 2,277 58 650 3 2,400 2 2,750 9 190
1955/56 9 2,634 59 824 2 310 - - 10 146
1956/57 14 13,435 62 1,276 2 1030 3 2,167 16 543
1957/58 19 6,293 38 1,367 4 1,419 1 500 23 436
1958/59 15 1,899 20 504 3 1,433 - - 11 217
1959/60 18 4,512 24 1,202 6 265 1 1,500 27 617
1960/61 16 6,558 25 1,370 10 534 1 150 70 650
%of IS 52 53 34 5 5 2 2 25 7
Total
Source: Agricultural and Industrial Loans Board Annual Report 1961, p.5.
In the 1950s the Agricultural and Industrial Loans Board was
profoundly biased against Fijians and in favour of Europeans. In the
period 1952/53-1960/61, Europeans received 15 per cent of all loans
and 52 per cent of all money while Fijians obtained 25 per cent of the
loans but only 7 per cent of the money. And it is significant that the
Board's lending to Fijians improved sharply in 1960 and 1961 - after
the submission of the Spate and Burns Reports. But even then, Fijians
still figured worse than Europeans.
The Burns Commission's major recommendations for state
initiatives for Fijian economic advancement had to do with agrarian
reform. Agricultural policy, it suggested, should be changed and
geared towards the 'emergence of the independent farmer' and the
specific areas which it pointed to included land policy, agricultural
extension services, credit provision and marketing arrangements.
Further, it suggested a series of agricultural projects ranging from tea
production to cattle ranching.
Capitalist consolidation, racial tension and decolonization 115
Acting on these recommendations, the colonial state announced in
June 1961 that a Land Development Authority would be established to
promote and assist the 'investigation, formation and carrying out of
projects for the development, improvement and settlement of land' (Fiji
Times 24 June 1961). In particular, the Authority would 'give the
Fijian community...assistance in the development of their land' (Fiji
Times 2 August 1961). In August, the Land Development Authority
(LDA) was formed and in conjuction with the Fijian A(iministration set
about its task. The showpiece of this experiment in Fijian economic
advancement was the Lomaivuna banana project but barely six years
later it collapsed. Other projects suffered the same fate.
During the 1960s there was a distinct pattern of agricultural lending
by the Agricultural and Industrial Loans Board which corresponded
closely to the fortunes of the agrarian experiment. Between 1960 and
1965, when the experiment was mooted and then implemented, the
number of agricultural loans given by the Board rose from 92 to 2,140.
From 1966 onwards, however, when projects began to collapse, the
number of agricultural loans fell off sharply. The figure for 1966 was
740; by 1969 it had dropped to 280 (see annual reports of the
Agricultural and Industrial Loans Board 1960-1967, and annual reports
of the Fiji Development Bank 1968-1971).
By the mid 1960s, then, economic projects in which the Fijian
Administration was involved showed virtually no promise of success.
When Cyril Belshaw published his authoritative work Under The Ivi
Tree in 1964, he presented the first public explanation for the failure of
the Fijian Administration as an agent of Fijian economic development.
His access to officials and documents of the Administration allowed
him to acquire unique insights and his analysis was widely respected.
He concluded that
the effects of the Fijian Administration on the economic
growth of the Fijian people have been little short of disastrous,
and the source of much of the difficulty lies within the
structure and philosophy of the Administration as a political
unit (Belshaw 1964:236).
Belshaw acknowledged that the Administration was hampered by
organizational weaknesses and lack of funds but the thrust of his
criticism is clearly aimed at its domination by the Fijian bureaucratic
bourgeoisie. For example, in the appointment of officers, he claimed
that the Administration 'leaned heavily on the side of family position
and benign paternal, even aristocratic authority' (ibid.). More
generally, it tended 'to lean on autocratic authority and to exercise it
arbitrarily and sometimes capriciously' (ibid.).
Belshaw pointed to the deep structural and ideological bias of the
Fijian Administration towards the class interests of chiefs and other
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members of the Fijian bureaucratic bourgeoisie. Some years later
Norton took up the same theme and said of the Fijian Affairs Board that
'its conservatism, reflected its domination by a political elite of chiefs
linked as a multiplex group by kin or affinal ties, and by associations in
the Council of Chiefs and Legislative Council' (Norton 1972:223).
Given its class character, the failure of the Fijian Administration to
alleviate the plight of the Fijian labouring classes is not surprising. It is
true, of course, that the Administration was restricted in what it could
achieve by its limited resources and, more generally, by its limited
power within the wider political economy. Our point, however, is that
it was even more limited by its internal class bias.
The attack on the Fijian Administration by the Spate and Burns
Commissions was unwelcome within Fijian ruling circles. Yet within
those circles, also, there existed some recognition that Fijian
commoners were increasingly disgruntled at the failure of the Fijian
Administration to improve their lot. Unless something was done, the
constraining effect of the Administration on the Fijian labouring classes
would rebound on the Fijian elite sooner or later. Consequently,
although the Council of Chiefs, at its meeting in 1960, rejected the
Burns Commission's recommendation for the gradual abolition of the
Fijian Administration, it did agree to some changes. A review of the
Administration was initiated and various changes were implemented in
1962 and 1967. Rusiate Nayacakalou, the man appointed to oversee the
reorganization, claimed that the changes were linked to a 'clamour for
freedom' among the Fijian people living in the villages (quoted in Cole
etal. 1984:5).
Rodney Cole and his colleagues have recently suggested that in
agreeing to reorganization the chiefs acted on their 'profound concern
for the Fijian people'. The motivation for change, they suggest, came
from the 'top down' (ibid.:6). Our argument, however, is quite the
reverse. It is probably true that there were chiefs who were genuinely
concerned. The point, however, is that in order to defend their interests
as a class they had to accept change. The particular system of
administration which they dominated and which was supposed to
advance the welfare of their followers did not measure up to
expectations. They could always abolish the system and sacrifice their
own class interests. Alternatively they could resist change and risk
further erosion of commoner loyalty, or they could agree to a
reorganization and hope by this means to stem commoner discontent
Our argument is that mere were structural forces at work and social
developments occurring which were simply much larger than even the
genuine concerns of individuals. The administrative structure the chiefs
dominated was stifling the progress of those it was supposed to serve.
Consequently it had to adapt to the realities of the times, to
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promote individualism and economic competitiveness among
the Fijian people. Custom and tradition were seen as
impediments to economic advancement; village life, and the
communal responsibilities entailed by it, was also regarded as
an obstacle to be overcome rather than a way of life to be
strengthened and enhanced (ibid.).
But as the administrative straitjacket was loosened, Fijian doubts
about the efficacy of the experiment persisted. Despite reorganization,
Fijian economic initiatives continued to fail. Also, geared as it was to
the rural setting, the Fijian administration seemed incapable of
responding adequately to new Fijian economic aspirations. The
economic boom was not in agriculture but in tourism, commerce,
building, transportation and the state sector. And Fijians wanted a piece
of the action.
Evidence of the changing character of Fijian economic aspirations
emerged as early as 1959 when a Fijian peasant organization, Dra ni
Lami, was formed in western Viti Levu. It did not last long but was
revived two years later as a cooperative organization known as the Bula
Tale. It too had a short life. Many might have believed R.A. Kearsley
when, in December 1964, he told the Legislative Council that the Fijian
was 'not good at commerce' and that his economic salvation lay in the
land (Burns etal. 1960:47).
But many Fijians had different ideas. In 1965, as the tourist boom
got underway, the short-lived Fijian Advancement Party called on the
colonial state (and, significantly, not the Fijian Administration) to
initiate a 'full-scale Fijian economic development plan' (Fiji Times 1
April 1965). It identified poor education as the key reason for Fijian
economic backwardness and drew this telling comparison: 'Practially
all professional, trained Fijians, except the clergy, are in the
Government service. The independent Indian middle class is weak but
the Fijian one is non-existent, and this [is] a serious matter' (ibid.).
In the following May, Ratu Mara told the Annual Convention of
the Fijian Association that the reason for the poor standard of higher
education among Fijians was their financial situation, and against the
view that Fijian economic advancement lay in agriculture, he argued
thus: 'our economy does not depend on the soil alone...Industries will
increase in importance in the future and they will provide a variety of
jobs' (Fiji Times 28 June 1966). Fijians, therefore, should be
encouraged to look to the industrial sector for a livelihood.
The next convention of the Fijian Association, held in May 1967,
had as its theme 'the economic weakness of the Fijian people'. Many
Fijians had by this time taken up jobs in the tourist industry but only a
few had set up their own businesses. Said Ratu Edward Cakobau, then
member for Commerce, Industry and Tourism: 'the general opinion of
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experts [is] that there [is] not one single project...[involving] Fijians
which [had] continued for any noticeable length of time' (Fiji Times 23
May 1967). Fijians, he argued, exhibited a 'definite absence of
commercial awareness', unreliability, and the lack of 'authority,
leadership and cohesion'. And that, he added, was unfortunate because
it was 'of vital importance' that Fijians derived a major direct benefit
from tourism.
It is interesting that lack of capital did not figure in Cakobau's list
of reasons for Fijian failures, all the more so because the largest loans
given by the Agricultural and Industrial Loans Board during the 1960s
went to the tourist sector. (See Table 6.5 below.) What is more, they
were given to a very small number of borrowers - less than five in each
year! A racial breakdown of the Board's loans in the 1960s is not
available but it is unlikely, given the racial pattern of the preceding
decade, that the relatively huge tourist loans went to Fijians. More than
likely, they went to Europeans. If that was the case, then Ratu
Cakobau's admonition of Fijians for their unreliability and lack of
commerical awareness needs to be tempered by the. racist, and in
particular anti-Fijian, bias of the colonial state's lending policy. Again
we ask: how could Fijians have possibly competed successfully in the
face of structural disadvantages such as mis?
Table 6.5 Agricultural and Industrial Loans Board Loans
Profile 1960-1969
% of Total Value No. of loans to Average Loan Size
of all loans to: Indust Sector
Year Agric. Indust Total Tourism Agric. Indust Tourism
Sector Sector Sub-sector
1960 39 69 30 4 £803 £3,879 £15,861
1961 57 43 27 2 292 1,530 4,200
1963 91 9 12 3 258 1,439 3,155
1964 68 32 16 2 149 4,775 20,000
1965 53 47 30 4 142 10,118 62,650
1966 62 38 14 3 304 10,036 34,000
1968 44 56 15 4 $740 $28,326 $28,250
1969 25 75 42 3 767 28,734 27,333
Sources :Agricultural and Industrial Loans Board annual reports 1960
1967 and Fiji Development Bank Annual Report 1968-1969.
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The general tenor of discussions at the May 1967 convention of the
Fijian Association testified to growing Fijian concern about their
economic 'backwardness' generally and the failure of Fijian businesses
in particular. A significant response to that concern was the formation
of the Fijian Chamber of Commerce in March 1968. At its official
opening, which was attended by more than 4,000 Fijians, the
president, Viliame Savu, delivered this message 'from the Fijian
people':
Please co-operate with us and lay no obstacle across the path
of seeking people. The absence of Fijians in the business field
[is] not only a challenge to the Fijians themselves, it is also a
question to be answered by the British Government (Fiji
Times 26 March 1968).
The aim of the Chamber, he later told the Fiji Times, was 'to assist
Fijians with commercial experience and training and their business
operations generally' (ibid.). But the Chamber did not last very long.
Despondency at the failure of yet another Fijian initiative was lifted
when the Fijian Association announced in November 1968 that it
would establish a 'development corporation to centralise and control
Fijian economic efforts'. The corporation would be 'owned and
controlled by Fijians' (Fiji Times 30 November 1968). In April 1969
the Fijian Investments and Development Corporation was formed. It
was sponsored by the 'Fijian chiefs of the major provinces headed by
the Vunivalu of Bau, Ratu George Cakobau, the Chief Minister, Ratu
Sir Kamisese Mara, Ratu Edward Cakobau and Ratu Penaia Ganilau'
(Fiji Times 10 April 1969). Although two board members were from
the country's western region, the corporation was clearly dominated by
easterners, particularly from Lau, Bau and Cakaudrove. The
corporation lasted longer than earlier initiatives, but it too, like others
which followed later, ended in failure.
Aiming for state power: the Fijian bureaucratic
bourgeoisie
On the eve of independence, then, the list of Fijian business failures
had grown considerably. Fijian attempts at constituting an indigenous
capitalist class had not succeeded. Yet, in the face of a whole series of
economic and competitive disadvantages, it was virtually impossible
for a Fijian capitalist class to emerge. Neither established capitalist
interests nor the colonial state were willing to create economic space for
the development of a Fijian bourgeoisie.
However, by the middle of the 1960s an alternative route to that
goal emerged— state power. Once it became clear that independence
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would come, aspiring Fijians saw in state power the most likely route
towards the development of an indigenous bourgeoisie. And as we
shall see, the contest for state power was essentially a bourgeois
contest, a contest in which the masses figured little and which produced
a multiracial bourgeois alliance dominated by Fijians.
By the beginning of the 1960s, anti-imperialist struggles in British
colonies had gathered momentum and the 'winds of change' which
blew over Africa and Asia soon reached Fiji. In March 1960 the
secretary of state for the colonies, Ian Macleod, informed the House of
Commons that he had no plans for further constitutional reforms in Fiji
beyond the few changes incorporated in the Fiji Letters Patent which
came into effect at the beginning of that year. (Those changes had to do
largely with the election ofFijian members to the Legislative Council.
Later that year the under secretary, Julian Amery, seemed to reaffirm
Britain's position: 'drastic' constitutional changes would not be
introduced (Fiji Times 28 October 1960).
But those statements did not dampen growing speculation within
Fiji about the country's political future. When the Legislative Council
debated the question of constitutional change in December 1960, the
matter of Fijian interests immediately came to the fore. Ratu Mara, for
example, insisted that if change was to come, then control of the land
must pass to Fijians (Fiji Times 15 December 1960).
Early in 1961 the colonial state proposed constitutional changes
leading to internal self-government. Immediately the Fiji Times,
mouthpiece of white capital, called for an 'All-Fiji Convention' to
discuss the proposals. Many Indians favoured the changes but
reiterated their call for a common roll. Representatives of local
European capital rejected the idea of self-government: 'any change in
the constitutional position is desired by no more than a small minority'
(Fiji Times 14 April 1961). Motions of opposition were passed at
meetings of the predominantly-white Suva and Federated Chambers of
Commerce (Fiji Times 14, 18 April 1961). When the proposed changes
were debated in the Legislative Council in April, Fijian Council
members again used the opportunity to make strong statements about
Fijian rights. The anti-Indian bias of the alliance between local white
capital and the chiefly class was unmistakeable.
The intensity of the bias was underlined in the following August
when the Council debated the overseas aid scheme and in the course of
the proceedings Ravuama Vunivalu staked a claim for the Fijian
bureaucratic bourgeoisie. He called for 'Fijian supremacy in the Civil
Service' and challenged Indian members to make known their attitude
towards that.
Nevertheless the Fijian leadership was still unsure about its
position on independence. In the early stages of 1962 their attitude was
that should Britain withdraw from the country then Fijians must be
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given control. Realizing, however, that the pressure for constitutional
change was mounting, they had to clarify their position. Consequently
the Fijian Association, the leading indigenous organization, convened a
series of meetings to discuss the matter. At the end of the year
Ravuama Vunivalu told the Legislative Council that Fijians did not
want independence and that constitutional changes should be
introduced only when Fijians expressed a wish for them. Not
surprisingly the local European members of the Council supported their
stand. Indians did not (Fiji Times 13 December 1962).
Fijian opposition to independence stemmed primarily from the
general weakness of the Fijian position. Fijians lacked economic clout
and the resources necessary for Fijian political mobilization. They were
organizationally weak and possessed few politically-experienced
members. Importantly, there were still no firm signs from the colonial
state of any commitment to the 'paramountcy of Fijian interests'. In
short, the Fijian leadership was not sufficiently strong to mount a bid
for state power.
Soon after Vunivalu's statement to the Council, the new under
secretary of state for the colonies, Nigel Fisher, gave assurances that
the principles of the Deed of Cession were 'inviolate' (Fiji Times 22
January 1963). To the Fijian leadership it was comforting news but no
immediate change of position took place. When the United Nations
Committee on Decolonization began discussing Britain's failure to take
Fiji towards self-determination, Fijian and European leaders rebuked it
Ratu Edward Cakobau, Ratu Mara, Ravuama Vunivalu and Semesa
Sikivou issued this statement:
Whatever the Committee of 24 might have to say about the
government of our country, the Fijian members of the
Legislative Council, on behalf of our people, want it to be
known that we do not desire their inteference nor are we
impressed with their much publicised utterances (Fiji Times 5
July 1963).
Again the European members supported them. John Falvey declared:
All right thinking people will treat the vapourings of certain
representatives in the Committee on Colonialism with
disdain...We shall hear no more of this nonsense (Fiji Times 6
July 1963).
It was not to be of course. Pressure from the United Nations
continued.
With anti-imperialist pressure continuing to grow, Britain finally
announced in August 1963 that a conference would be convened to
discuss constitutional changes in Fiji. Some Fijians were indignant.
The Fijian leadership, however, recognized that the tide of events
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pointed strongly in one direction and preparations should be made.
State power was at stake, and all the economic benefits that might flow
from it.
The level of Fijian political activity now increased. The details of
that activity are not important here; our main concern is to identify some
of the major developments in order to see how the dynamics of race
and class shaped the struggle for state power. In particular, we want to
see how racist ideology and practice was intensified in order to
consolidate the alliance between white capital and the Fijian
bureaucratic bourgeoisie.
Alliance, multiracialism and Fijian political dominance
The formation in 1964 of two Fijian political parties in western Viti
Levu underlined the significance of the regional cleavage which divided
Fijians. In Sabeto, Nadi, Apisai Tora formed the Fijian Democratic
Party, which was an offshoot of the earlier but shortlived Western
Democratic Party. Isikeli Nadalo formed die Fijian National Party and
later in the year made submissions to the governor, asking that Fijians
be given a 'prominent place' in the political control of the country (Fiji
Times 8 September 1964). Also in Nadi, a group of mainly
professional Indians formed the Fiji Labour Party (no connection to the
present Fiji Labour Party) and called for a common roll and an 'attempt
to eradicate economic exploitation of the masses by ruthless capitalists'
(Fiji Times 25 August 1964).
The Fijian Association also considered its position oh constitutional
change at a meeting in June and held another in January 196S led by
Ratu Mara, Ratu George Cakobau, Ratu Penaia Ganilau (eastern chiefs
all) and Josua Rabukawaqa. The proposed Constitutional Conference
was scheduled for the following August, so a clear position had to be
worked out. Very importantly, also in January 1965 Ayodhya Prasad,
secretary of the Kisan Sangh, initiated moves for the formation of yet
another party, the National Congress of Fiji. This was eventually to
become the third leg of Alliance Party, the Indian Alliance.
By the end of February 1965, the Fijian Association had
established, or was in the process of establishing, new branches in
Suva and Nausori in the east and Nadi and Lautoka in the west.
Representatives of local white capital also took steps to defend their
position. Suva lawyer R.G.Kermode urged Europeans in the west to
formulate a position for the forthcoming constitutional conference. The
predominantly-Indian Federation Party, formed in the aftermath of the
sugarcane farmers' strike in 1960, stood firm in its resolve to push for
a common roll. And in Labasa an Indian lawyer, H. Kohli, formed the
Fiji Independent Liberal Party to hasten the advent of self-government
arid promote racial unity (Fiji Times 4 May 1965).
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In June, however, the ideal of racial unity was jolted when about
4,000 people, mainly Fijians, attended a meeting of the Fijian
Democratic Party and heard its leader, Apisai Tora, insist that there
should be no Indian representatives at the constitutional conference and
that a commission be set up to arrange for the resettlement of Indians
outside Fiji (Fiji Times 18 June 1965). To Europeans, he extended a
'hand of friendship' but added a warning: *[N]o monkey business
please. Make no mistake about our determination to fight for and win
our rights' (Fiji Times 19 June 1965).
Even as Tora was fuelling racist sentiment, the Fijian Association,
the political arm of chief-dominated Fijian bureaucratic bourgeoisie,
was moving to forge an alliance with certain sections of the Indian
community. In a strategic political move, the Fijian Association invited
Indians to hold joint discussions before the forthcoming conference but
stressed that what it wanted was unity, not a common roll (Fiji Times
14 June 1965). Its calculated move marked the beginning of a major
turnaround in the dynamics of race and class in Fiji.
The Fijian Association felt that a common electoral roll for an
independent Fiji would favour the Indian-dominated Federation Party.
By building bridges with sections of the Indian community, it hoped to
weaken support for a common roll. Such an alliance would have the
even bigger advantage of being multiracial. If the Fijian Association
could bring together - and dominate - a multiracial political grouping,
then not only would its chances of thwarting moves towards a common
roll be greater but also its position would be strengthened considerably
because the alliance it would lead would be much more 'representative'
of Fiji society and hence more appealing and acceptable.
About a week after the Fijian Association issued its invitation, the
National Congress of Fiji called for the various races to work 'hand in
hand'. A few days later, on 25 June, a 'representative' group of Fijian,
Indian and European political leaders met in Suva and 'reached
unanimous conclusions on a number of constitutional matters,
including opposition to a common roll for Legislative Council
elections' (Fiji Times 28 June 1965). Present at the meeting were those
who subsequently formed the nucleus of the Alliance Party: Ratu Mara,
Ratu Edward Cakobau, Ratu George Cakobau, Semesa Sikivou, John
Falvey, Vijay R. Singh, K.S. Reddy, James Shankar Singh and
Manikam Pillai. The last four represented the National Congress of
Fiji. Later they would spearhead the formation of the Indian Alliance.
A statement issued by the 25 June meeting described the event as a
'turning point towards racial understanding and tolerance at a
responsible level in Fiji' (ibid.). It also said that similar meetings would
be held both before arid after the constimtional conference in London in
order to 'maintain the goodwill created and to put into resolute action
the decisions made by the representatives' (ibid). A major turnabout
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had occurred in the dynamics of race and class. The chief-dominated
Fijian bureaucratic bourgeoisie and local white capital had forged an
alliance with bourgeois Indians and the ideology of racialism began to
give way to its opposite— multiracialism.
The most crucial aspect of this whole development was its
bourgeois character. Essentially a petty bourgeois contest, the struggle
for state power nonetheless had all the appearances of being a racial
one. Because the struggle was dominated by bourgeois leaders who
defined and waged their battle along racial lines, the underlying class,
and in particular bourgeois, character of the struggle for state power
remained hidden. Even the vast majority of the working classes saw
developments in racial terms, hence it is not surprising that the class
interests of Fiji's labouring masses figured little. The emergent
ideology of multiracialism was, indeed, a major development in that it
put a new face on the racialform of Fiji politics. But as with the
ideology of racialism which it came to replace, multiracialism also hid
the underlying class content ofFiji politics. The racial form of the class
struggle now had a different and more acceptable face but it remained
racial nonetheless. And that change in appearance left the underlying
system of class exploitation virtually intact
Note, however, that we say the system of class exploitation rather
than the class structure. The new ideology of multiracialism was
necesssary in order to change the class structure; in particular, it was
necessary in order to ensure Fijian state power, strengthen the Fijian
bureaucratic bourgeoisie and, very importantly, apply that power to
constitute a Fijian capitalist class. As we shall see, the first two
objectives would be achieved but not the third. But first we return to
the historic meeting of 25 June 1965.
Enthusiastic in its praise for the outcome of the meeting, the Fiji
Times applauded the 'statesmanlike' approach of those involved and
berated the four members ofthe Federation Party who refused to attend
— A.D. Patel, Siddiq Koya, James Madhavan and C.A. Shah. At a
similar meeting in July, representatives of the Chinese and various
Pacific Island coummunities were also present to give to the Fijian and
European delegates at the London conference full authority to represent
them. At the same time the predominantly-Muslim Fiji Minority Party
sent a memorandum to the secretary of state for the colonies asking for
separate Muslim representation in any future legislature (Fiji Times 19
July 1965).
The Constitutional Conference was held at Marlborough House in
London and ended on 9 August 1965. Its principal recommendations
were the retention of the communal electoral system; an enlarged
Legislative Council with fourteen Fijian, twelve Indian and ten General
Elector seats; and a ministerial system of government. The first, not
unexpectedly, proved the thorny issue of the meeting and both at and
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after the conference condemnation was heaped on the representatives of
the Federation Party for their opposition to communal rolls. In the
following December the recommendations were debated in the
Legislative Council and accepted. That seal of approval was a major
victory for the bourgeois alliance which had been formed just six
weeks earlier. More importantly, it boosted the likelihood of Fijian state
power in independent Fiji. Eight months later, in February 1966, a
General Electors Association was formed, membership being open to
all voters registered on the General Roll. A few days later, a meeting of
'more than sixty men and women of all of Fiji's major races' resolved
to form a 'political alliance or organization' concerned with the welfare
of the people of Fiji. In March 1966 the Alliance Party was formally
launched. Among its objectives was the promotion of 'goodwill,
tolerance, understanding and harmony among all the Colony's
communities' (Fiji Times 28 February 1966). Multiracialism was thus
embraced as the ideology of the party which would enjoy almost
uninterrupted power until its defeat in April 1987.
In a test of strength, the Alliance Party soundly defeated the
Federation Party in the 1966 elections, winning twenty-three seats to
the Federation's nine, the remaining four going to two independent
candidates and two nominees of the Council of Chiefs. Deeply
dissatisfied with the outcome ofboth the constitutional conference and
the elections, the Federation Party tabled a motion in the Legislative
Council in September 1967 calling for a new constitutional conference.
Vijay R. Singh, minister for Social Services, immediately opposed it
and moved an amendment. As he spoke the opposition staged a mass
walkout.
In the resulting by-elections, which were held between 31 August
and 7 September 1968, all nine opposition members were returned with
increased majorities. To the Alliance Party, but more particularly its
Fijian members, their success was a slap in the face. Leading Fijian
members of the party immediately initiated a Colony-wide campaign to
find out whether or not Fijians wanted independence and a common
roll. A meeting of some 2,000 Fijians in Suva on Wednesday 9
September 'unanimously voted against independence and a common
roll' (Fiji Times 13 September 1968). Strong views against the
Federation Party were also expressed and a statement issued after the
meeting said:
the control of the land should be returned to Fijian hands, by
force if need be...No further abuse levelled against Fijian
chiefs and traditions by the Federation Party will be tolerated
as from now (ibid.).
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Twenty years later, during the 1987 election campaign and the pre-coup
agitation of the Taukei Movement, precisely the same demands were
expressed.
Three days after the Suva meeting, another meeting was held in
Vatukoula. About 3,000 Fijians attended and again intensely anti-
Indian feelings were expressed. Suggestions were also made mat leases
of Fijian land to Indians should not be renewed and that Indians be
deported. The leasing of Fijian land to Indians, it was said, was a
'gesture of goodwill' but the outcome of the by-elections showed that
the Fijian people had been 'deceived by the Indians' (Fiji Times 16
September 1968). A few days later, a spokesman for the national
committee of the Fijian Association warned that 'any moves to make
Fijians second-class citizens' would be resisted — with force if
necessary. He added:
Should social strife break out in the Colony, the Federation
Party will be held fully responsible for it...Fijians are not
going to fight...for the Indianization of Fiji (Fiji Times 17
September 1968).
The growing racial tension prompted the Synod of the Diocese of
Polynesia to call on the leaders of the country to take 'immediate joint
action' to prevent the country from being split by racial differences (Fiji
Times 19 September 1968). One week later, Ratu Mara, the chief
minister, announced that the Fijian people felt 'betrayed and alarmed'
and that they intended to have their interests defended (Fiji Tunes 27
September 1968). The very next day, chiefs led a procession of about
2,000 people through Ba. Escorting the chiefs were Fijians in
traditional costumes and daubed with war paint. Twenty years later,
similarly dressed Fijians conveyed the same threatening message when
they put down a lovo (earth oven) in the grounds of government
buildings in Suva.
The Federation Party did not respond publicly to these events but
the Fiji Muslims Political Organization did. It announced its 'whole
hearted support' for Fijian opposition to a common roll and called on
all Muslims to support the Fijians 'politically and materially' (Fiji
Times 19 November 1968).
At the same time, Indian supporters of the Alliance Party formed a
National Political Organization of Fiji Indians and announced that they
would seek affiliation with the Alliance. The organization was the
forerunner of the Indian Alliance, the third constituent body of the
party. The other two, the Fijian Association and the General Electors
Association, were already established. Included in the interim
committee of the new organization were Vijay R. Singh, James
Shankar Singh, Ayodhya Prasad and M.T. Khan. The first three had
earlier represented the National Congress of Fiji at the historic meeting
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of 15 June 1965. Vijay Singh was, by now, a minister, his uncle,
James Singh, would be similarly rewarded later.
With the Alliance Party now looking nicely multiracial, the next
task was to seek a rapprochement with the opposition. But why should
that be necessary? After all, the Alliance's resounding electoral victory
in 1966, supported by the increasing power of multiracialism as an
ideology, pointed strongly to Fijian state power in the future.
The need for rapprochement with the Federation Party had to do
essentially with the viability of a Fijian-dominated postcolonial state.
The bulk of the country's wealth was produced by a predominantly-
Indian farmer class which gave much more allegiance to the Federation
Party than the Alliance. To alienate that class would mean risking a
large portion of the finance on which the postcolonial state would
inevitably depend. It was better, therefore, to seek some
accommodation with the Federation Party than to let ill-feelings fester.
In May 1969 Ratu Mara was in London to attend a meeting of the
International Sugar Council. He refused to invite A.D.Patel, the leader
of the Federation Party, to accompany him. The gap between the two
men had always been enormous. But in an interview with the BBC,
Mara said that if there was a prospect of agreement between the major
political parties in Fiji, then another constitutional conference would be
called. Back in Suva in the following June he announced that
discussions on a new constitution for Fiji would be held between the
two major parties. Those discussions commenced in the following
August but mere was little progress.
In October, A.D. Patel died. 'A contentious figure', as Ahmed Ali
put it, 'was removed from the scene'(Ali 1980:160). Siddiq Koya, a
lawyer and a Muslim, assumed the leadership of the Federation Party
and soon proved rather more amenable to cooperation than his
predecessor (Fiji Times 8 October 1969). By the end of the year,
significant agreement between the two parties was reached.
In January 1970 Lord Shepard, minister of state for foreign and
Commonwealth affairs, returned to London satisfied with the degree of
agreement and soon afterwards Britain declared its 'readiness' to grant
independence to Fiji. Further inter-party talks were held and in April
the second constitutional conference began at Marlborough House in
London.
The high level of pre-conference agreement paved the way for a
meeting which lacked the rancour and bitterness of the earlier one. On
the thorny issue of the electoral system, it was agreed that communal
rolls would be retained but also that sometime after the next general
election (scheduled for 1972) a Commission of Inquiry would be
appointed to investigate 'the most appropriate method of election and
representation in Fiji'. It was a significant compromise. Also, it was
agreed that there should be an equal number of Fijian and Indian seats.
128 Beyond the Politics of Race
But on the number of general elector seats, Ratu Mara and the British
delegation disagreed. The British recommended three, Ratu Mara
insisted on eight And when it became clear that the former would not
change, the high chief from Lau threatened to resign as chief minister
upon his return to Fiji. Thereupon the British delegation agreed to
Mara's figure of eight. Thus was secured the gross over-representation
of general electors which Mara believed would ensure continued
Alliance dominance. Representing a mere 6 per cent ofthe population,
general electors would have 15 per cent of the seats. In this manner Fiji
became independent from Britain on 10 October 1970, after exactly 96
years of British rule.
Chapter 7
Fijian State Power - For Fijians or the Ruling
Class?
Having won state power, the Alliance Party was now faced with the
task of delivering on its promises. The euphoria surrounding
independence strengthened the popularity of the government and its
first two years of office were relatively easy. But by 1973 the
honeymoon period had ended.
As we have seen, a significant feature of the struggle for state
power was the major change in the ruling ideology. The vehement anti-
Indian racism of the early 1960s gave way to the ideology of
multiracialism. Once it became clear in the second half of the decade
that power would pass to a Fijian state bourgeoisie dominated by
eastern chiefs and their commoner allies, the moderation of anti-Indian
sentiment became possible. Clearly, however, such a change was
necessary, not only to placate local Indian capital but more importantly
at that stage to avoid jeopardizing the lifeblood of the economy - sugar.
Most of the sugarcane farmers were Indian and aligned with the
National Federation Party. For them multiracialism would have little
meaning if it did not advance their standard of living.
In 1969 Lord Denning was appointed to arbitrate in the dispute
between the CSR and the canefarmers over the terms of the new ten-
year agreement. The CSR had done well under the Eve Contract
concluded ten years previously, and if it could secure a similar contract
now, it would stay (Moynagh 1981:222). But the Denning Award
favoured the farmers and, very importantly, in the negotiations leading
up to the award the Alliance Party threw its weight behind the farmers.
It could hardly have done otherwise; not to have done so would have
meant risking the legitimacy of the Fijian-dominated state that was soon
to emerge. In 1973 the company sold its operations to the state and
withdrew from Fiji.In 1969, then, the Alliance Party had supported the
farmers and strengthened its claim to the state. In office in 1973, it
inherited the underlying tensions and contradictions which formerly lay
beneath the relationship between the CSR and the farmers.
Another important development was the enactment of the 1973
Trade Disputes Act. By the end of 1972 the contradictions which lay
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beneath the economic boom of the late 1960s and early 1970s were
beginning to surface. As they deepened, class tensions increased, and
when the trade union movement sought to defend the interests of
workers, the highly repressive act was passed. The restrictive effect of
the act soon began to tell, but the state also engaged in a series of
initiatives aimed at establishing a formal arrangement through which
industrial relations could be better regulated. In 1976 the Tripartite
Forum was established and until its collapse in 1986 it was to serve as
a cornerstone for the management of class conflict
A third development in 1973 was the sacking of assistant minister
for Commerce and Industry, Sakeasi Butadroka, for criticizing the
Alliance government's failure to improve the economic situation of
Fijians. The problem of Fijian economic disadvantage, as we noted in
the previous chapter, was a central and recurring theme in the lead-up
to independence. Butadroka's attack brought the issue out into the open
again and gave it new urgency. The Alliance did not tolerate his
criticism but certainly heeded his warning by promptly addressing the
issue he had raised. Various initiatives were undertaken and Fijian
hopes for economic advancement were raised. As we shall see,
however, the Alliance failed in this crucial project - crucial because the
legitimacy of the state depended most critically on the support of
Fijians. In this chapter we will be centrally concerned with how and
why it failed in that task
The limits and class bias of Fijian state power
The economic boom of the 1960s carried over into the early 1970s but
by 1973 the signs of economic stress began to appear. The situation
was worsened by the increase in oil prices in October of that year and
by 1974 Fiji was locked in a deep and prolonged economic recession
which extended into the 1980s. As Table 7.1 below shows, economic
expansion in the early years after independence was followed by an
extended period of sluggish economic growth.
Alongside the sluggish economic growth was the relative failure of
the Alliance government to realize its objective of economic
diversification. This is indicated by the figures in Table 7.2. Apart from
a few significant changes, the structure of the economy remained fairly
constant after independence. The main changes had to do with the
relative shrinking of the economy's productive base - agriculture and
industry - against a corresponding increase in the sevices sector,
especially the state sector. By 1986 the contribution of 'government
and other services' to GDP had more than doubled from 9. 1 per cent to
19.7 per cent.
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Table 7.1 Annual Growth in Gross Domestic Product
1971-1985
Year $million Rate (%)
at constant 1968 prices
1971 157.6 6.0
1972 170.0 7.9
1973 191.6 12.7
1974 196.6 2.6
1975 196.8 0.1
1976 202.1 2.7
at constant 1977 prices
1977 605.7
1978 616.6 1.8
1979 690.9 12.0
1980 679.3 -1.7
1981 719.9 6.0
1982 712.2 -1.1
1983 683.9 -4.0
1984(r) 741.3 8.4
1985(p) 705.4 -4.8
1986(p) 767.7 8.8
Source: Fiji Bureau of Statistics, Current Economic Statistics, April
1987.
These broad changes had important political implications,
particularly with regard to the Alliance's power base — the Fijians.
Fijians were heavily concentrated in the rural areas, and as we shall see
made up the bulk of the peasantry. The structural shift against
agriculture might therefore be seen has having posed an objective threat
to rural Fijian support for the ruling Alliance Party. However, peasant
conservatism and the persistent strength of traditional chiefly authority
in the countryside helped to maintain general Fijian peasant support for
the Alliance. But as the Alliance painfully discovered in the elections of
April 1977, the loyalty of the Fijian peasantry could not be taken for
granted. We will take up this issue again later.
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Table 7.2 Sectoral Composition of Gross Domestic
Product 1970-86
1970 1975 1980 1985 1986
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
Agriculture 25.1 23.5 20.0 16.1 19.3
Industry 20.7 20.4 19.6 16.8 19.4
Manufacturing 12.4 10.7 10.9 8.0 10.4
Construction 5.8 6.9 7.5 4.8 4.9
Electricity, gas & water 1.3 1.4 1.5 3.2 3.2
Mining 1.3 1.4 -0.2 0.8 0.8
Services 42.2 47.7 51.7 54.8 53.5
Transport & communication 5.4 6.0 8.2 9.1 9.0
Trade 16.5 19.0 16.5 15.7 15.5
Banking^nsurance/real estate 11.1 12.3 11.4 12.5 2.3
Government & other services 9.1 10.4 18.0 20.3 19.7
Other branches n.a. n.a. 0.7 0.7 0.7
Imputed service charges n.a. n.a. -3.2 -3.5 -3.6
Net indirect taxes 11.9 8.4 8.4 12.3 7.8
GDP at market prices 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Cole and Hughes,(1987:119).
The massive growth in the public sector also had important
consequences for the Alliance's Fijian support Of all the races, Fijians
were most heavily reliant on the state for employment. In 1986, for
example, 47 per cent of Fijian wage and salary earners were employed
in the public sector. The corresponding figures for Indians and others
were 31 per cent and 33 per cent respectively (Fiji Census Office
1987). With this degree of Fijian dependence on state employment, any
attacks by the Alliance government on workers generally in the public
sector ran the risk of alienating Fijian support. As we shall see later, by
the 1980s the Public Servants Association had emerged as the largest
and most militant union in the country. And its attempts to improve the
lot of its members were complicated by the state's ever increasing
budget deficit (See Table 7.3 below.)
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Table 7.3 Public Debt of the central government,
1976-1986
($million)
1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981
42.2 44.5 53.8 31.8 5.3 21.1
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986P
48.9 72.8 56.9 51.3 84.5
Source: Cole and Hughes (1987:102).
The problems facing the Alliance government were, of course,
exacerbated by its persistent external dependence. The trade deficit
grew throughout the 1970s and 1980s, more than doubling from
$100.3 million in 1973 to $236.6 million in 1985.
Table 7.4 Balance of Trade, 1970-1985
($million)
1970 1973 1976 1980 1982 1985
-28 -100 -116 -153 -208 -237
Sources: Fiji Bureau of Statistics, Overseas Trade Fiji 1981; Current
Economic Statistics, April 1987.
Also, the external debt continued to impose a considerable burden
on the country's resources. In 1984, for example, it represented 36 per
cent ofGDP and 73 per cent of exports.
Table 7.5 External Debt Burden 1975-1984
As%of 1974 1976 1978 1980 1984
GDP 34.4 26.2 29.3 22.2 36.0
Exports 59.4 51.8 64.4 40.0 73.0
Source: Reserve Bank ofFiji Quarterly, December 1977,
December 1979, December 1984.
134 Beyond the Politics of Race
Sugar and tourism maintained their leading positions as the largest
sources of export earnings, and together accounted for around 66 per
cent of foreign revenue. Fiji has been fortunate in having guaranteed
markets and prices for the great bulk of its sugar, a factor which for a
long time was a key to Fiji's stability. In 1970 83 per cent of Fiji's
sugar was sold under preferential arrangements and in 1985 the figure
was 78 per cent Tourism accounted for between 26 per cent and 55 per
cent in the decade to 1983 and was responsible for an increasing
proportion of paid employment — from 9.4 per cent in 1971 to 16.5
per cent in 1985. However, considerable foreign ownership and a high
import content meant that the industry had a higher leakage factor than
any other except mining.
In part because of the requirements of the tourist and tourist-related
industries, Fiji continued to rely heavily on imported fuel,
manufactured goods, machinery and equipment, which in 1970
accounted for 66 per cent of the total import bill and in 1985 70 per cent
(Taylor 1987a; Britton 1987).
Table 7.6 Composition of Imports (%)
1970 1980 1985
Fuels, lubricants etc. 11.0 23.0 22.7
Manufactured goods 19.5 18.7 19.8
Machinery and equipment 20.8 22.6 18.0
Food 18.7 14.2 15.8
Misc. manufactures 15.0 8.8 9.6
Others 15.0 12.7 14.1
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
Sources: Fiji Trade Report 1971, 1980; Current Economic
Statistics,April 1987 .
Australia, the United Kingdom, New Zealand, Japan and the
United States continued to be Fiji's major trading partners after
independence. As buyer of the bulk of Fiji's sugar, the United
Kingdom remained the single most important export market but
declined as a source of imports. New Zealand and Japan maintained
their relative positions, particularly as suppliers. Trade with Southeast
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Asia increased but remained comparatively small. Australia, on the
other hand, firmly established itself as Fiji's main trading partner. By
far the major source of imports, it has become an increasingly
important export market, particularly after the signing of the Sparteca
Agreement in 1980. 1
Table 7.7 Direction of Trade 1970-1985
(%)
Year UK Australia NZ Japan USA Others
Exports
1970 31 9 7 4 16 33
1975 56 9 8 - 2 23
1980 20 7 10 10 10 43
1985 31 13 7 2 5 42
Imports
1970 17 24 12 15 4 28
1975 13 29 12 16 4 26
1980 7 31 15 14 7 26
1985 5 35 17 15 4 24
Sources: Fiji Trade Report 1971, 1980, Current Economic
Statistics, April 1987.
Australia's preeminence in Fiji's external trade parallels its leading
position as a foreign investor in Fiji. In 1971 41 per cent of foreign
companies in Fiji were Australian; ten years later the figure had risen to
43 per cent. British companies were the next most numerous but as a
proportion of the total fell from 23 per cent to 14 per cent (Carstairs and
Prasad 1981:11). But more important than the number of foreign
campanies in Fiji is the extent oftheir dominance.
Apart from the sugar industry, where the processing and sale of
sugar is controlled by the state-owned Fiji Sugar Corporation and Fiji
Sugar Marketing Corporation respectively, the key sectors of the
The South Pacific Regional Trade and Economic Co-operation (Sparteca)
Agreement was signed in July 1980. It gives South Pacific island
countries preferential access to the Australian and New Zealand markets.
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economy are dominated by foreign corporations. This is also the case
in the tourism sector (see below). The giants of the distribution sector
are the Australian corporations W. R. Carpenters and Burns Philip.
Emperor Gold Mines, another Australian firm, monopolizes the
goldmining industry. International travel and transportation are
dominated by such companies as Qantas, Air New Zealand, P&O Line,
Kyowa Shipping, Sofrana Unilines, Bank Line and Columbus Line.
And the very important financial sector is also dominated by Westpac
Banking Corporation, Australia and New Zealand Bank, Colonial
Mutual Life Assurance, Queensland Insurance (Australian companies
all), Bank of New Zealand, Bank of Baroda, and New India Assurance
Company Limited. In other sectors as well, foreign capital has a
significant presence: for example, British Petroleum in the pine
industry, Colgate Palmolive and Cope Allman in manufacturing,
Can'eras of Fiji and Central Manufacturing Company in tobacco,
Watties Industries in the chicken industry, and until recently C. Itoh
Limited in commercial fisheries.
This picture of foreign capital's commanding position in the
economy is reflected in the figures in Table 7.8. In 1980 foreign
companies accounted for 100 per cent of turnover in the utilities sector,
99.6 per cent in mining and quarrying, 90 per cent in finance, 75 per
cent in hotels, 63 per cent in wholesale and retail, and 43 per cent in
transport, communications and storage. Together these sectors
accounted for 65 per cent of total turnover (ibid. :96). This clearly gives
the lie to the claim that Indians control the Fiji economy.
Table 7.8 Sectoral Domination of Foreign Companies
1980
Number of % Share
Companies ofTurnover
Electricity, gas and water 5 100.0
Mining and quarrying 38 99.6
Finance {179 90.4
Real estate and business services { 22.0
Hotels {138 74.5
Wholesale and retail { 63.4
Transport, communications & storage 106 42.5
Manufacturing 61 30.3
Community, social and personal services 8 27.4
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 7 15.0
Source: Carstairs and Prasad (1981:18).
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For the benefits which foreign investment brought, the Fiji
economy has had to sustain outflows in the form of dividends, interest,
royalities, payments for administrative services and so forth. Such
outflows have been conservatively estimated at $28 million a year in the
early 1980s, which is about 2 per cent of Gross National Product.
Moreover, these figures do not take into account possible additional
outflows through transfer pricing (Taylor 1987a:61).
By the 1980s foreign investment in Fiji was being reshaped as a
result of international and local pressures but, as Taylor argues, foreign
control of the Fiji economy did not decline. What changed was the
nature of foreign involvement and control. Foreign companies either
abandoned some sectors (e.g. W.R. Carpenter's withdrawal from
copra processing), entered into joint ventures with local companies,
moved more into sectors where they had better access to capital than
their local rivals (e.g. the urban real estate market in Suva), or
attempted to monopolize specific and well-defined sectors like chicken
meat processing (ibid.:65).
An important factor behind the restructuring of foreign invesment
in Fiji was increased local competition. The expertise and ability of
local entrepreneurs had grown but, very importantly, the Alliance
government had also made substantial moves to expand local business.
As the Economic Development Board put it in 1982:
Whilst welcoming overseas capital the Government is
encouraging Fiji citizens to expand locally-owned enterprises
and establish new ones;
The Government wants the skills and knowledge of Fiji
citizens to improve, and their chances of taking part in the
ownership and management of sound domestic and
international business to expand;
The Government wishes to ensure that unnecessary
competition from abroad does not discourage local investment;
Preference will be given to Fiji citizens in the setting up of new
industries which they are capable of running (quoted,
ibid.:62).
Increased local competition was therefore 'a fulfilment of
Government policies and desires' but, significantly, it has also been
ascribed to the political patronage of some now-large local enterprises
(ibid.:64). What, then, is the character of the growing local
bourgeoisie?
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Taylor has identified three types of local enterprise: livelihood
enterprises, which are tiny and are so labelled because they offer
returns to their owners that differ little from what could be expected
from wage employment; subcontractors, which are small and simply
structured organizations whose productive potential is harnessed
largely by foreign-owned firms; and locally-owned groups. The last of
these are clearly the the dominant fraction of the local bourgeoisie and
Taylor's description of them is revealing:
Locally-owned groups in Fiji have an economic significance
that far outweighs their [small] numbers. They obviously vary
greatly in size and the more prominent companies in their
ranks include Motibhai and Company, RV Patel, Punja and
Sons, Tapoo Ltd, Lees Trading and GB Hari. They are multi-
site operations that have highly centralised control and are
ususally family-owned. Most are owned by Indo-Fijians.
Some are partnered by overseas companies in joint ventures,
and a small number have themselves become multinational
with overseas operations in Hong Kong and Australia for
example. These are: "the new breed of flourishing local
companies in Fiji, the kind moving in, taking over and then
developing where oldtimers are dying off'. (Islands Business,
April 1984, p.40) A range of factors has promoted the growth
of these locally-owned groups. Their greater age (29 years
average in 1983) implies greater capital backing and
established business and borrowing records. They are,
therefore, in a position to occupy the niches vacated by foreign
companies. They also have managerial expertise. As a result,
these companies are well placed to partner foreign companies
in joint ventures. Political patronage too, as has been
suggested in the context of Mahendra Patel and his family
group Motibhai and Company Ltd for example, can also play a
significant part in the emergence of these groups (ibid.:70).
Simione Durutalo, a Fijian sociologist, also discusses political
patronage in Fiji and refers to linkages between the Fijian-dominated
Alliance state and capital, particularly foreign and local Indian capital,
through directorships, joint ventures and financial support for the
Alliance Parry (Durutalo 1986). On directorships, he says that 'most
indigenous Fijian directors are appointed for their political influence
and potential benefits they might bring to the corporation in the forms
of contracts and licences obtained from the government' (ibid.:36).
Such links further expose the class bias of the state, in particular its
bias towards existing local, especially Indian, capital. Fijians could
never hope to compete against large foreign companies, but against
local Indian firms there was some chance of success. Yet even there, as
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we shall see, any potential for Fijian success was seriously
compromised by the class bias of the Alliance state, a class bias that
undermined the very centrepiece of the Alliance's efforts to 'draw
Fijians into business' — the Fijian soft loan scheme of the Fiji
Development Bank.
There are, of course, many particular reasons for Fijian failure in
business: insufficient discipline, lack of experience, unfamiliarity with
business practice, the onerous demands of social and customary
obligations and so on. At a broader level, however, there were
structured factors which also limited the possibility of a Fijian
bourgeoisie emerging: the small size of the economy, resource scarcity,
the high level of foreign control, an existing domestic bourgeoisie
dominated by Indian capital, and other established interests intent on
preserving their interests. The capacity of the Fijian-dominated state to
develop an indigenous Fijian bourgeoisie was therefore limited.
But so too was its willingness to do so, constrained as it was by its
own class interests and biases. The class interests of the Fijian state
bourgeoisie were strongly linked to those of its bourgeois allies,
particularly foreign and local Indian capital. The Fijian clamour for
'more Fijians in business and commerce' was certainly heeded by the
Alliance state. The realization of that goal, however, was highly
problematic. But before looking at why and how the Alliance state
failed in that task, we need to examine briefly the other side of this
crucial class project—the control of labour— which again reveals the
class bias of the Alliance state.
In order to 'secure the economic advancement of the Fijians', the
Alliance needed more resources which, of course, would meant more
taxes. That implied a higher level of economic activity, which in turn
required business confidence, profitability and a stable environment.
The converse of all this was the containment of labour. We have
already described the forms of containment in the pre-independence
period and the important developments of the 1960s. In the early
1970s, however, those efforts threatened to come unstuck.
By the time of independence, the contradictions which lay beneath
the economic boom of the 1960s were beginning to surface. One early
indicator was the worsening inflationary spiral. From an increase of
1.4 per cent in 1967, the consumer price index rose steadily and by
1970 registered an annual increase of 4.1 per cent. The Alliance
government, barely six months old, realized that the upward trend
would continue if it did not intervene. Consequently in April 1971 it
introduced limited price controls. But that immediately provoked
stinging attacks from capital, the Chambers of Commerce being
particularly severe in their criticism. Two months later the Alliance
government exposed its class bias and eased the price curbs. Prices
rose again. By the end of 1971 the consumer price index had risen by
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6.5 per cent and in 1972 it rose by another 9.5 per cent. Class tensions
mounted. The working classes bore the brunt of higher costs and
understandly became increasingly agitated. The number of strikes
jumped from a low of 8 in 1970 to 47 in 1972 as more and more
workers sought higher wages.
In April 1973 the state reacted by passing the Counter-Inflation Act
and the highly repressive Trade Disputes Act. The stage was now set
for a series of bitter struggles as capital and labour sought to defend
their respective interests. There were 69 strikes and 116,998 lost
workdays in 1973. However, the restraining influence of the Trade
Disputes Act soon began to tell and the number ofworkdays lost fell to
83,332 in 1974 and 57,373 in 1975.
The Alliance government insisted that the act was not intended to
undermine the workers' right to strike but rather to improve the
machinery for settling disputes and encourage dialogue. In 1974 the
prime minister announced his intention to hold regular meetings with
union leaders and employers. At its annual conference in December
1975 the FTUC (whose president, Mohammed Ramzan, had been
elected to parliament on an Alliance Party ticket in the April 1972
elections) resolved to ask the prime minister to begin talks 'for the
development of a tripartite alliance for social-economic development
and the spread ofjustice' (Fiji Times 22 December 1975).
An alliance along similar lines already existed in Singapore and it is
significant that the FTUC conference was addressed by Devan Nair the
secretary-general of the Singapore Trade Union Congress. The FTUC,
he suggested, might wish to consider the approach which his
organization had taken to the 'problems of socio-economic
development and nation-building'.
In July 1976 the Fiji Employers Consultative Association pledged
its support for the FTUC proposal for a 'Singapore-style Government-
employer-trade union council'. Later that year the state, FTUC and
FECA formed the Tripartite Forum. With the unions now co-opted into
the state machinery, the containment of class conflict became more
institutionalized and manageable. What is more, the essentially petty
bourgeois and reformist leadership of the trade union movement had
close links with the ruling Alliance Party. Not surprisingly, as Table
7.9 below shows, the number of strikes and workdays lost generally
declined.
With the new system of industrial relations, then, the Alliance state
was better able to contain organized labour and so ensure a reasonably
stable economic environment Later we consider how the system came
under increasing strain from the end of 1983, eventually being
abandoned in 1986.
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Table 7.9 Strike Activity 1977-1983
Year No of strikes Workdays Lost
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
64
33
65
73
41
44
9
57,373
77,615
32,083
8,600
26,500
22,623
2,877
Sources: Ministry of Labour, Annual Reports; Kuruduadua, The
Fiji Employers Consultative Association, p.31; Howard
(1979:115).
For our present purposes, what is important is that it functioned
reasonably effectively during that period when the Alliance state was
ostensibly striving to advance Fijians economically. In that respect, the
operation of the Tripartite Forum was an important counterpart to the
Alliance's attempt to develop a Fijian bourgeoisie. With organized
labour generally contained, a higher level of economic activity than
otherwise possible was achieved, and so too a greater volume of state
revenue. With more revenue, the state was, theoretically at least, better
placed than it might otherwise have been to develop a Fijian
bourgeoisie. But it failed to do so.
This brief overview of major economic developments since
independence serves to underscore two crucial features of postcolonial
Fiji, both of which bear directly on the capacity and willingness of the
Alliance government to realize its crucial twin tasks of containing class
tension and developing a Fijian bourgeoisie. The first is the continuing
fragility of the economy - its smallness, external dependence and
vulnerability. This imposes serious domestic and externally-determined
limits on the capacity of the postcolonial state not only to deliver on its
general promise of national development and multiracial harmony but
also to advance Fijians economically and, more particularly, develop a
Fijian bourgeoisie. The second crucial feature is the bourgeois character
of the Alliance state. Its own class interests, together with its bias
towards foreign and local (especially Indian) capital, were crucial
determinants of the way it sought to deal with its key class projects.
In the face of these structural and class constraints, the particular
task of developing a Fijian bourgeoisie proved difficult. Not only did
the Alliance state have to appease its existing class allies but also the
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limited scope for diversification was reduced even further by sluggish
economic growth. What this meant was that the structural possibility
for the emergence of a viable Fijian bourgeoisie became progressively
less likely.
As we have seen, the most profitable areas for investment were not
in agriculture but in industry and commerce; hence the attempt to draw
Fijians into business. But even if that attempt were to succeed, the
number of Fijians involved could not have been anything but small. On
the other hand, the very presence of a successful Fijian business class
— of a Fijian bourgeoisie — would at least have given some
impression of Fijian economic advancement. And the myth of Indian
economic dominance would have been dented. If there was some
evidence of significant Fijian economic success, then Fijian concern
about their economic disadvantage would be much less of a political
problem for the Alliance. A prosperous Fijian race was clearly not
possible. At a minimum, what was needed was a viable and
functioning Fijian bourgeoisie.
Fijian advancement, Fijian bourgeoisie: Alliance
failure
At the outset, the Alliance government announced its intention to get
more Fijians involved in business. That meant raising Fijian
educational standards and certain key recommendations contained in the
1969 report of the Fiji Education Commission formed the basis of
subsequent state policy. One of these was that half of government
scholarships be set aside for Fijians and the other half be given to
students of other races. But other initiatives were clearly necessary, and
among the possibilities considered were preferential loans from the
FDB, the establishment of a special institute to train Fijians in business
practices, the reservation of certain lines of goods for sale exclusively
by Fijians (especially duty free goods), the setting up of more Fijian
companies, and racial parity in the civil service. In May 1974 a cabinet
subcommittee led by Prime Minister Mara was formed 'to study ways
ofimmediate and long term help to assist Fijians in the economic field'.
Also in 1974 the commercial arm of the Native Land Trust Board
(NLTB), the Native Land Development Corporation (NLDC), was
formed to begin business ventures in property development, industry,
agriculture, fishing and tourism.
Early in 1975 the cabinet subcommittee on Fijian economic
development announced that directions would soon be given to the
FDB to help Fijians with low-interest loans. The attack from capital
followed soon after. Dick Warner, chairman of the Fiji Visitors
Bureau, condemned the decision and the Suva Chamber of Commerce
described the decision as 'unfair' and 'discrimination of the first order'.
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The government responded by saying that its action did not amount to
favouritism. Most Fijians, it said, had no security loans and unlike
people of other races could not turn to friends for help because they
also had no money. They therefore had to be 'helped a little more into
commerce'.
Ofthe economic initiatives undertaken by the Alliance government
to help Fijians, financial assistance through the FDB was by far the
largest and certainly the most important politically. With offices being
opened in the major centres and loans being made to Fijians throughout
the country, the FDB scheme soon became a highly visible form of
direct assistance and helped to sustain Fijian political support for the
Alliance. It created the appearance of an Alliance government
committed to securing the economic advancement of the Fijians. What,
then, was the FDB 's record?
The first observation which can be made is that the Alliance
government always professed its commitment to the development of
agriculture and it complained continually about the commercial banks'
bias against agricultural lending, a tendency which further
disadvantaged Fijians. It is reasonable therefore to have expected the
government to give prominence to agriculture in its own lending policy,
especially as its lending capacity was tiny compared to that of
commercial banks. (In 1985, for example, commercial banks lent
$1,414 million, the FDB a mere $24 million). Yet between 1980 and
1985, the proportion of FDB funds lent to agriculture, fisheries and
forestry fell from 47 per cent to 25 per cent
Even with the bulk of FDB funds going to the commercial and
industrial sectors, there was no guarantee that Fijians would benefit
most In the first five years of the preferential loan scheme, the number
of commercial and industrial loans to Fijians rose from 130 to 403,
peaking at 545 in 1979. But the benefit to Fijians was not as great as
these figures suggest because Fijian loans were generally much smaller
than the overall average. In fact, except in the year in which the scheme
was introduced, their loans were less than half that of the overall
average (see Table 7.10). Worse still, as a proportion of all loans, the
value of loans to Fijians declined rapidly, falling from 80 per cent in
1975 to 27 per cent in 1979. Fijians got the greatest number of loans
but non-Fijians got most of the money.
Because Fijians typically received less than others, they were less
likely to become successful economic competitors. To make matters
worse, the FDB allowed most of the money lent to Fijians to be
invested in precisely those activities where existing capital was already
well-established. In 1978 and 1979, for example, most of the FDB
money lent to Fijians was spent in the transport sector (FDB Annual
Reports 1979, 1980).
144 Beyond the Politics of Race
Table 7.10 FDB Commercial and Industrial Loans to
Fijians 1975-1980
No.of (A) as Av.size Av.size (Q/(D) Value of
Fijian %of of Fijian for all Loans as
Loans Loans Loans % ofTotal
Loan Value
Year (A) (B) (Q (D) <m (F)
1975 130 n.a. 7,670 12,739 60 80
1976 296 n.a. 5,368 11,020 49 36
1977 495 n.a. 4,374 11,549 39 28
1978 536 71 5,153 13,039 40 28
1979 545 73 4,833 12,961 37 27
Source: FDB Annual Reports 1976-1981
Observation suggests that much of that money was invested in bus
and taxi transportation. These activities were already dominated by
Indian entrepreneurs who were highly unlikely to yield easily to Fijian
competition. Evidence of this was the failure of the Rewa Provincial
Development Company which was involved in bus transportation. But
in commerce too, the second largest area of FDB lending to Fijians,
competition from established businesses, particularly Indian ones, was
stiff.
By the end of the 1970s the attempt to develop Fijian business - to
develop a Fijian bourgeoisie - showed little sign of succeeding and in
1979 the Alliance government sought to rectify this by setting up the
Business Opportunity and Management Advisory Service (BOMAS).
But that did little to improve Fijian fortunes. Even the larger and more
highly publicized ventures failed to create anything like a strong Fijian
business presence. Examples include the Cakaudrove Bua Macuata
Group, Yatulau Company, the Tailevu Provincial Dairy Company,
Kubuna Holdings, the Macuata Provincial Development Company, and
the two on which so much Fijian hopes had been pinned, the Fijian
Investments and Development Corporation which was formed back in
1969 and the NLDC. The NLDC was created in 1975 to increase Fijian
business involvement through the development of native land in urban
and peri-urban areas. One of its major projects was to increase Fijian
participation in sugarcane production and the centrepiece of its effort in
that regard was the Seaqaqa Sugarcane Extension Scheme. By 1977,
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491 Fijian canefarmers had been established under that scheme with the
help of soft loans from the FDB. In 1985, however, the deputy prime
minister and minister for Fijian Affairs, Ratu David Toganivalu,
reported NLDC losses amounting to some $9 million (Durutalo
1986:55).
By the early 1980s, then, Fijian business failure had become
increasingly apparent and fresh appeals for more state assistance were
made. Apisai Tora called for an 'advisory unit' to encourage more
Fijians into commerce and Ram Meli Loki pleaded in the Senate for 'a
crash education and economic programm to help launch Fijians in
business. The suggestions were not taken up. Instead the Alliance
government continued to rely largely on its existing programmes, and
in particular its Fijian soft loan scheme through the FDB. But the
evidence of the 1970s had cast doubts on the effectiveness of the
scheme. The grounds for such scepticism were strengthened by the
experience of the 1980s. This particular attempt by the Fijian-
dominated Alliance Government to develop a Fijian bourgeoisie was
failing.
Table 7.11 Percentages of FDB Commercial and
Industrial Loans Given to Fijians 1978-1985
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1984 1985
Number 71 73 66 68 57 57 52
Value 28 27 21 17 14 14 8
Source: Fiji Development Bank Annual Reports 1982, 1986.
As Table 7.1 1 shows the proportionate decline in the 1970s in
both the number and value ofcommercial and industrial loans to Fijians
continued into the 1980s. By 1985 Fijians still received most of the
loans but their proportion of the total had fallen from 71 per cent in
1978 to 52 per cent However, the proportionate decrease in the value
of those loans was worse — from a meagre 28 per cent to a pitiful 8
per cent over the same period. Little wonder that Fijians became
doubtful. Another way of presenting this worsening situation is to
make direct comparisons between loans to Fijians and loans to non-
Fijians. The figures are presented in Table 7.12 below.
The increase in the number of loans given to Fijians yields a
positive image of the FDB's preferential scheme. But in fact, not only
did Fijians receive far less than non-Fijian, the gap continued to widen,
so that by 1985 non-Fijians received eleven times as much as Fijians.
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Table 7.12 FDB Commercial and Industrial Loan by
Race 1978-19
Number Value
Fijians Non-Fijians Fijians Non-Fijians Ratio
(A) (B) (Q (D) (Q/(D)
1978 536 215 2.8 9.8 3.5
1979 545 201 2.6 9.7 3.7
1980 403 206 1.9 7.0 3.7
1981 410 195 1.4 6.7 3.1
1983 327 243 2.0 11.8 5.9
1984 355 264 2.4 14.1 5.9
1985 292 262 1.5 17.0 11.3
Source: Fiji Development BankAnnual Reports 1979/80-1985/86.
Beneath this broad picture of unmistakeable bias lies an even more
telling one. Table 7.13 below shows that across economic sectors the
average size of loans to non-Fijians was generally several times greater
than those given to Fijians. But two particular features are especially
significant. First, except in relation to transportation, the gap in average
loan size tended to worsen after 1980. And secondly, the bias against
Fijian borrowers was generally greater in respect of loans for
investment in tourism than in other industries. The peak came in 1984
when the ratio between Fijians and non-Fijians was 1 to 93! The
economic sector in which Fijians had hoped so much to succeed,
therefore, was the very one in which they were most heavily
discriminated against under the FDB lending scheme. Furthermore, it
was also the industry in which the FDB was least willing to assist
Fijians.
As Table 7.13 shows, only 2 per cent of industrial loans to Fijians
were for investment in tourism. Significantly, the FDB continued with
its longstanding lending bias towards the transportation and
commercial sectors, precisely those areas where existing competition
was well established. The relative decline in transportation loans is
notable but what is more interesting is that it resulted from the FDB's
rather belated 'cautious attitudc.due to suspicions of saturation' (Fiji
Development Bank, Annual Report 1985/86:27). On the other hand,
the value of commercial loans to Fijians rose from 33 per cent of total
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lending in 1980 to 62 per cent in 1985. Rather than using its resources
to increase Fijian involvement in tourism or real productive activity, the
Table 7.13 FDB Commercial and Industrial Loans to
Fijians, by Sector, 1980-1985
(%)
1980 1981 1983 1984 1985
Transport 37 43 21 19 24
Commerce 33 38 56 58 62
Construction &
manufacturing 11 6 15 18 12
Tourism - 2 1 - 2
Timber 18 4 6 4 -
Sources: Fiji Development BankAnnual Reports 1979-1986.
FDB instead concentrated even more on relatively unproductive
commercial loans:
[t]he Bank has reformulated new guidelines that allow for the
refinancing of commercial buildings. These refinancing
proposals have contributed to the high proportion in number
and value of loan approvals in this sub-sector (jbid.:2%).
The proportionate value of commerical and industrial loans to
Fijians for investment in tourism never rose beyond 2 per cent. With
such meagre assistance, how could Fijians ever hope to draw more
benefits from tourism? And that they got only the crumbs has been well
demonstrated by research conducted by Britton in 1977. There is no
evidence that the situation has improved very much since.
The distribution of gross tourism receipts for 1977 is shown above
in Table 7.14. Foreign enterprises got the most (75.8 per cent), Fijian
ones the least (0.5 per cent). But the 8.2 per cent received by local
Indian enterprises is also significant because it contradicts the view that
Indians dominate the economy. That, and the poor performance of
Fijians, can be elaborated. As Table 7.15 shows, the great bulk of
tourism revenue is generated in the accommodation and tourist
shopping subsectors (44 per cent and 35 per cent respectively). Travel
and tours account for only 19 per cent and handicrafts a mere 2 per
cent.
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Table 7.14 Distribution of Tourist Receipts by Ownership
of Enterprises, 1977
Ownership Category % ofTotal Turnover
Overseas owned enterprises 75.8
Fiji owned enterprises:
European 7.8
Indian 8.2
Fijian 0.5
Other 1.9
Misc. tourist expenditure 2.9
Government revenues 6.5
Source: Britton (1987:90).
Table 7.15 Subsectoral Composition of
Tourism Receipts, 1977
Tourism Subsector $ million %
Accommodation 31.7 44
Tourist shopping 25.1 35
Travel and tours 13.8 19
Handicrafts 1.4 2
Total 72.0 100
Source: Britton (1979:445).
Table 7.16 shows that the three most lucrative subsectors -
accommodation, tourist shopping, and travel and tours — were
dominated by foreign capital. Local white capital ranked second in
travel and tours, and local Indian capital in tourist shopping. Fijian
enterprises fared worst, most of their tourism earning coming from the
least lucrative subsector - handicraft sales. Clearly, therefore, by far the
greatest share of tourism earnings went to foreign enterprises and the
smallest to Fijian.
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Table 7.16 Ownership and Distribution of Turnover in
Fiji Tourist Industry, 1977
(%)
Subsectors
Accommo Tourist Travel Handi- % of all
■ -- * .-
dation shopping & tours crafts enterprises
Foreign 65.6 72.2 60.4 4.6
Local:
European 15.8 1.8 35.2 10.9 5.1
Indian 11.2 25.9 2.8 41.2 39.2
Fijian 0.04 0.05 0.5 44.2 47.9
Other 7.4 0.1 1 3.7 3.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Britton (1979:445).
Table 7.17 Tourism Enterprises by Subsector and
Ownership, 1977
Accommo- Tourist Travel Handi-
dation Shopping & Tours crafts
no. % no. % no. % no%
Ownership
Foreign 20 31 6 4 12 32 -
Local
European 19 29 4 3 14 36 5 1
Indian 17 26 140 91 5 12 162 28
Fijian 3 5 1 1 6 15 385 68
Other 5 9 16 3 2 5 16 3
Source: Britton (1979:443).
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While it is true that in the tourist industry Indian firms fare better
than Fijian firms, it is certainly not the case that they dominate Fiji's
second largest industry. What appears to many as Indian dominance
and control is in fact Indian numerical preponderance, especially in
highly visibly activities like retailing generally and duty free sales in
particular. This preponderance is clearly shown in Table 7.17. In 1977
91 per cent of enterprises in the tourist shopping subsector were
Indian. But as Table 7.16 shows, they received only 25.9 per cent of
revenue from tourist shopping. Table 7.17 further underlines the
disadvantaged position of Fijians in the tourist industry. They certainly
dominated handicraft sales but such activity accounted for a mere 2 per
cent of total tourism revenue.
Clearly, then, Fijian performance in the tourist industry was
dismal, but that was typical of the broader pattern of Fijian business
failure. The attempt by the Alliance state to draw Fijians into business
— to develop a Fijian bourgeoisie— had failed. And, as we have seen,
a major reason for the failure was that the centrepiece of the whole
exercise — the FDB's Fijian soft loan scheme — was imperiled from
the outset by an anti-Fijian bias which in turn was the product of the
Alliance's class bias in favour of existing capital, particularly foreign
and local Indian capital. Little wonder therefore that Alliance policy and
practice came to be viewed with increasing Fijian suspicion.
Such suspicion was bound to have political consequences for the
Alliance and nowhere was this more clearly evident than in the conflict
over the processing of Fiji pine - a conflict which was all the more
important for its regional character.
The planting of Pinus caribbea began in the late 1950s and early
1960s. Most of the pine was grown in western Viti Levu. Li 1976 the
government, together with the landowning mataqali in the pine-
growing areas, formed the Fiji Pine Commission (FPC) to oversee the
development of the industry and soon afterwards tenders were called
for the harvesting and processing of mature pine. Tenders were
received from the M.K. Hunt Foundation, Shell New Zealand Forest
Products, British Petroleum Southwest Pacific Limited (BP), and the
United Marketing Company (UMQ which was owned by an American
businessman, Sandblom.
The FPC accepted BP's tender on the grounds that it was more
flexible and promised rational management of the industry. The
landowners, led by Ratu Osea Gavidi, a chief from Nadroga, favoured
the UMC propsal because it 'apparently recognised legitimate
landowner rights, offered them a greater share of the profits, and
allowed participation at all levels of the industry' (Lai 1986a:99). The
FPC refused to budge and the government declared Sandblom a
prohibited immigrant. Thereafter the conflict worsened as landowners
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resisted the FPC and boycotted several FPC pine planting programmes.
Eventually, however, the FPC won.
A major consequence of the struggle over Fiji's 'green gold' was
the formation in July 1981 of a new political party, the Western United
Front (WUF).2 The WUF saw the government's actions as interference
in the right of western Fijians to utilize their resources according to
their wishes. Many wanted a decentralized pine industry because such
an arrangement held more promise of real benefits for them. The state,
however, preferred more centralized control. As far as the Alliance state
was concerned, Fijian economic advancement would be pursued so
long as its own interests were not offended.
For the vast majority of Fijians, then, the hope of economic
advancement under Alliance rule remained unfulfilled. Even the
minimal class project of drawing Fijians into business and thus
developing a Fijian bourgeoisie had failed. It is not surprising,
therefore, mat Fijian support for the Alliance became shaky, and in the
next chapter we will examine the political consequences of this.
Classes and racial fear
At the level of appearance, there are understandable grounds for the
Fijian fear of being dominated by Indians. Outside of the subsistence
sector, the two major economic areas in which Fijians are most
frequently involved on a daily basis are retail trade and ground
transportation. And it is precisely these areas which are most heavily
dominated by Indians. Both in the urban and in the rural areas, Indians
control the majority of retail outlets. They also operate the vast majority
of buses and taxis. For a sizeable part of their daily requirements,
therefore, Fijians rely greatly on local Indian capitalists. And out of this
daily experience emerges an understandable fear and resentment.
Unfortunately, capitalist Indian success is often mistakenly seen as
Indian success, for as we shall see presently, the vast majority of
Indians, like the vast majority of Fijians, belong to the working
classes.
Fijian fears are further aggravated by the poor performance of
Fijians relative to Indians (and other races) in education and
employment. Academic underachievement has long been a source of
Fijian anxiety and recent evidence shows that it continues to be a
problem (Cole and Hughes 1988:30). There are many reasons for this,
not least of which are the differences in socio-economic backgrounds
and study environments. Equally, however, there is merit in the
For a detailed study of the pine dispute and the WUF see Durutalo
(1985).
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argument that the pattern of differential achievement is due in large part
to differential application.
Table 7.18 White Collar Employment By Race, 1986
Fijian Indian Other Total
Professional and 2,266 9.023 1,765 13,054
managerial (17.4%) (69.1%) (13.5%) (100%)
Senior state
officials 222 207 90 519
Scientists 55 71 60 186
Engineers 120 232 182 537
Doctors 77 187 48 312
Dentists 23 55 2 80
Judges & lawyers 16 110 38 164
Other professionals 58 450 254 762
General managers 57 447 531 1,035
Production managers 212 115 98 425
Other managers 1,426 7,149 459 9,034
Middle level: 9,707 1,4901 2,796 27,404
(35.4% (54.4%) (10.2%) (100%)
State officials 435 508 92 1,035
Teachers 2,889 4,098 451 7,438
Nurses 1,030 393 108 1,531
Supervisors 999 1,606 333 2,938
Technicans 599 836 197 1,632
Sales reps 81 318 47 446
Others 3,674 7,142 1,568 12,384
Lower level:
White collar workers 7,348 12,6190 2,060 22,027
(33.4% (57.3%) (9.3%) (100%)
Total white collar 19,321 36,543 6,621 62,485
(30.9%) (58.5%) (10.6%) (100%)
Source: 1986 Census.
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Academic success does not guarantee better employment, and often
personal or family connections or other factors are more important. But
it certainly helps, so it is not altogether surprising that higher-level,
better-paid, and white collar jobs tend to be dominated by Indians. This
is borne out by Table 7. 18 which shows that in 1986 Indians held 58.5
per cent of all white collar jobs and 69.1 per cent of professional and
managerial jobs. The corresponding figures for Fijians were 30.9 per
cent and 17.4 per cent.
With Indians being so visibly dominant in highly-paid,
professional, managerial and other white collar occupations, the
deepening sense of Fijian disadvantage is even more understandable.
For not only did they dominate those economic activities which
impacted daily and most directly on Fijian lives, they also commanded
the most sought after jobs. Clearly, then, there are grounds for the
Fijian envy of Indians. But therein lies the problem. Fijians generally
perceive the cause of their legitmate grievance in racial terms. In their
eyes the problem is a racial one: Indian success, Fijian failure. We
argue, however, that the problem is also, indeed primarily, a class one.
This is not to deny the force of racist sentiment in Fiji, and in particular
the enormous influence of racial stereotyping, but rather to argue that
there is a material basis - a class basis - to racism which needs to be
recognized. When, for example, Fijians sneer at an Indian
businessman, it is out of resentment and envy. He is resented because
he is an Indian (as opposed to, say, a European). But he is certainly not
envied for being Indian. Rather, he is envied because he is a
businessman. The envy has to do primarily with class not race, even if
the resentment might spring from both. Unfortunately, the racial form
of the problem invariably hides its class content. And this helps to
sustain the myth of Indian domination. For the reality is that most
Indians, like most Fijians, belong to the lower classes.
In the 1986 census, people who were economically active were
asked to indicate whether or not they were in paid employment. Those
who were in paid employment were asked to describe their occupation
and also to indicate whether they were self-employed, employed in the
public sector, or employed in the the private sector. The results are
summarised in Table 7.19.
Several important features about Table 7.19 may be noted. First,
Indians account for the largest proportion of paid employment - 54.1
per cent, compared with 40.1 per cent for Fijians and 5.8 per cent for
other races. Conversely, Fijians make up the vast majority of those
without paid employment: 69.3 per cent compared with 25.2 per cent
for Indians and 5.5 per cent for other races. Secondly, Indians
dominate the professional, managerial and middle level occupations,
but they also make up the majority oflower level workers (white collar,
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blue collar and rural workers). Thirdly, Fijians make up the vast
majority of farmers, including subsistence farmers, while most unpaid
family workers are Indian.
Table 7.19 Economically Active Population By Race
1986
Number Percentage
Fijian Indian Other Total Fijian Indian Other Total
Professional
& managerial
2,266 9,023 1,765 13,054 17.4 69.1 13.5 100
Middle level 9,707 14,901 2,796 27,404 35.4 54.4 10.2 100
Lower level: 42,708 59,743 5,706 108,517 39.5 55.2 5.3 100
Workers
White collar
Blue collar
Rural
7.348
22,233
13,127
12,619
26,905
20,219
2,060
3,319
327
22,027)
52,457)
33,673)
33.4
42.4
39.0
57.3
51.4
60.0
9.4 100
6.3 100
1.0 100
Farmers 18,306 14,907 604 33,817 54.1 44.1 1.81 100
Total in paid
employment
72,987 98,574 10,571 182,132 40.1 54.1 5.8 100
Employable but 40,917
Without paid Jobs:
14,890 3,221 59,028 69.3 25.2 5.5 100
Subsistence
farmers
Unpaid family
30,310
1,947
8,660
3,226
3,046
8,618
1,873
437
911
3,5409
5,430
18,189
85.6
35.9
47.6
9.1
56.1
47.4
5.3 100
8.0 100
5.0 100
workers
Seeking
employment
TOTAL 113,904 113,464 13,792 241,160 47.2 47.1 5.7 100
Source: 1986 Census.
Taken together, these features are important because they cut
across the racial dichotomy of Indian dominance/Fijian disadvantage.
Above all else, they show that although Indians dominate higher and
middle level occupations the numbers involved are very small. The
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majority of economically active Indians either have lower-level jobs or
are not in paid employment. The same is true of most Fijians. This
points, of course, to the heavy concentration of Fijians and Indians in
the lower classes.
To construct a picture of the Fiji class structure, the census
figures on occupation were reclassified on the basis of the more
detailed descriptions of occupations. The picture is presented in Table
7.20.3
The class sizes are reasonably close to what might be expected.
The ruling class is small and comprises the foreign and local
bourgeoisie, the Fijian-dominated state bourgeoisie (which includes
cabinet ministers, permanent secretaries, directors, and heads of
parastatal organizations) and the chiefly elite. The sizeable middle class
is also to be expected and includes doctors, technicians, teachers and
middle-ranking civil servants. The petty bourgeoisie consists of those
in small, owner-operated enterprises which hire little or no wage labour
and instead rely largely on family labour. It is often referred to as the
informal sector and is probably larger than the figure of 6.5 per cent
suggests.
The figure of 44.8 per cent for the working class is more an
indication of the the large mass of working people in Fiji than of a large
industrial working class.
Any such exercise is of course plagued with enormous difficulties. Did
individuals accurately describe their occupations? If they worked for a
private firm, was it large? Small? Family-owned? Did their jobs involve
managerial, supervisory or other control functions? If so, how much?
Were they full-time, part-time or casual workers? What about their
income level, level of education, place of residence, value of assets,
membership of political and social organizations? How many farmers
were engaged in full-time commercial farming? How many owned large
farms? How many hired wage labour, and how much?
Then there is the problem that the data base is the economically active
population, which in 1986 represented only 34 per cent of the total
population, although here we rely on the defensible assumption that
members of a household generally belong to the same class.
These and other problems are acknowledged and a better picture of the
Fiji class structure must await further research. The class structure
presented here is a first attempt. The occupational descriptions were
reasonable and together with personal knowledge of Fiji allowed
recategorization into classes
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Table 7.20 Fiji Class Structure
%
Ruling class l.S
Middle class 8.8
Petty bourgeoisie 6.5
Working class: 44.8
white collar 9.1
blue collar 21.8
rural 13.9
Farmers 13.9
Reserve army 24.5
(Employable but without
paid jobs:
Peasantry 14.7
Unpaid family workers 2.3
Seeking employment 7.5
Total Economically Active Population 1 00.0
The figure of 21.8 per cent for blue collar workers is a better
indication of the latter. The considerable number of rural workers,
together with the sizeable farming class, underlines the importance of
the rural sector. But it is important to note that many rural workers are
hired on a part-time, casual or seasonal basis, as sugarcane cutters for
example. Finally, the very large reserve army is not unsurprising. The
reserve army refers to those who are employable but do not have paid
jobs, and of these the largest group by far is the peasantry. The
peasantry comprise those who engage in production primarily for
subsistence but who might also sell some of their produce. A highly
significant feature of the peasantry in Fiji is that the vast majority (85.6
per cent) are Fijians.
With this picture of the class structure, it is now possible to see
more clearly the class basis of racial antagonism. The racial
composition of classes is presented in Table 7.21 and illustrated in the
diagram below.
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Table 7.21 Racial Composition of Classes
Fijian Indian
(%)
Other
Ruling/dominant class 12.8 60.0 27.2
Middle class 39.0 49.8 11.2
Petty bourgeoisie 21.0 73.3 5.7
Working class - white collar 33.3 57.3 9.4
- blue collar 42.4 51.3 6.3
-rural 39.0 60.0 1.0
Farmers 54.5 43.7 1.8
Reserve army -peasantry 85.6 9.1 5.3
- others 44.9 49.4 5.7
Diagram: Race and Class in Fiji
| | Fijians
fc^j Indians
■B Others
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In Table 7.21 and the diagram above the ruling class is referred to
ashe ruling/dominant class primarily to underline the political
dominance of the Fijian-dominated state bourgeoisie, the eastern-
dominated chiefly elite and (since 1987) the military, despite their small
size and economic weakness. Of course, the other outstanding feature,
as indicated by the diagram, is the absence of a Fijian bourgeoisie. The
disportionately high number of other races in the ruling/dominant class
not only reflects their success in high-level occupations, it also
indicates the presence of foreign corporations whose control over the
commanding heights of the economy we described earlier in this
chapter.
The high Indian representation in the ruling/dominant class reflects
Indian preponderance in the local bourgeoisie. It is that, together with
the Indian preponderance in the middle class and the petty bourgeoisie,
which lies at the heart of anti-Indian sentiment. Indian
overrepresentation in these classes, in other words, represents the class
foundations of anti-Indian feeling. In that regard, Indian preponderance
in the petty bourgeoisie merits special mentioa
Typically smalltime, family-based, petty commodity producers, the
Indian petty bourgeoisie are particularly susceptible to racial
stereotyping. Hamstrung by limited resources, and often by large
families, they work long and hard and exercise great frugality. To
many observers, including Fijians, this is seen as obssession with
making money; frugality is seen as meanness, mamaqi in Fijian. But it
is only through sacrifice and discipline that such Indians survive, and
sometimes even succeed. Of course, the negative perception described
here may be warranted in some cases, but that is equally true of non-
Indians. What is certainly unjustifiable is the wholesale stereoptyping
in that way of Indians as a race. Yet this is precisely what has
happened.
It began in the colonial period when white capital, especially local
white capital, used it as a device to control the Indian working masses
and counteract competition from the emerging local Indian bourgeoisie.
In that task it secured the support of the chiefly class, especially eastern
chiefs; soon anti-Indian sentiment began to pervade the Fijian
community. In the transition to independence the ruling class, and most
especially the chiefly elite, introduced the ideology of multiracialism in
order to facilitate Fijian state power in the postcolonial period. With that
secured, and so long as the Fijian-dominated Alliance Party enjoyed
political dominance, the ideology of multiracialism held firm. Beneath
this outward ideological hegemony, however, lay a deep-rooted racism
nurtured by racist socialization processes and continually reinforced by
racialist constructions of class difference of the types described above.
However, as our discussion in this chapter has revealed, there is a
major disjunction between the Fijian perception of Indian economic
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dominance and the realities of the situation. Indians appear to be
economically dominant because they have the highest number ofhigh
level, middle level and white collar jobs and because they account for
the largest number of capitalists. But number does not necessarily equal
power, and as we have seen, it is foreign capital which wields
economic power.
But there is another side to this gap between myth and reality
which is equally if not more important. Against the misguided Fijian
perception of Indian economic dominance stands the fact that the vast
majority of Indians (89 per cent), like the majority of Fijians (79 per
cent) belong to the disadvantaged classes — the farmers, wage
workers, the peasantry, unpaid family workers and the unemployed.
Unfortunately, the consuming strength and pervasiveness of anti-
Indian sentiment has been such that their common predicament as
oppressed and disadvantaged people has not always found expression
in sustained, organized and united struggle. For the greater part of Fiji
history since the arrival of Europeans and Indians, racist ideology and
practice, coupled with persistent Fijian loyalty to tradition and chiefly
authority, proved far too enduring and divisive. Until, that is the latter
half of the 1980s when the politics of race began to show real signs of
being fundamentally breached.
Having borne the brunt of prolonged economic recession, the
working classes became more restless and assertive. Very importantly,
the Alliance had failed Fijian hopes that it would advance their
economic interests. The development of a Fijian bourgeoisie would
have provided at least some evidence of Fijian business success, but
even that minimal project the Alliance did not achieve. With mounting
class tension and growing Fijian disaffection, then, greater unity
among the working classes became possible. And with the formation of
the Fiji Labour Party to consolidate this new alignment of class forces,
the stage was set for the defeat of the Alliance Party. Shocked, and in
the name of 'Fijian paramountcy', representatives of the eastern-
dominated chiefly elite and the Fijian state bourgeoisie orchestrated a
destabilization campaign which led to the coups of 1987 and their
subsequent return to power. For the working masses, the promise of a
'better tommorrow' was not to be. As we turn now to that sad story we
begin by tracing the Alliance's growing crisis of legitimacy.

Chapter 8
Crises, Coups and the Republic
From the very outset, the viability of the Alliance state rested on
contradictory class foundations. On the one hand it needed the
economic support of the capitalist class (foreign and local capital),
while on the other it needed the political support of a large section of
the disadvantaged classes —wage workers, farmers, peasants and the
unemployed. In particular, it depended for its political survival on
Fijians and general electors in the lower classes. Racialist ideology and
practice have ensured, however, that these power bases are seen in
racial terms - Fijians and general electors for the Alliance; and Indians
fortheNFP.
Certainly there is evidence which seems to bear out the racialist
orthodoxy. Our argument, however, is that racialist explanations hide a
deeper class reality and in this chapter we will try to demonstrate this
further. The test case, of course, is the situation in post-coup Fiji where
the 'Indian factor' has been weakened/contained/neutralized and yet
there is no Fijian unity. Instead what we find is open tension and
struggle among Fijians. How is this to be explained? Why are Fijians
fighting Fijians? The racialist orthodoxy cannot explain this.
What is more, it would be ludicrous to suggest that the intra-Fijian
antagonisms we are now witnessing have their origins in the post-coup
period. They do not, as previous chapters have clearly shown. They he
deep in Fiji's history. The difficulty is that they have been supressed or
masked by racial forms of social conflict. Only now, with the Indians
removed, so to speak, from the race equation, do we see underlying
causes more clearly. Some of those causes have to do with aspects
which are unique to intra-Fijian relations — chief/commoner relations,
regional antagonisms between east and west, traditional political
alignments, and so on. But at the broader level of Fiji society as a
whole, they have to do fundamentally with class.
In previous chapters we showed how in the colonial era these
tensions periodically became manifest and, more importantly, how they
were contained. We now extend that exercise into the postcolonial
period and thus further expose the mystifying, and therefore
ideological, role of the racialist orthodoxy. Focussing on broad political
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developments, we approach the task through an examination of the
problem of the legitimacy of the state.
We will argue that from the mid 1970s the Alliance state was faced
with an increasingly serious problem of legitimacy which deepened in
the mid 1980s when economic conditions worsened. In that situation
emerged the Fiji Labour Party. The party's denial of racial politics and
criticism of the Alliance for perpetuating it represented a major breach
of racialist politics in Fiji. That, coupled with its commitment to the
plight of 'the poor, the weak and the disadvantaged' captured the
imagination of the underclasses who now looked with hope to the
party's promise of 'a brighter tommorrow'. Loyalties began to shift,
and the demise of the Alliance gathered pace.
The biggest losers in the Alliance's defeat in April 1987 were the
eastern-dominated chiefly elite and the Fijian state bourgeoisie. Their
representatives therefore quickly set about a destabilization campaign
which would lead to miltary intervention and their subsequent
reinstatement to power, ostensibly impelled by a concern for 'the
paramountcy of Fijian interests'. This whole process marked the return
of racialist politics, but this time in more virulent, violent and
pernicious forms than ever before.
But the racist regime has not delivered on its promise of 'Fiji for
the Fijians'; indeed it cannot, organized as it is around the interests of a
privileged minority backed by the barrel of the gun. And now that
disadvantaged Fijians are increasingly showing signs of discontent, the
regime is becoming worried, indeed desperate, as we shall see below.
Crisis of legitimacy: alliance in decline
Because electoral outcomes are a major empirical basis for our
discussion, it is necessary briefly to describe the electoral system under
the 1970 constitution. There were 52 single-member constituencies
contested on the basis of simple majorities. Constituencies were of two
types: communal and national, of which there were 27 and 25
respectively. Each type was in turn composed of separate Fijian, Indian
and general elector constituencies, the numbers of which are shown in
Table 8.1 below.
Communal constituencies were racially exclusive, so that only
Fijians could vote in and be candidates for Fijian communal seats, and
similarly for Indians and general electors in respect of their communal
seats. Voters cast one vote for a communal candidate. National
constituencies, on the other hand, were not racially exclusive in that
they included voters of all races. However, voters elected three national
candidates — one Fijian, one Indian, and one general elector. This is
the so-called cross-voting system.
Crisis, coups and the republic 163
Table 8.1 Electoral Constituencies Under the 1970
Constitution
Fijian Indian General TotalH ctor
Communal Seats 12 12 3 27
National Seats 10 10 5 25
Total 22 22 8 52
The operation of the electoral system is perhaps best illustrated by
way of example. A Fijian voter cast four votes: one communal vote (for
a Fijian candidate) and three national votes (one for a Fijian, one for an
Indian, and one for a general elector candidate).
The clearest indication of party support is the communal vote, and
the distribution of communal votes in each of the post-independence
national elections is shown in Table 8.2.
The figures clearly show the dominance of the major political
parties and also the strong racial pattern of voting behaviour —
overwhelming Fijian and general elector support for the Alliance, and
overwhelming Indian support for the NFP.
Table 8.2 Ethnic Voting Pattern
1987 1982 1977 1977 1972
(Sept) (April)
Communal Votes
Fijian for Alliance 78.1
General elector 80.7
for Alliance
Indian for NFP 82.6
83.7
89.7
84.1
80.5
n.a
84.9
64.7
n.a
73.2
83.1
76.0
74.3
Sources: Lai (1986b:90); Robertson and Tamanisau (1988:60).
But there is further evidence to suggest that the Alliance's crisis of
legitimacy worsened over the years - the general decline in the
Alliance's parliamentary majority. (See Table 8.3.)
164 Beyond the Politics of Race
This would seem to lend considerable support to the orthodoxy
about the primacy of race. Against that, however, several points can be
made. The first is the obvious one that the racial pattern of voting is in
large part the product of the electoral system. Secondly, although the
voting pattern is strongly racial, there is a noticeable and highly
suggestive difference between Indian and Fijian voting patterns. While
Indian support for the NFP has remained high, Fijian support for the
Alliance has fluctuated. Indeed, in the second general elections, held in
April 1977, Fijian support for the Alliance fell to its all-time low. It
subsequently improved but ten years later it fell again. This suggests
that by the mid 1970s the Alliance state was faced with a serious
problem of legitimacy.
Table 8.3 Alliance Parliamentary Majorities
Year ofElection
1972 1977 1977 1982 1987
(Apr) (Sept)
14 -2 21 4 -4
In order better to understand the underlying causes of the
Alliance's crisis of legitimacy, we will examine the key issues in the
five national elections. Our concern is not so much with the details of
the elections but rather with underlying tendencies.1 Several general
factors account for the Alliance's resounding victory in 1972: the
euphoria of independence was still in the air; the economy was
reasonably healthy, Ratu Mara commanded immense prestige both as a
high chief, a moderate, and a statesman; and the party was well-
organized. Also important was the pro-Alliance leanings of the FTUC
leadership. The two men who led the labour movement from the early
1960s, Mohammed Ramzan (president) and Sakeasi Waqanivavalagi
(secretary) successfully contested the elections as Alliance candidates
and subsequently became ministers. Into their shoes steppped two
other pro-Alliance men, Joveci Gavoka and James Raman.
By 1973, however, the Alliance's honeymoon period was over as
the contradictions of the neocolonial economy began to surface.
Between July 1973 and October 1973 prices rose by 15 per cent
1 For studies of the elections see Chick (1973); Ali (1972, 1977);
Premdas (1979); and Lai (1983).
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(Leckie 1988:139) and the government's attempt to curb the upward
trend through the Counterinflation Act of 1973 weakened the position
of workers even more. A wage freeze lasted until June 1973 and over
the next six months wage bargaining had to be conducted around a
guideline of 8 per cent set by the Alliance. The class tensions which
this created were fuelled by the highly repressive Trade Disputes Act of
1973, and the oil price rises of late 1973/early 1974 made matters
worse. Of course the rural sector, where Fijians were most heavily
concentrated, was especially hard hit In addition to having to pay
higher prices than urban dwellers, there were limited opportunities for
paid employment and many were dependent on outside incomes.
It was in that difficult situation that Sakeasi Butadroka, assistant
minister for Commerce and Industry, launched his attack on the
Alliance government for not doing enough for Fijians. He was
promptly dismissed from his post and the party, but remained in
parliament as an independent and turned his energies to forming the
Fijian Nationalist Party in 1974. Butadroka's primary concern was
Fijian economic disadvantage, an issue which figured prominently in
the lead-up to independence but then was neglected by the Alliance. His
intervention in 1973 brought the issue back into the open and forced the
Alliance state into action.
Attacked by one of its own members for neglecting its power base,
the Alliance was forced into doing more to advance Fijian economic
interests, and in particular to draw more Fijians into business.
Essentially, the Alliance sought to develop a Fijian bourgeoisie. The
showpiece of its efforts was the Fijian soft loan scheme, which showed
little sign of succeeding by the time of the second national elections in
April 1977 (see chapter 7). The only Fijians who seemed to be doing
well were those in the Fijian state bourgeoisie and a handful of
(primarily eastern) chiefs. Increasing resentment of this fact among the
Fijian masses provided fertile ground for Butadroka and the FNP.
Before developing this point, however, we need to consider what the
FNP saw as the other cause of 'Fijian economic backwardness'.
Like many others, Butadroka blamed the Indians, invariably
comparing 'Fijian' economic failure with 'Indian' economic success.
The local Indian bourgeoisie was flourishing and Indians dominated the
professions and other high-level occupations in both the public and
private sectors.2 Indians were therefore seen as dominating the
economy, and in 1975 when changes to the terms of leases of native
land were proposed Butadroka found another opportunity to intensify
his attack on Indians.
For 1976 figures on this see Sutherland (1984: chapter XI).
166 Beyond the Politics of Race
The distribution of land ownerhsip in Fiji is shown in Table 8.4.
Collectively owned by mataqali, Fijian native land is inalienable. Most
of the freehold land is owned by Europeans. Indians make up more
than 80 per cent of sugarcane farmers, and most Indians lease native
land.
Table 8.4 Land Distribution in Fiji
Category Acres % ofTotal
Native land 3,714,000 82.16
Freehold land 368,000 8.15
Crown land 377,000 9.45
Rotuman land 11,000 0.24
SourceiLal
(1986a:81).
Indian farmers had long been concerned about the security of their
native leases and persistent pressure led to a 1975 report which
recommended, among other things, a minimum lease period of 30
years with a further extension of 20 years. A Bill to amend the existing
legislation was introduced in October 1975 and passed in November
1976 as the Agricultural Landlords and Tenants Act (ALTA).
Within the Indian tenant community there were two views of the
bill: one saw it as the best that could be expected in the circumstances,
the other that it simply extended existing uncertainties. In parliament in
November 1976, the Alliance supported the bill; the next elections were
due in the following year. The NFP opposition, on the other hand, split
on the issue and thus allowed the Alliance to secure the 75 per cent vote
in the House of Representatives required by the 1970 constitution. The
faction led by NFP leader Siddiq Koya opposed the bill while the
faction led by Karam Ramrakha and Irene Narayan supported it. The
Alliance dominated the Senate and so had little difficulty meeting the
other constitutional requirements relating to changes affecting Fijian
land — a 75 per cent Senate vote plus the votes of at least 6 of the 8
Senate nominess of the Council of Chiefs.
For Butadroka, the new act represented yet another example of
Indian gain. The former cooperatives' officer, who had spent a great
deal of time with grassroots Fijians, particularly in the rural areas, was
well attuned to Fijian feelings. When the bill was first introduced in
October 1975 he moved a motion in parliament for the repatriation of
Fiji Indians to India. Although unsuccessful, it appears that the motion
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expressed a sentiment widely held by Fijians. As even the deputy prime
minister at the time, Ratu David Toganivalu, reportedly put it:
Ethnic feeling or rivalry is very real. One must be very honest
in saying that all Fijians consciously, but mainly
unconsciously, feel at times...what is expressed in the motion;
this is how we feel at times; at certain moments, in times of
anger, this is what we say (quoted in Ali 1977:194).
Soon after the Agricultural Landlords and Tenants Act was passed
in November 1976, Butadroka renewed his call for the repatriation of
Indians and in December 1976 made it a central part of the FNP's
manifesto for the forthcoming elections. It was to be a factor in
Butadroka's success.
But it was the anti-Alliance thrust of the FNP's campaign which
was far more important. The party's critical message was that the
Alliance was supposed to advance Fijian interests but had failed to do
so and that only the small Fijian elite had benefitted under Alliance rule.
And the fact that the FNP won 1 1.6 per cent of the Fijian communal
vote showed that at least some sections of the Fijian masses were
becoming aware of and disgruntled by intra-Fijian class differences. As
one FNP election handout put it:
The only Fijians who seem to be getting ahead are those who
do not do any useful work, these are the Government
Ministers. As the Fijian saying goes: 'E votavota 'o
Tuirara.. .'[translated: 'The village headman who usually
divides a Fijian feast normally leaves the largest proportion for
himself] (quoted in ibid.).
The class message here is unmistakeable: Alliance rule had done
little for the vast majority of onlinary Fijians. Chiefs and the Fijian state
bourgeoisie had benefitted but not Fijian workers and peasants. And it
was the latter which the FNP had in mind when it said:
Fijians are far behind as regards owning those things which
stand as symbols for social and economic development, eg,
bus, house, car, telephone and industries. This is due to the
weakness and blindness of the Alliance Government (quoted
in ibid.).
Unfortunately, the nascent class awareness indicated by this
statement was swamped by racist sentiment, and ten years later the
FNP's extremist brand of Fijian nationalism would be used to justify
the destabilization and otheithrow ofthe democratically-elected Bavadra
government. The FNP's manifesto for the April 1977 elections
foreshadowed with chilling accuracy many of the extremist demands
implemented ten years later in the racist Republic:
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The interests of the Fijians will be paramount at all times.
The Fijians must always hold the positions of Governor
General, Prime Minister, Minister for Fijian Affairs and Rural
Development, Minister for Lands, Minister for Education,
Minister for Agriculture, Minister for Home Affairs and
Minister for Commerce, Industry and Co-operatives.
More opportunities should be given for Fijians to enter into
business and commerce.
Total opposition to common roll
Strengthen Fijian Administration and the Government should
give it financial backing and support
Establishment of a Fijian Institute to teach Fijians in business.
Pensions for ex-servicemen.
Indians should be repatriated to India after Fiji gained full
independence.
More Government development projects should be
concentrated in rural areas.
Expansion of the Royal Fiji Military Forces' trade section to
help ease unemployment.
The return to Fijians of all land that was sold illegally.
(Ibid.A90).
The FNP struck a chord with disadvantaged Fijians and in the
April 1977 elections Fijian support for the Alliance fell by 18.7 per cent
to an all-time low of 64.7 per cent. Butadroka won the
Rewa/Serua/Namosi Fijian communal seat, and in the western region
Ratu Osea Gavidi, standing as an independent, won the
Nadroga/Navosa Fijian communal seat Disaffection among the Fijian
masses was dramatically demonstrated.
But the Alliance also miscalculated its Indian support What gains it
might have expected as a result of the ALTA was negated by one of its
education policies which became publicly known only one month
before the elections. The Alliance government had decided that to be
eligible for a scholarship to undertake a pre-degree programme at the
University of the South Pacific, Indian students would need a
minimum pass mark of 261 in the New Zealand University Entrance
Examination whereas Fijian students would need only 216 marks. The
Indian community was outraged. But it was the poorer Indians who
were most disadvantaged by the policy. Wealthy Indians could afford
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the high fees. Of course the NFP thoroughly exploited the issue and
won 26 seats. The Alliance won 22, and independents 2.
Fear and apprehension quickly engulfed the country. Would an
Indian government be acceptable? How long would it last? How would
Fijians react? Would the overwhelmingly Fijian military intevene?
Rabuka has recently acknowledged that he did in fact contemplate
staging a coup.3 As it happened, rivalries within the petty bourgeois
leadership of the NFP meant that the party could not move quickly and
decisively to form a government, thus obviating the need for a military
coup.4
Indeed, the NFP made overtures to the Alliance to form a coalition
headed by Ratu Mara, but he would have none of it Eventually, after
four long and agonizing days during which the country held its breath,
Koya was chosen to be the prime minister. But by then the governor-
general, Ratu Sir George Cakobau, exercising 'deliberate judgement',
had appointed Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara to head a caretaker government
until fresh elections could be held. Stunned, the NFP denounced the
governor-general's actions but there was little they could do.
The details of the crisis which followed the April elections are of
lesser importance here than its general effects: denial of the democratic
process and a deepening of racial fear. Many Fijians could not accept
an 'Indian' government and many Indians feared a Fijian backlash.
Political stability was under serious threat. It is not surprising,
therefore, that in the subsequent elections held in September 1977
Fijians flocked back to the Alliance.
The damaging inroads made by the FNP into the Alliance's power
base forced the latter into a 'painful and thorough self-analysis'. It
'became obsessed with eliminating the Nationalists'. The party machine
was therefore activated to counter the FNP threat. The Fijian
Association, the institutional bacbbone of the Alliance, organized visits
to Fijian villages to repair the damage caused by the FNP, especially its
propanganda against the Alliance leadership. The prime objective now
was to regain the lost Fijian votes: 'for the Alliance, the [National
Federation Party] was of little or secondary importance' (ibid.). The
strategy paid off. Fijian voter turnout increased by 6.4 per cent, Fijian
support for the Alliance jumped by 15.8 per cent, and the FNP lost its
only seat
This is revealed in his interview in Islands Business, September 1987.
See also Lai (1989:6).
4 For a more detailed discussion of these rivalries see Premdas (1979:195-
200).
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For its part, the NFP was bitterly divided. The split which emerged
during the ALTA debate deepened during the constitutional crisis which
followed the April elections: 'with the loss of the Prime Ministership to
the NFP, each faction accused the other of sabotage thereby
precipitating into the open bitter public dispute for control of the party
machinery' (ibid.). Court proceedings were taken out to decide use of
the official party symbol during the campaign for the forthcoming
September elections. The Ramrakha-Narayan group won and became
known as the 'Hibiscus' or 'Flower' faction; die Koya group became
known as the 'Dove' or 'Bird' faction.
Of course the virulent and messy internal strife cost the NFP
dearly. Its power base was divided as many Indians took sides and
others decided not to vote at all. Angry that the NFP had been denied
office, Indians voted in greater number for the NFP. But the factional
split, coupled with the 1.9 per cent fall in the Indian voter turnout,
sealed the party's defeat. The final outcome was Alliance 36 seats,
NFP 15 (Flower faction 12, Dove faction 3), and independent (Ratu
OseaGavidi) 1.
As for the FNP, it lost the one seat which Butadroka had captured
in April. Thereafter the FNP went into decline (Premdas 1980). But the
'low profile' it subsequently displayed is not as 'mystifying' as has
been suggested (Lai 1983:134). Without Butadroka in parliament, the
party lost its primary means of maintaining a significant political
presence, and without sufficient resources its already weak
organizational base could not be sustained. It is not surprising therefore
that the party found it difficult to continue to be the force it once was.
But the more important reason for the eclipse of the FNP was the
renewed vigour and determination with which the Alliance sought to
consolidate its Fijian support. Its defeat of April 1977, the party
resolved, should never again be repeated. In office the party would of
course pursue its class projects — supporting foreign capital, the local
Indian bourgeoisie, the chiefly elite and the Fijian state bourgeoisie.
But should any section of the Fijian masses again threaten withdrawal
of support, the party would counter it with every available resource.
And this is precisely how the Alliance responded to the only serious
Fijian threat to emerge until the next general elections in 1982 — the
dispute over the pine industry.
The dispute, as we saw in the previous chapter, was centred in
western Viti Levu and revolved around proposals for the harvesting
and further development of pine. Many western Fijians wanted a
decentralized pine industry, believing that such an arrangement would
be more beneficial to them. The state, however, wanted more
centralized control— and got it.
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Out of the controversy emerged the Western United Front,5 led by
Ratu Osea Gavidi. It criticized the government's interventions as
interference in the right of western Fijians to utilize their resources
according to their wishes. Ratu Osea accused the Alliance of 'holding
us back' (quoted in Martin 1981 :8) and thus articulated western Fijian
resentment of the 'iniquitous treatment they were receiving at the hands
of the eastern chiefly establishment' (Lai 1986a:99). Not suprisingly,
'frightening' political consequences were envisaged for the Alliance
(Martin 1981:8). As an independent, Ratu Osea had twice beaten
Alliance candidates. Now he led a political party which threatened to
undermine western Fijian support for the Alliance even more.
The emergence of the WUF was the clearest political expression up
to that point of the underlying problem of uneven development. The
western region contributed enormously to the national economy —
sugar production, tourism, mining and the pine industry were
concentrated there and the main international airport was in Nadi. Yet
the benefits of development accrued mainly to the eastern region.
Western Fijians resented this and the pine controversy made them more
outspoken:
[The pine dispute] revived...the lingering, though rarely
publicly espoused, resentments of some western Fijians
against the peripheral treatment they felt they had received at
the hands of the eastern (Bau-Lau) chiefly establishment. They
drew attention to the paucity of western Fijians in high
positions in the civil service, provincial administration,
statutory bodies and the like, a disparity which seemed
especially glaring in contrast to their overall contribution to the
economy. These issues were brought into sharper relief when
a debate in the House of Representatives to allocate $435,868
for the reconstruction and renovation of certain historic sites
on Bau [in the eastern region]...led to the resignation from the
Alliance of the Tui Nadi, Ratu Napolioni Dawai. He pointed to
more pressing needs of western Fijians — education, water
supply, roads, dormitories for school children from outer
islands, which had long been neglected by the government
(Lai 1986b:140-141).
With all the evidence of western Fijian discontent, the stage looked
set for a possible repeat of April 1987. But it was not to be. The
Alliance calculated, correctly, that Butadroka's FNP would not pose a
serious challenge and turned its attention instead to the threat from the
For a detailed analysis of the dispute and the emergence of the Western
United Front see Durutalo (1985).
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west: 'Gavidi's seat was the one that the Alliance made an all-out effort
to win' (ibid.), and it did.
Apart from its vastly superior resources and much better
organization, the Alliance had the additional advantage of a crucial
tactical error committed by the WUF. It entered into a coalition with the
NFP. The NFP wanted to expand its Fijian support, the WUF wanted
to tap the resources of the NFP. But all that the coalition succeeded in
doing was to alienate Fijians who might otherwise have voted for the
WUF. As was to happen to the Fiji Labour Party in 1987, many
potential Fijian supporters were lost because of the link with the
'Indian' NFP.
To make matters worse for the NFP/WUF Coalition, anti-Indian
sentiment was heightened by two other developments. In its last
fortnight, the election campaign took a totally unexpected turn with
disclosures by the Australian Broadcasting Corporation's (ABC)
television programme, 'Four Comers', of foreign (Australian)
interference in the Fijian elections (see i£»<*.:147-151). The programme
exposed the contents of what came to be known as the Carrol Report,
'which was reported not only to recommend [to the Alliance]
questionable tactics for winning elections but also to involve misuse of
Australian aid money by the Alliance Party'(iWd.:148). Enraged, the
NFP/WUF coalition secured and made copies of the programme and
screened it throughout the country.
But its hope that the revelations would win it more votes were
dashed by the Alliance's deft reactioa Turning the charge of foreign
interference back on the TV team, the Alliance described the team's
visit to the country as 'an act of sabotage against a sovereign nation'.
More effectively, it seized upon and twisted the opening words of the
programme that Fiji's present political leaders were descendants of
chiefs who 'clubbed and ate their way to power'. This, the Alliance
proclaimed, was an insult to Fijian chiefs and traditioa
The other important development was Jai Ram Reddy's 'earlier
uncharacteristic and unfortunate slip-of-the-tongue statement that Mara
would even open a toilet to shake a few more Indian hands to get their
votes'. That too was publicized by the Alliance to portray Reddy as a
racist. Needless to say, the combined effect of these developments was
to harden racial voting patterns. That in turn meant that deeper
contradictions were denied political expression — the regional one
discussed above, and also class ones, to which we briefly turn.
Apart from temporary booms in 1979 and ! 981, the country fell
back into the broader trend of economic decline, and the NFP/WUF
coalition, drawing on official sources, made great play of the country's
economic woes: a widening trade deficit, growing indebtedness, rising
unemployment (16.2 per cent in 1981), worsening inflation (11.3 per
cent in 1981), mounting squatter problems, and the shortage of medical
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drugs (ibid.:l45, 147). The worst victims of the recession, of course,
were the lower classes whose capacity to improve their lot was
weakened by various forms of class containment
The predominantly Fijian peasantry lacked organizational and other
resources but were also hamstrung by tradition and the power of
chiefs. Farmers and wage workers in the sugar sector were controlled
by the highly restrictive provisions of the Sugar Act. Other workers
were also constrained. Hamstrung by the repressive provisions of the
1973 Trade Disputes Act, and co-opted into the Tripartite Forum
(which began operating in 1977), the trade unions were forced into
moderation. But with pro-Alliance people like James Raman (president)
and Joveci Gavoka (secretary) leading the FTUC, the 'responsible
unionism' which capital and the Alliance state sought was generally
forthcoming. Of course some unions, particularly the public employees
unions and most especially the Fiji Public Servants Association
(FPSA), were agitated by the FTUC's moderate leadership and the
restraining influence of the Tripartite Forum, but for some time were
unable to counteract it (see Leckie 1988:154; Howard 1985:135).
The effective containment of the working classes, then, together
with the unique set of events in the latter part of the 1982 elections,
meant that underlying class tensions were again submerged by the
weight of racialist politics. Yet the final outcome of the elections
suggests the legitimacy of the Alliance state remained problematic. The
majority of 21 which the Alliance secured five years earlier was slashed
to a mere 4.
In the next two years, class tensions would intensify along with the
economic recession which by 1982 had already set in. Through the
struggles of the labour movement and the party it spawned, the Fiji
Labour Party (FLP), underlying class tensions would begin to break
through the politics of race.
Racialism breached: The Fiji Labour Party
A dispute in early 1980 between the FPSA and the Public Service
Commission (PSQ, the largest union and employer respectively, led in
May of that year to an agreement that there be an evaluation 'covering
the classification, grading and salary structures' of all posts in the civil
servce. A review committee of two— Harry Nicol and Alan Hurst—
was appointed and both sides agreed to abide by its recommendations
from July 1981. The Nicol and Hurst Report was not submitted until
July 1982, and although there were criticisms from both the FPSA and
the PSC, the main point of contention was the date to implement the
recommended pay increases.
Reneging on its earlier undertaking, the PSC asked the FPSA to
accept an implementation date of January 1983. The latter refused;
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negotiations continued until August 1983 when the matter was referred
to arbitration. In the same month the government asked its employees
to forgo a cost-of-living increase awarded to them by the Tripartite
Forum in the previous June. Public service workers were outraged and
the FTUC and other unions rallied behind the FPSA. A compromise
agreement on payment of the Nicol and Hurst awards was finally
reached in August 1984; arrears would be paid in installments of cash
and government bonds. But many workers remained unhappy and
three months later their simmering anger boiled over. In November
1984 Finance Minister Mosese Qionibaravi, in handing down the
government's budget for 1985, announced retrenchments in civil
service jobs and a freeze on all wages, salaries and increments. The
economy was in the doldrums (GDP declined in 1982 and 1983) and as
far as the Alliance was concerned workers would yet again have to bear
the burden.
The reaction from organized labour was immediate and strong, and
in December 1984 the executive of the FTUC unaminously decided to
form the FLP. In February 1985 the two teachers unions staged a two-
week strike and newly-graduated student-teachers from the University
of the South Pacific went on a hunger strike to protest the
government's refusal to honour its undertaking to employ mem as civil
servants. In the following April the Confederation of Public Sector
Unions was formed to strengthen worker solidarity in the Public
Service. Mahendra Chaudhry was elected secretary and Dr Timoci
Bavadra (president of the FPSA since 1977) was elected president.
But by then opposition to increasing worker assertiveness was
already growing. It was 'motivated primarily by the threat posed to the
ruling Alliance by the proposed Labour Party' (Howard 1985:148).
Suggestions were made in the Alliance-dominated Senate to tighten
labour legislation, and certain trade unions were accused of having
links with Cuba, the Soviet Union and Libya. Also, attempts were
made to split the trade union movement. In March 1985, for example, a
senior Alliance minister appealed to Fijian dockworkers on racial lines:
'Nothing can destroy Fijian solidarity' (quoted in ibid.). In the same
month Joveci Gavoka, pro-Alliance leader of the blue collar Public
Employees Union, announced plans to form a national organization of
unions. Three months later he and other unionists, including Taniela
Veitata (later to become a leading force in the Taukei Movement and
currently minister for Industrial Relations), formed the Confederation
of Blue Collar Unions as a counter to the Confederation of Public
Sector Unions. But these and other efforts failed to break the
determination of progressive forces in the union movement, and on 6
July 1985 the Fiji Labour Party was formed.
In his launching address, party president Dr Timoci Bavadra
described the FLFs origins:
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As the economic crisis worsened through the late 1970s and
early 1980s the unions tried their best to work with the
government in seeking equitable solutions. The unilateral
imposition of the wage freeze last year indicated clearly that the
government was no longer willing to discuss matters with the
representatives of the working people of Fiji. As responsible
trade unionists we felt compelled to react strongly to
government policies that threaten the wellbeing of our
members and, in fact, of all Fijians. We recognised that it was
time for the working people of Fiji to form their own political
party rather than continue to rely on the goodwill of existing
political parties that increasingly had demonstrated that they
represent only the narrowest of interests.
He then outlined the basic cause of increasing dissatisfaction with the
Alliance:
What has become apparent to more and more people in Fiji is
that a tremendous gap exists between the rhetoric by which the
ruling party claims to be serving the interests of the people of
Fiji and the reality. Whether one be a civil servant, cane
farmer, copra cutter or urban labourer, it is obvious that the
government is not doing enough and that it has become
increasingly distant from die majority ofpeople.
And as for the Labour Party:
Our aim is to provide a real alternative to this rhetoric to create
a political force that truly represents and is responsive to the
needs, aspirations and will of the people of Fiji. Our aim is the
creation of true democracy in this country and to put an end to
the many undemocratic features that dominate the political life
of Fiji.
Very importantly, he explicitly stated that the FLP was 'for all
Fijians...whatever their race'. At the end of the speech, he reaffirmed
the party's commitment to the disadvantaged:
...I would like to reiterate the call of the Fiji Labour Party to
do something about the disadvantaged groups within our
society who have been neglected for far too long, and whose
lives have become marginalised by the demolishing effects of
the wage freeze, the uncontrolled price rise in essential goods
and food items, and the scandalous rise in school bus fares
(the full text of the speech appears in South Pacific Forum,
July 1985:70-81).
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These extracts capture the class foundations and orientation of the party
and at the same time underline the party's denial of racial politics.
Primacy is given to the underclasses — workers, overburdened rural
dwellers, the urban poor, unemployed youth, the destitutes, domestic
workers, the majority of Fiji women and so on. Through the FLP,
welling class tensions were to be harnessed and given organized
political expression.
The second half of 1985 saw growing evidence of the party's
popularity. In November it scored a stunning victory in the Suva City
Council elections, winning eight seats. The Alliance won seven, and
independents five. It did less well in municipal elections held soon
afterwards in Nadi and Labasa but its public profile was helped
enormously by the publicity. Its first test as a national political force
came in December when it contested the North Central Indian national
in a by-election. With Mahendra Chaudhry as its candidate, the party
campaigned on issues while the Alliance 'countered with standard
tactics, offering patronage to voters with one hand and labelling Labour
an Indian and anti-chief party with the other' (Robertson and
Tamanisau 1988:36). The outcome was highly significant. The
Alliance won by a mere 241 votes out of a total of 20,709. More
importantiy, Labour beat the NFP into second place. For a party that
was just five months old, this was a stunning achievement. And for the
Alliance the message was clear.
Attempts had already been made to undermine the FLP by striking
at its union base. Moves in November 1985 to remove Krishna Datt as
secretary of the Fiji Teachers Union were followed by threats to
deregister his union and the FPSA. In 1986 the attack on the trade
union movement intensified, culminating in the government's decision
in June of that year to withdraw recognition of the FTUC because four
of its executive members were FLP officials — James Raman,
Mahendra Chaudhry, Joeli Kalou and Krishna Datt. In so doing,
however, the government also brought about the collapse of the
Tripartite Forum and threw the system of industrial relations into
chaos.
With its union base under severe threat, the FLP leadership became
increasingly worried about the future. If the FLP should fail as a
political force, the future of the trade union movement would be
gravely threatened. As Bavadra later recalled, 'If we were to allow the
Alliance government to remain in power that would be the end of the
labour movement of any sort' (quoted in ibid/31). That feeling,
together with the NFP's visible weakness, opened the way to an
electoral marriage with the other opposition parties.
In early June 1986 initial talks were held between FLP and WUF
leaders. It was argued that there should only be two groups fighting the
forthcoming elections. At another meeting nine days later, agreement
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was reached that the common objective of the two parties was to defeat
the Alliance. On 26 June the move towards a coalition was taken a step
further at a meeting of the FLP, WUF and NFP.
Soon, however, strong opposition to the idea of a coalition began
to emerge among FLP supporters. The party, they felt, should fight the
elections alone, and especially because its multiracial image was
crucial, it had to avoid being tarnished by the 'Indian' image of the
NFP. At the FLP's first annual convention, held in Lautoka in July
1986, opposition to a coalition was strongly expressed. However,
party secretary Krishna Datt persuaded the convention to allow the
party's management board a free hand to negotiate possible areas of co
operation that might serve the party's electoral strategy. In the
following November the FLP/NFP Coalition was formed and the stage
set for a two-way contest
The details of the election campaign have been adequately
described elsewhere and need not detain us here. What is important is
the broad difference in appeal and strategy between the protagonists.
The Alliance pointed to its 'record of sound leadership', claimed credit
for Fiji's 'peace, progress and prosperity', relied heavily on racialist
appeal (particularly to Fijians), and warned of the consequences of
supporting the 'socialist' Labour Party. In contrast, the Coalition
focussed on the class bias of Alliance rule and attacked the Alliance for
yet again resorting to the 'politics of race and fear'. On the Alliance's
class bias, a Coalition advertisement proclaimed:
Under the Alliance, the elite have feathered their own nests
while conditions for the rest, particularly the poor and
disadvantaged have got steadily worse. Inequalities have
become part and parcel of Alliance rule. Poverty is a disease
— the Alliance is the carrier (ibid.:5 1).
The 'party of the rich' was also confronted with a whole series of
allegations of corruption and mismanagement. In addition to other
claims,
Baba alleged that the [state-owned] National Bank of Fiji
wrote off $4 million owed by the Stinson Pearce Group [with
which Peter Stinson, Minister for Economic Planning,
allegedly had an association at the time of the write-off].
Lautoka lawyer Bhupendra Patel claimed evidence in March
that garment manufacturers paid $52,000 to the Alliance Party
to prevent the enforcement of minimum wages. At the same
time Mahendra Chaudry stated that two large businesses
donated $100,000 each to the Alliance in order to protect their
interests. In April Krishna Datt disclosed that sweets
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manufacturers paid the Alliance $15,000 to remove the budget
tax imposed on Indian sweets (ibid.).
Of course the charges were denied, but neither were they legally
contested.
The Coalition's message to the electorate, especially the 'poor,
weak and disadvantaged' ofFiji, was that what the country needed was
'clean, caring and open government'. It promised anti-corruption
legislation, a leadership code, abolition of the Official Secrets Act and
enactment of a freedom of information act Its economic platform rested
on several key planks: economic growth, better utilization of resources,
more jobs, a just wage, better working conditions, fair prices and
easier access to finance. In the area of social welfare it promised to
work towards housing for all, better education, adequate health and
nutrition at low cost, a fair deal for women and youth, greater
assistance for the elderly, disabled and destitute, and a physically safer
society. Its programme for 'fair and open government' rested on the
promise to make government more accountable and more accessible.
It is this broad reformist thrust which lies behind the Coalition's
victory. But the electoral gains achieved by the Coalition's undoubted
appeal to the underclasses might have been greater were it not for the
Alliance's exploitation of racialist sentiment and fear. As an Alliance
pocket meeting was told, 'If the Alliance falls, the Fijians will never
lead this country'. This strategy of trying to divide trie Fijian masses
was most effective in relation to the vital question of land.
The Coalition promised to set up a Native Lands and Resources
Commission to allow greater involvement by ordinary Fijians in
decision-making about the development and management of their land
rather than having such key decisions made by the NLTB and other
insitutions. But the Coalition also stressed that the proposed
Commission would work with the NLTB.
The proposal was immediately attacked by the Alliance, claiming
that it would jeopardize Fijian land rights. Nothing could be further
from the truth The Coalition did not question Fijian land rights, which
in any case were solidly safeguarded by the extremely tight provisions
of the 1970 constitution. Amendments to constitutional provisions
relating to Fijian interests required a 75 per cent vote in both the House
of Representatives and the Senate and also the assent of at least six of
the Council of Chiefs' nominees in the Senate.
For the Coalition, what was at issue was not ownership of Fijian
land but its class control, and here Bavadra pointed to the Alliance's
mismanagement of Fijian commercial ventures such as the failed
NLDC, the FIDC, Naviti Investments and the Lomaiviti Company.
What is more, he went on to say, 'All these businesses were
established by the hard earned cash of the poor villager' (quoted in
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ibid.AS). Slamming the Alliance's lies as an example of the 'politics of
fear', he addressed this statement to Fijians:
They are lies of desperate men clutching on to the last vestiges
of power and privilege. Do you really believe that I, a son of
the land, would ever dream of letting my Coalition threaten
your land. I would never do what the Alliance government has
done to the people ofNasomo over their land (ibid.).
The Coalition had earlier released a statement outlining how Nasomo
land had been given to the Emperor Gold Mining Company without
consideration of rentals or compensation for the Nasomo people.
The Alliance's gross misrepresentation of the Coalition's policy on
Fijian land clearly showed that it was concerned about its Fijian
support. But its worries stretched way back. In 1983 the Council of
Chiefs proposed another reorganization of the system of native
administration. It recalled that the reorganization of the mid 1960s was
prompted by 'a general feeling that the Fijians needed to be
emancipated from the control of the Fijian Regulations and central
authority' (Great Council of Chiefs 1985:64). But now it complained
that 'the abolition of the Fijian Regulations and the winding up of the
Fijian judicial system, together with the non-enforcement of by-laws,
meant that many of the decisions of the Provincial Councils were not
pursued to their logical conclusion' (ibid.:65). The worry now was that
while
[T]he line of authority from the Provincial Council to the
[Fijian Affairs Board], the Great Council of Chiefs and the
Minister for Fijian Affairs is clear and understood....[b]elow
the Provincial Council the Fijians have tended to wander from
one authority to another (ibid.:6S).
The upper echelons of the Fijian community were worried that they
were losing control over the Fijian masses and duly commissioned a
review of the provincial administration. In 1984 the review team
submitted its report. The broad thrust of the recommendations was that
the provinvial administration be expanded. If implemented, greater
control could be execised over the Fijian masses. In March 1987, one
month before the general elections, the Alliance announced that the
provincial administration would be reorganized. How much effect that
had on Fijian voters is difficult to tell, but the announcement pointed
very suggestively to Alliance's unease about the loyalty of its traditional
power base.
As it happened, the Alliance won all the Fijian and general elector
communal seats while the Coalition won all the Indian communal seats.
But several features of the final outcome are highly significant. First,
overall voter turnout fell to its lowest level ever — 70 per cent
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compared with the alltime high of 85 per cent in 1982 and a usual
turnout rate of about 80 per cent. This suggests a higher degree of voter
anxiety than ever before, which is understandable given that for the
first time there was now a credible but untested alternative to Alliance
rule.
Secondly, the lowest turnout rates occurred in Indian communal
constituencies taking in the urban, peri-urban and rural areas around the
capital, Suva: Suva Rural 60.3 per cent, Suva City 61.7 per cent and
Nasinu/Vunidawa 62.5 per cent. By comparison, voter turnout in the
Fijian communal seats, which cover roughly the same area, was
generally higher: Kadavu/Tamavua/Suva Suburban 65.6 per cent,
Ra/Samabula/Suva 67.1 per cent, Lomaiviti/Muanikau 68.7 per cent
and Rewa/Serua/Namosi 71 .9 per cent
On the logic of the argument about racial voting patterns, the low
Indian turnout rates would have hurt the Coalition and the higher Fijian
turnout rates would have helped the Alliance. More importantly, these
differential effects should have been repeated in the four most crucial
seats in the elections — the four national seats which cover the
southeastern region around Suva — and thus increase the Alliance's
chances of victory. But they were won by the Coalition.
The seats were the Suva Fijian, Suva Indian, Southeastern Fijian
and Southeastern Indian national seats, and turnout figures given above
clearly suggest that they could not have been won by the Coalition
without considerable Fijian support. And that there was such support is
suggested most strongly by the fact that the Coalition's winning
margins were bigger in the two constituencies where there were more
Fijian than Indian voters (Southeastern Fijian and Southeastern Indian)
than in the two constituencies where there were more Indian than Fijian
voters (Suva Fijian and Suva Indian national).
But there is another telling feature of the Coalition's victory in
these four crucial seats. The region covered by these constituencies
contained the largest and most visible concentration of the industrial
working class, the unemployed, urban youths and squatters. This is the
region where, especially in Suva, much of the intense industrial conflict
of the preceding five years was played out. It was here, therefore, that
class antagonisms were likely to be at their sharpest and most visible. It
was here that the Coalition's appeal to the underclasses was most likely
to find a receptive audience— including, very critically, a Fijian one. It
was here that the Coalition defeated the Alliance and breached the
politics of race most clearly.
But the historic victory was to prove shortlived. No sooner had the
Coalition taken office than the forces of reaction set about undermining
it.
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Racialism reasserted: coups and the Alliance's return
As we noted earlier, the biggest losers in the elections were the eastern-
dominated chiefly elite and the Fijian state bourgeoisie. Immediately
their representatives began a destabilization campaign which soon came
to be organized around the Taukei Movement. (Taukei are the
indigenous Fijians and the term derives from Taukei ni qele which
literally means owners of the soil.) Among the prominent figures were
the following:
Ratu Meli Vesikula, an eastern chief, formerly a sergeant
major in the British Army and who previously served in
Cyprus and Northern Ireland;
Apisai Tora, former minister for Rural Development;
Filipe Bole, fomerly minister for Education and before that
permanent secretary for Education;
Ratu Finau Mara, an eastern chief, eldest son of Ratu
Mara, and a lawyer in the Crown Law Office;
Jone Koroitamana, chief executive of the Civil Aviation
Authority;
Dr Inoke Tabua and Jona Qio, both Alliance Senators;
Aparosa Rakoto, formerly an Alliance Senator;
Jone Veisamasama, secretary ofthe Alliance Party;
Taniela Veitata, Alliance MP,
Ratu Ovini Bokini, the Tui Tavua and a brother-in-law of
Filipe Bole;
Viliame Govelevu, Alliance MP and vice president elect of
the Methodist Church in Fiji
Rev Tomasi Raikivi, a Methodist minister,
Ratu Inoke Kubuabola, an eastern chief, president of the
Fiji Council of Churches, and secretary of the Fiji Bible
Society;
Ratu George Kadavulevu, a senior eastern chief; and
Ratu Josaia Tavaiqia, a senior western chief, Alliance MP
and former minister for Forestry.
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The details of the Taukei Movement's destabilizatdon campaign and the
military coup which followed it on 14 May 1987 are relatively well
known and have been adequately described elswhere (see Robertson
and Tamanisau 1988; Piper 1988). What is important here is that the
campaign was essentially an attempt by the Fijian elite to recapture
power, and that the keys to their success were the racist ideology of
'Fijian paramountcy' and Fijian monopoly of the means of violence.
Riding on the back of the Fijian masses — workers, peasants and
the unemployed — the disgruntled Fijian elite projected the former's
disadvantaged class condition as a racial problem, a 'Fijian' problem.
And the cause of their predicament was, the demagogues claimed, a
racial one— the Indians, who were not only 'economically dominant',
but now 'politically dominant' as well. If therefore the 'Fijian race' was
to be 'saved' from the 'Indian threat', strong action was needed. And
who better to lead the Fijians than chiefs and the Alliance.
Here was Fijian elite racism at its Machiavellian worst, and that at
least some sections of the Fijian masses succumbed to it is suggested
by the turnout of some 5,000 Fijians at an anti-government
demonstration in Suva at the height of the destabilization campaign.
Two weeks later, on Thursday 14 May, the military, led by Sitiveni
Rabuka, ousted the Coalition government. Again many Fijians took to
the streets to show their support for the 'revolution' that was supposed
to liberate their race from the 'Indian threat'. The governor-general,
Ratu Sir Penaia Ganilau (who is also Rabuka's high chief), helped
along by internal and external pressures, offered some resistance but
eventually, on 15 October, 'gave up the struggle' and resigned. On 5
December he became president of the Republic.
The historic breach in racialist politics that had recently been
achieved by the FLP was effectively reversed. But the ease with which
this was achieved is not surprising in view of the country's long
history of racism. It was not difficult to get Fijian support for the
extremist and racist demands put forward by the Taukei Movement and
later used by the military to justify the coup. For many ordinary
Fijians, then, objective class interests were overwhelmed by racist
ideology.
But it was not long before the Fijian masses began to see that what
had been done supposedly on their behalf — the overthrow of a
government which many of them had elected, the terrorization of
Indians, and the violation of basic human rights — was really intended
for another purpose, a class purpose. 'Fijian supremacy', they soon
began to discover, really meant supremacy of the Fijian elite.
In the wake of the May coup came political chaos, social tension
and disastrous economic decline. Retail sales fell by 20 per cent,
manufacturing output by 50 per cent and property values 50 per cent.
Wages were slashed, farmers delayed the cane harvest in protest, cane
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mill workers refused to work believing that they might not be paid, the
number of tourists plummeted, foreign reserves shrank, the Fiji dollar
was devalued by 17.75 per cent, and skilled and professional people
left in their hundreds (Robertson and Tamanisau 1988:119). Before
long the economy was tottering on the edge of collapse and the signs of
discontent began to show.
The two English-language dailies, particularly the Fiji Sun,
highlighted the injustices resulting from the coup and in Suva emerged
the Back to Early May Movement It called on the governor-general to
return the troops to barracks, place security in the hands of the police
and courts, resummon the dissolved parliament, form a government of
national unity, and begin a proper examination of the constitution after
first translating it into Fijian. Armed with a petition signed by 1 10,000
people, it was 'able to claim that many people wanted a new political
compromise'.(Robertson and Tamanisau 1988:129). In the west,
discontent was shown most dramatically by the massive destruction of
pine forests: 'altogether [365] fires in the west damaged 6,500 hectares
of pine forest by September' (ibid.: 129. 1 thank Robertson for pointing
out that the number of fires was 365, not 651 as incorrectly stated in
his book).
Faced with economic disaster and growing opposition, the regime
tried to restore stability and business confidence and allowed talks
between the Alliance and the Coalition with a view to achieving some
political accommodation. That produced the Deuba Accord of 23
September under which 'both parties agreed to participate equally in a
Caretaker Government under [former governor-general] Ganilau'
(ibid.:l3S). But the Taukei Movement would have nothing of it, and
spokesman Vesikula issued this telling threat:
The Taukei Movement would like to remind the people of Fiji
about the consequences of a caretaker government in Northern
Ireland in 1971 during a civil strife similar to the one here.
Seveteen years later, 10,000 civilians and security forces were
dead; some 50,000 were badly wounded; properties, assests,
business establishments reduced to ashes or rubbles...and still
no solution insight (quoted in ibid.).
On 25 September the military again took over the country, and
thereafter the economy again plunged into crisis. The currency was
devalued by a further 12.25 per cent, inflation worsened, wages were
cut again, and even more jobs^ were lost. Again the worst hit were the
underclasses. For the Fijian masses in particular, the pain and
discomfort was now so much the worse because they now saw more
For more detailed discussions see Knapman (1988); Cole and Hughes
(1988); Kasper, Bennett and Blandy (1988).
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clearly that the the fruits of the 'revolution' staged in their name going
to the Fijian elite who had recaptured political power.
The regime went through four changes. The first two — the
Council of Ministers of 15 May and the Council of Advisers of 23 May
— were dominated by the Alliance. The third followed the Taukei
Movement's outright rejection of the Deuba Accord and the second
military coup on 25 September. Following the second coup, Rabuka
agreed to hold discussions with Ganilau, Bavadra and Mara on 5
October. But sensing that he had the upper hand, he changed his mind
and on 1 October abrogated the 1970 constitution. The talks went ahead
but Rabuka presented his 'minimum demands' for restoring executive
authority to the governor-general— a 67-seat parliament with 36 seats
for Fijians; ten-yearly reviews of the constitution; reservation of the
offices of governor-general, prime minister, Home Affairs and Fijian
Affairs for Fijians; and an entrenchment of the Sunday ban on sport
and trading that he had already imposed. The Alliance accepted the
demands. The Coalition refused. The next day, 6 October, Rabuka
declared Fiji a Republic and three days later appointed the third Council
of Ministers. It was dominated by Taukeists, among whom, very
significantly, were Ratu Meli Vesikula and Sakeasi Butadroka. During
their short tenure, however, the economy deteriorated further and social
tension worsened. They were ousted by the military who on 5
December appointed yet another Council of Ministers overwhelmingly
dominated by the Alliance with Ratu Mara as prime minister.
At the bureaucratic level, the return of the Alliance was
accompanied by the sidetining of key officials whose loyalties to the
regime were seen to be suspect More trustworthy, invariably Fijian,
ones took their place. Ultimate power still rested with the military, but
without the political and administrative competence to run the country,
it needed the services and support of the Alliance-dominated Fijian state
bourgeoisie.
The relationship between the two has not always been smooth, but
it is in the outcome of their cooperation that the seeds of their possible
undoing lie. For while bom have benefitted, the masses have become
worse off. More importantly at this historical juncture, the Fijian
masses are worse off. What is more, they have not only begun to
recognize the hidden class agenda of the upheavals that were
engineered supposedly for their betterment, but also have started to act
on it.
Apartheid Fiji-style: racism and resistance in the
Republic
The move to draw up a new constitution which would ensure Fijian
political supremacy began with the formation of the Constitutional
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Review Committee in July 1987. In September 1988 the regime
released a draft constitution and later set up the Constitution Inquiry
and Advisory Committee (CIAQ to receive and report on submissions
on the draft. International criticism of the draft constitution quickly
followed its release and within Fiji the oppositional forces represented
by the Coalition rejected it outright. Over the next two years the regime
sought to contain the continuing opposition but without success, and
by the middle of 1990 it was clear that the ruling elite had become
desperate. Their main worry was the growing disaffection of the Fijian
masses, and it was primarily in response to that that several crucial
amendments were made to the draft before a new constitution was
promulgated in July 1990. In order better to appreciate the significance
of the changes (which we examine in the next chapter), it is necessary
first to outline the key objections to the draft constitution and indicate
the nature of the growing discontent, particularly among ordinary
Fijians.
In its submission to the CIAC in January 1989 the Coalition
totally rejected the draft constitution:
The anti-democratic nature of the Draft is obvious from the
compositon of the legislature, which would now be
unicameral. Section 38 provides for 67 members, of which 28
would be Fijians, 22 Indians, 1 Rotuman, and 8 General
Electors. Given that Indians are the single largest community,
there is serious discrimination against them. The
unrepresentativeness of this provision is aggravated by
paragraph 7 of the same section which provides for 8 members
(with all the rights of elected members) to be appointed on the
nomination of the Bose Levu Vakaturaga [Great Council of
Chiefs]. Since the Bose Levu would be a body of Fijian
chiefs, it is a fair assumption that a large majority, if not all of
these members would be Fijians. In addition these members
would not owe their seats in the legislature to any democratic
process or elections. The Draft itself prescribes no criteria or
procedures for their nomination, opening the way to abuse and
arbitrariness. Indeed the Draft does not even define the Bose
Levu Vakaturaga, a serious ommission given the important
role assigned to it, and symptomatic of the disregard of the
democratic principles and procedures which charactrize the
Draft
The undemocratic nature of the legislature is also underlined
by the provision in section 67(4) whereby the prime minister
can nominate a further 4 persons who, despite not being
elected, would thereby become full members of the legislature.
Again, it may not be unreasonable to assume that the majority
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of these members will be Fijians, given that under the
proposed membership of the legislature, the person who is
prime minister would be dependent on Fijian support. Thus
the number of Fijian members could be as high as 40 out of a
total membership of 71. This means that Indians, representing
48.65per cent of the population [which totals 715,000] would
have 31 per cent of the seats; the Fijians with 46.6 per cent
would have 56 per cent of the seats; and the General Electors
with 5 per cent of the population would have 1 1 per cent of the
seats. Also, 12 out of [the] 71 members would be unelected
and nothing precludes them from forming a cabinet. A House
so composed can hardly claim to be fair or democratic
((National Federation Party and the Fiji Labour Party Coalition
Submission on the Draft Constitution to the Fiji Constitution
Inquiry and Advisory Committee, 16 January 1989, pp.9-10).
The Great Council of Chiefs (Bose Levu Vakaturaga) referred to in the
submission is a new and smaller body created by a restructuring of the
existing council and it is there that the regime intended to concentrate
more political power. This explains the immense political influence
accorded to it by the draft constitution. The Bose Levu Vakaturaga, in
other words, was created to strengthen the position of the ruling Fijian
elite, and in part this was achieved by excluding potential opponents of
the regime from its membership.
Initially this kind of exclusion was made possible by the absence in
the draft constitution of any definition of the Bose Levu Vakaturaga,
something which the Coalition criticized. Before the coups,
membership of the Council of Chiefs included all 22 elected Fijian
members of the House of Representatives. After the coups, however,
they were excluded from the Council, and that they might be excluded
permanently was the reason for the Coalition's concern. That concern
was vindicated in June 1990 when a meeting of the Bose Levu
Vakaturaga formally determined its future membership and decided that
elected Fijian members of parliament would not necessarily be
included.7 But such members were not the only potential opponents.
Prior to the coups, the Council of Chiefs was constituted by all elected
Fijian members of the lower house of the Fiji Parliament, 8 chiefs
appointed by the minister for Fijian Affairs, 7 others appointed by him,
and representatives of each of the provinces (2 or 3 depending upon size
of the population). Membership of the newly-constituted body is as
follows: 42 representatives of the provincial councils (3 for each of the
14 councils and chosen at each council's discretion); 3 nominees of the
president; 3 nominees of the minister for Fijian Affairs; 1 nominee of
the Rotuma Council; and 5 ex-officio members, namely the president,
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The restricted membership of the Bose Levu Vakaturaga necessarily
meant that not all chiefs would be included in it. Which chiefs,
therefore, would be excluded? And how would they feel about their
exclusion?
In the lead-up to the 1987 elections there had been a debate about
relative chiefly status and the distinction between 'high chiefs' and
'sub-chiefs' offended many chiefly egos. It was always likely,
therefore, that exclusion from the Bose Levu Vakaturaga would cause
offence and increase inter-chiefly rivalry. And that it had precisely that
effect became publicly evident in December 1991 when chiefs from the
western province of Nadroga/Navosa formed a new political party. But
we take up that story in the next chapter.
The draft constitution also reserved certain key positions for
Fijians — prime minister, chairman of the Public Service Commission,
commissioner of police, and chairman of the Police Service
Commission. Effectively the same applied to the president who would
also be commander-in-chief and who 'shall be appointed by the Bose
Levu Vakaturaga'. The draft constitution also stipulated that the
commander of the Military Forces be an ex-officio member of the
House of Representatives and the cabinet Little wonder, therefore, that
the Coalition rejected the document as 'authoritarian, undemocratic,
militaristic, racist and feudalistic'.
Neither is it surprising that the vast majority of Indians and other
non-Fijians opposed the draft constitution. But much more worrying
for the regime was that there was simply not the solid Fijian support for
it that the regime expected, and it was that which led to threats of yet
another coup. In a speech in October 1988 Ratu Mara reportedly
'forewarned of a new military takeover unless the Draft Constitution
was adopted'. A couple of weeks earlier, Rabuka reportedly
told the Nabua military camp congregation that he had been
given the 'green light' by Mara to take over again if there was
not unanimous Fijian support for the Draft Constitutioa..[He]
urged the worshippers to get the message to the Fijian people
that they must support the constitutional proposals (Fiji
Situation Report (FSR), 20 October 1988).
One reason for the Fijian disapproval was the proposal that Fijian
electoral constituencies be the same as the existing provinces. Behind
that lay a massive gerrymander designed to undercut Fijian opposition
and preserve the existing leadership. First, it would seriously
the prime minister, the commander of the Armed Forces, the minister
for Fijian Affairs, and the permanent secretary for Fijian Affairs. See
Dunstan (1990).
188 Beyond the Politics of Race
undermine the political clout of urban Fijians whose votes would be
split and redistributed to provinces whose boundaries cut into urban
areas. The votes ofurban Fijians would therefore be swamped by those
of their rural, and generally more conservative, counterparts. Secondly,
the proposal was biased heavily in favour of provinces where support
for the existing leadership was likely to be strongest This served to
give an even sharper edge to another axis of post-coup intra-Fijian
tension.
Since the May coup traditional rivalries between the three political
confederacies of Tovata, Kubuna and Burebasaga resurfaced as a major
factor in the intra-Fijian power struggle. Fijians belonging to the
Kubuna and Burebasaga confederacies soon became increasingly
agitated by what they perceived to be Tovata dominance in the regime.
At the top of the power elite were Tovata people like President Ganilau,
Prime Minister Mara, Rabuka, Education Minister Filipe Bole, and
Public Service Commission Chairman Poseci Bune. It is true that
'relationships extend across confederacies and political lines', and that
the present Fijian elite includes people from the Kubuna and
Burebasaga confederacies. But it is equally true that the allegiance of
the latter is 'political, not tribal; their motivation [being] the restoration
of Fijian ruling class authority' (Robertson and Tamanisau: 1988:99).
For disadvantaged Fijians this is precisely the problem: that what is
essentially class power appears in various forms — as military,
politico-bureaucratic, chiefly or tribal power. And these forms have
become the immediate foci of Fijian opposition and resistance.
Antagonism towards Tovata dominance is one example ofthis.
Another is the formation in 1988 by western chiefs of their own
fourth confederacy, the Yasayasa Vaka Ra (see map). Significantly,
that development was helped by the support given to it by Ratu Sir
George Cakobau, indicating a split within the eastern chiefly
establishment. The Vunivalu of Bau, paramount chief of Fiji and head
of the Kubuna confederacy, was previously a senior member of the
Alliance and Fiji's first governor-general. Important though his
blessing was, the formation of the fourth confederacy was grounded
first and foremost on solid western Fijian support. And in that regard,
the military's response to a strike in Lautoka in October 1988 helped to
strengthen that support At a sawmilling complex ISO workers, mainly
Fijian, struck when forty of their colleagues were made redundant The
strikers asked Rabuka to intervene on their behalfbut to their disgust he
sent in troops who duly broke up the strike (FSR 20 October 1988).
The new confederacy was rejected by the regime in November
1988. But the rejection simply added to the antagonism already
generated by the highly repressive Internal Security Decree (ISD) of
June 1988, which followed the discovery two months earlier of arms
smuggling into Fiji. Worried, the military decided to flex its muscles
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yet again. On 17 November while the cabinet met to consider, among
other things, the fourth confederacy and possible suspension of the
ISD, an estimated 300 troops were deployed onto the streets of Suva.
Media establishments, public utilities and government buildings were
surrounded by bom plainclothes and uniformed troops. In that highly
threatening atmosphere, the fourth confederacy was rejected by the
regime and four days later the Council of Chiefs followed suit
The formation of the Yayasa Vaka Ra confederacy by most of
Western Viti Levu's chiefs was rejected by the Bose ni Turaga
meeting at the Nabua military barracks[!] on Monday 21
November 1988. Most of the western chiefs boycotted the
meeting whilst others walked out after the opening
ceremonies. The meeting then went ahead and endorsed
nominations for the newly restructured Great Council of
Chiefs based on the existing three confederacies. The heavily
populated western region is split between two...confederacies
[Burebasaga and Kubuna]...[and] is the Fijian powerbase of
Dr Bavadra's Labour Party, although both the newly elected
President of the [Western] Confederacy (the Tui Vuda) and his
advisor, Apisai Tora, are conservative...Ministers in [the
present regime] (FSR 23 November 1988).
It is highly significant that at the November meeting the Council of
Chiefs did not ratify the draft constitution. To have done so when
western chiefs had so forcefully and directly demonstrated their
anger would have been highly impolitik. But worse was yet to
come. Six months later, in May 1989, the Twelve Member
Committee of the Western Confederacy made its submissions to
the CIAC in which it launched a stinging attack on the draft
constitution and the regime. For what it reveals, the document is
worth quoting at length:
The draft constitution was promulgated amidst promises of
returning Fiji to Parliamentary democracy. It fails because it
does not provide for equal participation of all the peoples of
Fiji in their government. . . .
We are constantly being told the draft constitution will improve
the status of indigenous Fijians. It fails because it does not
provide for their equal representation in their government
By urging false distinctions between Fijians and all the other
peoples of Fiji, the proponents of the draft constitution have
endeavoured to imply a special unity among Fijians. The draft
constitution destroys that unity by discriminating against and
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compromising the human rights of Fijians as readily as it does
all others!...
While invoking an almost sacred call to preserve Fijian
tradition, the proponents of the draft constitution seek to
codify for their own benefit an oppressive, authoritarian
system of thought and action mat will usher in a new era of
exploi[ta]tive insular imperialism that augurs ill for Fiji and the
Fijians!
If the proponents of the draft constitution truly believe it serves
the best interests of the Fijian people, why aren't we being told
the truth about it? If the nature and provisions of the draft
constitution must be misrepresented to gain the support of the
Fijian people, what are the real intentions of its proponents?
Who are its real beneficiaries?. . .
[Two years after the 14th May 1987 coup d'etat], we know
[that] "race" and "indigenous Fijian rights and aspirations" are
not really the issue; even though the draft constitution is being
"sold" in those terms. We know those are not the issues
because, under the draft constitution, the rights of indigenous
Fijians are as badly compromised as any....
The draft constitution does not discriminate then along purely
racial lines. It discriminates against the progressively
productive, better educated, forward thinking Fiji citizens of
all races in favour of that minority segment of the community
that represents (and seeks to reserve for itself) the aristocratic,
undemocratic, privileged patterns of colonial life. Sadly, the
draft constitution sanctions and implements discrimination
against indigenous Fijians by other Fijians. ...
The government defined by the draft constitution is not a
Parliamentary democracy and the resulting society will not be
democratic. Adoption of the draft constitution would sanction
the continuation of military and chiefly rule imposed by and
embodied in the interim government. The draft constitution is
not designed to return Fiji to Parliamentary democracy, as we
have been promised. Rather [it] seeks to perpetuate the interim
government and its ilk in permanent office....
We conclude by reinterating that the pattern of government
defined by the draft constitution is totally undemocratic. In
West and Central Africa, it's called re-tribalization. In South
Africa, of course, it's called apartheid}. Nowhere is it called
democracy! (Twelve Member Committee of the Western
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Confederacy, 'Submissions on the 1988 Draft Constitution',
16 May 1989).
Strong words indeed, so it is not surprising that when in June 1990 the
Bose Levu Vakaturaga decided on its future membership, important
chiefs from the west, particularly Nadoga/Navosa, were excluded.
But alongside the deepening regional cleavage between east and
west were other intra-Fijian struggles. An important one occurred
within the leadership of the Taukei Movement. By March 1988 the
movement was deeply split, Veitata, who along with Tora (until he was
sacked in 1991) is a minister in the present regime, formed the Domo m
Taukei (Voice of the Taukei), while Ratu Meli Vesikula claimed to
represent the original movement. Disillusioned with the 'Mara regime',
Vesikula later joined forces with the man he helped to oust, Dr
Bavadra. His reason for the turnaround was described in one report:
'He believes the Taukei were used by Mara to regain office using the
cover of Fijian interests. He now says mat ordinary Fijians are living in
poverty whilst a corrupt government is in power' (FSR 23 November
1988).
Vesikula's cooperation with Bavadra was all the more significant
being an eastern chief, and the new relationship was seen as an
extension of Bavadra's effort to win more Fijian support. A major part
of that effort was 'Operation Sunrise', a project started in the second
half of 1987 and which involved Bavadra visiting rural Fijian villages
to explain his party's views.
In the urban areas, too, Fijian resistance hardened. In 1988 senior
Fijian civil servants sympathetic to the regime tried to divide the FPSA
along racial lines by forming a separate union for Fijian civil servants,
the Viti Civil Servants Association (VCSA). It declared its support both
for the draft constitution and for a third coup should the draft
constitution not be accepted (FSR 30 September 1988). It is highly
significant therefore that the breakaway union drew few members, the
majority ofFijian civil servants preferring to stay with the FPSA (FSR
8 December 1988)8
Another telling example of intra-Fijian conflict within the trade
union movement was the struggle between the long-established, 250-
member Seamen's and Portworkers' Union (SAPU) and the newly-
formed, FTUC-backed Fiji Foreign Going Seamen's Union (FFGSU).
Previously led but still 'under the effective control of Industrial
Relations Minister Taniela Veitata, the former '[used] roughhouse
tactics to thwart the growth of the now 600 strong FFGSU'. On 14
February 1989 two members of the FFGSU were assaulted by the
For a more detailed and recent discussion of the VCSA see Leckie
(1991).
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secretary of the SAPU when they tried to board their ship, the MV
Fijian. In the words of one report, the growth of the FFGSU 'appears
to be a reaction amongst Fijian workers against racist unions...and
although the FFGSU is officially recognized by the company
involved....[Veitata] has since arbitrarily cancelled the FFGSU
recognition agreement' (FSR 16 February 1989).
Other developments have served to increase intra-Fijian tension: the
suspension in 1988 ofRatu Apenisa Cakobau, son of Fiji's paramount
chief, from his civil service position for having 'questioned/ridiculed
the Minister for Fijian Affairs' and also for having questioned the
ability of the prime minister and the president to lead the country (FSR
28 April 1988); the continued harassment of other Fijian opponents of
the regime; the intimidation of Fijian journalists; and the 'public
brawling' which seriously split the religious bastion of the Fijian
community, the Methodist Church.
In February 1989 Fiji's leading Methodist dissentor, the Reverend
Akuila Yabaki, described the deepening Fijian pessimism and
disaffection, pointing out that the euphoria and sense of power that
were apparent among some Fijians in the early days of Rabuka's
republic were disappearing:
Life has not improved. People's expectations were raised after
the coups that things would be better. That dream is still there
but they are starting to say:' was it worth it?' (Sydney Morning
Herald 11 February 1989).
With Fijian opposition growing, the regime became increasingly
desperate. In a document letter-dropped to 10,000 Fijian households in
Suva, Taniela Veitata issued this threatening message:
He who is not proud of his race has no right to live and should
go hurrying, with that crazy demon DEMOCRACY, to bloody
hell! (ibid.)
But Veitata was obviously less willing than others in the regime to heed
the evidence of growing opposition. Towards the end of February
1989 senior military officers met to reconsider the draft constitutioa In
Rabuka's words, 'We have been listening and gauging the pulse of the
nation on the draft constitution and we have decided to have another
look'. Without saying whether or not the military was happy with the
draft, he reportedly gave the impression that the draft might not be
accepted: 'We are gauging the feelings of the nation on it and present
indications seem to be going the other way. If it does go the other way,
what then?' (Fiji Times 23 February 1989). Could it be that the military
was considering reverting to the 1970 constitution? The fact the officers
would not discuss the Coalition's submissions on the draft constitution
seems to suggest not. In any case, the real powerholders appeared to
Crisis, coups and the republic 193
show some willingness to accommodate the welling resentment of the
'authoritarian, undemocratic, militaristic, racist and feudalistic regime'
which they installed and continue to prop up.
At the economic level, also, Fijian discontent was growing.
Initially there were hopeful signs that the longstanding economic
disadvantage ofthe Fijian masses might be resolved. Section 20 of the
draft constitution, for example, contained promising provisions. It
obliged 'Parliament and the Government' to promote Fijian 'interests
and aspirations' and in particular their 'cultures, traditions, and social,
educational and economic wellbeing'.? To that end, Section 20 allowed
for certain proportions of state-funded scholarships and business or
trade licences to be reserved for Fijians. These provisions were soon
acted on. The previous policy of reserving 50 per cent of government
scholarships for Fijians was abandoned, allowing the regime to allocate
a higher proportion to Fijians. To encourage more Fijians to enter into
business, the regime approved a nine-point plan in November 198810.
the broad thrust of which dovetailed with the objectives of the Viti
Chamber of Commerce (VCC), an organization formed by Fijians in
late 1987 to 'promote and encourage meaningful participation by
indigenous Fijians in business'.
The focus of the scheme was the 'restructuring and strengthening
of the executive capability of the Fijian Affairs Board to formulate and
implement policies and strategies aimed at improving the lot of Fijians
in all sectors'. The plan included cabinet approval of a $20 million
interest-free loan to the Fijian Affairs Board to buy shares in Fijian
Holdings Limited ('the holding company for Fijians at the national
level') which, in turn, would acquire shares in 'profitable companies in
the industrial and commercial sectors'. Such investments were seen as
part of a strategy to achieve 1S per cent Fijian ownership of the
corporate sector by 1995 and not less than 30 per cent by the year
2000.
The plan also proposed reservation of certain lines ofindustrial and
commercial activity for Fijians; minimum Fijian ownership in selected
resource-based industries; Fijian ownership of at least one English
daily newspaper; more money and concessions for FDB commercial
loans to Fijians; and the introduction in 1989 of a Fijian Store Scheme
to help 'selected indigenous Fijians with the necessary talent to
successfully manage retail businesses' (Fiji Times 14 December 1989).
Implementation of the plan began soon afterwards. In January
1989, for example, the regime announced that restrictions on the
importation of white polished rice would be eased and that, of the
9 Section 20 also applied to Rotumans, a small group of Polynesians
whose islands are part of Fiji.
10 A summary of the plan appears in Fiji Times 21 November 1988.
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17,000 tonnes to be imported in 1989, 3000 tonnes would be set aside
for importation by Fijians (Fiji Times 20 January 1989). Also, in the
course of that year the number of Fijian retail outlets increased and a
Fijian-owned English daily newspaper was established.
These promising signs, however, were of little comfort to the vast
majority of Fijians, for as we shall see shortly, they gained little from
the policy of 'positive discrimination'. But mat outcome is not at all
surprising precisely because it exposed the class character of the policy.
The policy was less an attempt to secure the economic advancement of
the Fijian race man an attempt to realize the critical class project which
the Alliance had pursued in the mid 1970s but had failed to achieve—
the development of a Fijian business/capitalist class, a Fijian
bourgeoisie. As was true of the Alliance then, the viability of the post-
coup regime depended in large part on its ability to provide evidence of
Fijian economic advancement But such advancement essentially meant
Fijian success in business; in other words, the development of a Fijian
bourgeoisie.
Realisation of that class project, however, was always going to be
difficult and contradictory. First, in its pursuit of that project the regime
was constrained by the limited size of its resources and by the
competing claims on those resources. Secondly, the development of a
Fijian bourgeoisie would inevitably have contradictory consequences
not only for workers but for other capitalist interests in Fiji as well.
Thirdly, and relatedly, the problematic nature of the project was linked
very closely to the regime's wider strategy of economic reconstruction.
hi response to the deepening economic crisis which followed the
two coups, the regime embarked on a strategy of economic
restructuring based on increased export production, greater foreign
investment, privatization and deregulation. The contradictory tension
between the goal of economic restructuring on the one hand and the
development of a Fijian bourgeoisie on the other was soon revealed by
reactions from established capitalists. One victim of the plan to allocate
import licences for a range of commodities to Fijians only was local
Indian importer and industrialist Hari Punja whose business empire
was estimated in 1989 to be worth $180 million. He reacted strongly to
the plan and claimed that it would not succeed (The Australian 1S
March 1989). That Punja is Indian is, of course, significant but so too
is the fact that his sentiments echoed similar ones expressed two
months earlier by other resident business interests, thus exposing a
danger in the drive to get more Fijians into business. Getting at
particular capitalists like Punja was one thing, creating unease among
other capitalists was quite another. The nascent Fijian bourgeoisie had
got an early taste of inter-capitalist rivalry.
The centrepiece of economic restructuring was the creation in 1988
of tax free zones/factories. The sales pitch to potential investors was
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'Fiji: Your Profit Centre in the Pacific' and the attractions were
tantalizing: generous tax concessions, duty free imports, 'educated,
easily trained labour', 'well developed' infrastructural and
communications facilities, access to preferential trade agreements and
so on.n By the third quarter of 1988 $24 million had reportedly been
attracted under the scheme (Island Business November 1988:35). Two
features of the tax-free factories were especially significant
First, Fijians were investing in them, particularly in garment-
making factories. This, together with the small but growing number of
Fijians who were moving into other lines of business, underlined the
emergence of an indigenous Fijian bourgeoisie. Secondly, Fijian
women comprised a large proportion of the predominantly female
labour fource in the tax-free factories. Alongside their non-Fijian
counterparts, these Fijian women workers have waged a continuing
battle for better wages and working conditions. In the course of that
struggle they have become increasingly conscious and resentful of the
regime's class biases, thus adding yet another dimension to Fijian
opposition to the regime.
Despite the inherent dangers, the regime's attempt at constituting a
Fijian bourgeoisie is more likely to succeed than the Alliance's earlier
attempt in the mid 1970s. There are two reasons for this. First, the
political need for such success is now much greater. Having gone to
the extreme lengths of creating widespread tension and overthrowing a
democratically-elected government for the expressed purpose of
advancing Fijian interests, the present rulers urgently need to provide
These benefits were elaborated in a full-page advertisement in the
December 1988 issue of the regional magazine Islands Business:
Fiji offers Tax Free Zone/Tax Free Factory status for export enterprises
which includes:
Tax holiday for 13 years
No withholding tax on interest, dividends and royalty
Freedom to repatriate capital and profits
Duty free entry of capital goods, plant and equipment, raw materials,
components, spares, and building materials, furniture and fixtures
Freedom to import specialist personnel
In addition to the above:
Get your products to US, Canada, Japan, EEC countries, Australia
and New Zealand either duty free or at substantially reduced duties
under preferential trade agreements Fiji has with these countries
Have access to educated, easily trainable and cheap labour force
Enjoy excellent sea and air freight connections
Enjoy well developed infrastructure services, including ISD, Telex,
Fax, etc.
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evidence of such advancement, in particular Fijian economic
advancement. The emergent Fijian bourgeoisie is deemed to be
evidence of this.
The second reason has to do with the strengthened position of the
Fijian state bourgeoisie. After the coups, Fijians came to occupy an
increasing number of key civil service positions, many of which had
been vacated by Indians who retired or resigned after the coups. As
Table 8.5 shows, between July 1987 and June 1989, for example, 904
Indians resigned from the service and a further 310 retired. The
corresponding figures for Fijians were 157 and 220 respectively. Table
8.6 shows, however, that the number of new appointments taken up by
Fijians was three times that of Indians, 725 compared with 302.
Table 8.5 Resignations and Retirements from the Fiji
Civil Service by Racial Group
Resignations Retirements
Fijian Indian Other Total Fijian Indian Other Total
July-Dec 1987 25
Jan-Dec 1988 95
Jan-June 1989 37
187
539
178
30 242
34 671
13 228
56
122
42
194
96
20
2 252
18 236
4 66
Total 157 904 80 1141 220 310 24 554
Source: Leckie (1991:66)
Table 8.6 New Appointments in the Fiji Civil Service
by Racial Group
Fijian Indian Other Total
1/7/87-30/6/88
1/7/88-1/6/89
534
191
196
106
100
48
830
345
Total 725
62
302
26
148
12
1175
100Percentage oftotal
Source: Leckie (1991 :66)
The formation of the Viti Civil Servants Association in late 1987 was
an important factor behind this 'Fijianization' of the bureaucracy and
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how that process has altered the racial balance of the public service is
indicated by the figures in Table 8.7.
Table 8.7 Racial Composition of the Fiji Civil Service
Fijian Indian Other Total
No % No % No % No %
1/5/87 8067 46.8 8208 47.6 962 5.6 17237 100
30/6/88 8413 49.9 7621 44.6 928 5.5 16962 100
31/5/89 8648 53.0 7127 43.0 648 4.0 14423 100
Source: Leckie (1991:67)
With the Fijian state bourgeoisie now in a stronger position than
before, the chances are greater that more state resources will be put to
the service of 'Fijian economic nationalism', and in particular to the
development of a Fijian bourgeoisie. And that the Fijians most likely to
benefit from this are well-connected ones is suggested by a 1988 report
on Navi Naisoro, senior public servant and architect of the tax free
factories scheme: 'Indirectly he is in business himself. His wife is a
shareholder in a garment factory' (ibid.).
But what of the Fijian masses? For them the early promise of the
regime's policy of 'positive discrimination' and its strategy of
economic restructuring came to little. Indeed, even as the regime
boasted about economic recovery in 1989 (when the Gross Domestic
Product grew in real terms by 12.5 per cent*2), evidence was emerging
that the benefits of 'positive discrimination' and economic growth were
being spread very unevenly.
A study undertaken in that year pointed to the 'dramatic increase in
poverty' since the coups (Barr 1990). It also provided telling accounts
by ordinary people of their worsening situation, and for the regime, the
deteriorating economic condition of the Fijian masses in particular was
of special significance. From the accounts of Fijian factory workers,
domestic workers, copra cutters, cane cutters, unemployed youths,
squatters and villagers, it was clear that the Fijian masses were hurting.
As one villager put it, 'life is a struggle'. Especially significant were the
telling signs of antagonism towards chiefs: 'the chief is taking the best
of everything'; and '[The chiefs] used to share with us but not now'
(quoted in ibid.:76, 79).
For a review of the Fiji economy since the coups see Elek and Hill
(1991).
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By the end of 1989, then, the nature and level of Fijian
discontent had become increasingly problematic for the regime. Earlier
expectations (even presumptions) by the regime that Fijian support for
it would be solid and lasting were never wholly tenable; now they were
even less so. The major worry now was that the draft constitution
which had been designed to keep the ruling Fijian elite in power could
no longer be relied upon to do that. The draft constitution therefore had
to be changed to counteract the threat posed by the sobering realization
amongst the increasingly disaffected Fijian masses that behind the
'revolution' staged supposedly on their behalf lay a class agenda to
which they had already become victim. As one Fijian friend put it, 'Sa
dola na mata' — 'the eyes have opened'.
Chapter 9
The Myth of Fijian Supremacy: Class Rule in
the Republic
In July 1990 the new constitution of Fiji was promulgated. The way
was now open for elections. In the preceding June, the Council of
Chiefs declared its approval of the constitution and announced that a
new political party would be formed. Dubbed 'the chiefs' party', its
name, Soqosoqo ni Vakavulewa ni Taukei (SWT), roughly means
Fijian Political Party. The timing of these developments was not
fortuitous. Continuing scrutiny by the international community of the
pace of Fiji's return to 'parliamentary democracy' and the lingering
concerns of potential foreign investors about the the political situation
in Fiji had put pressure on the regime to provide a clear indication of
the country's future direction. More important, however, were internal
pressures and of these the most critical were the pressures of Fijian
discontent.
As we saw in the previous chapter, the key political conflicts in
post-coup Fiji were intra-Fijian ones, and the more that Fijians fought
among themselves the clearer it became that Fijian disenchantment with
the regime was on the increase. By the middle of 1990 three years had
passed since the coups, and for many Fijians there was little to
celebrate. Not only had their economic condition worsened but also
there was now a distinctly hollow ring to the 'political supremacy'
supposedly won for them by the coups. For them 'Fijian political
supremacy' meant little if they could not exercise political choice. The
cynicism which followed each postponement of the election is therefore
not surprising.
By mid 1990, then, the regime was confronted with a dilemma.
There was pressure to speed up the return to 'parliamentary democracy'
and to hold elections. Failure to accommodate that pressure was clearly
risky; but so too was the alternative of accomodating it, for in the face
of mounting Fijian disaffection the regime's electoral fortunes looked
shaky. The strategy it decided upon was to amend the provisions of the
draft constitution in a way that would increase its chances of electoral
success and also to form a political party to spearhead its electoral
effort.
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The events of mid 1990 were a turning point in post-coup Fiji. By
clearing the way for elections, they created the political conditions
which allowed the class character of intra-Fijian tensions to emerge
more clearly. By that time underlying class contradictions in Fiji were
worsening and one year later they had so intensified that the regime
was driven to launch a major attack against the working classes. That
began in May 1991 with the announcement of proposals to introduce a
value added tax and new anti-labour legislation.
An important feature of the political crisis which that produced was
the way in which the racial solidarity amongst the working classes
highlighted the class face of intra-Fijian tensions. A second important
feature was the intensifying struggle between Mara and Rabuka. That
struggle was an expression of the growing contradiction between chiefs
and commoners. More importantly, it also had to do with a class
agenda to re-establish links between the state and capital, particularly
established Indian capital, which had been broken by the coups. We
will argue that elements of the populism which Rabuka increasingly
demonstrated after 1991 threatened the class interests of capital and the
state and that Mara's attempts to marginalize this pretender to his throne
was driven not only by personal and chief-commoner tensions but also
by the need to defend the class interests of the regime and its capitalist
allies.
For the masses, unfortunately, the prospects became progressively
gloomier as the organized opposition became more and more divided.
By the end of 1991, deep divisions threatened to split key opposition
groups — the FTUC, the Coalition and the FLP. By March 1992 when
elections were formally scheduled for the following May there were no
fewer that fifteen political parties. At least nine could be classified as
opposition parties, and of those five were Fijian parties. This
proliferaton of parties, particularly the emergence of the New Labour
Party as a result of the split within the FLP, underscored the
fragmentation of the organized oppositioa This did not augur well for
the the future of Fiji's underclasses. Class rule had changed in its
configuration but nonetheless remained deeply entrenched. Divisions
within the the leaderships of the opposition forces threatened to make
class rule easier. The immediate origins of that story lay in the
gerrymander orchestrated by the regime in mid 1990 to contain rising
Fijian discontent.
Fijian discontent and the gerrymander
The 1990 constitution is similar in most respects to its draft version.
The provisions for the reservation of key political positions for Fijians,
the increased political power of the Council of Chiefs, the military's
ultimate responsibility for the welfare of the country, and other similar
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provisions remained intact Not surprisingly, the major changes related
to the electoral provisions. The total number of seats in the lower
house was set at 70, with 37 seats reserved for Fijians, 27 for Indians,
5 for General Electors, and 1 for Rotumans. Of the 37 Fijian seats, 32
are for the fourteen provinces and 5 for urban Fijians.
The distribution of seats provided for under the draft constitution
had been severely criticized for being racially biased, and that criticism
remained valid in respect of the new provisions. The
underrepresentation of Indian voters and the overrepresentation of non-
Indian voters are indicated in Table 9.1 below.
Table 9.1 Distribution and Weighting of Seats in the House
of Representatives
Type of Voters Seats Voter
Seat Number % Number % per Seat
Fijian:
Provincial 110619 35.0 32 45.7 3457
Urban 43276 13.7 5 7.1 8655
Total 153895 48.7 37 52.8 4159
Rotuman 3572 1.1 1 1.1 3572
General Voters 10607 3.3 5 7.1 2121
Indian 148522 46.9 27 38.6 5500
National Total 316596 100 70 100 4522
Source: Fiji Labour Party, News in Brief, 7 February 1992.
Against the overrepresentation of Fijians generally, however, lies
the stark underrepresentaton of urban Fijian voters and also of two key
Fijian provinces, Ba and Nadroga/Navosa. Urban Fijian voters made
up 1 3.7 per cent of the total voting population but had only 7. 1 per cent
of the seats. The corresponding figures for Fijian voters in Ba province
were 5.3 per cent and 4.3 per cent, and for Nadroga/Navosa 3.6 per
cent and 2.9 per cent respectively. But there is futher evidence of bias
against these provinces. For Ba the average number ofvoters per seat
was 5,584 and for Nadroga/Navosa 5,713. As Table 9.2 below
shows, these were the highest figures by far for all fourteen provinces.
The discrimination against these provinces was strengthened by
improving the representation of provinces where support for the regime
was rather better. Under the draft constitution, Ba, the most populous
province, was given four seats. That was reduced to three. In contrast,
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the number of seats for Lau (province of Prime Minister Mara),
Cakaudrove (province of President Ganilau and Rabuka), and Tailevu
(province of Deputy Prime Minister Kamikamica) was increased from 2
to 3. The gerrymander was most blatant in the two least populated
provinces, Serua and Namosi, where the number of seats was doubled
from one to two. Together they accounted for a mere 1.5 per cent of
voters but a massively disproportionate 5.7 per cent of the seats. And
compared with Ba and Nadroga/Navosa, where the the average number
of voters per seat was well over 5,000, for Serua and Namosi the
figures were ridiculously low — 1,438 for Serua and a mere 955 for
Namosi. It is telling that the Namosi Provincial Council had earlier
opposed the creation of separate urban Fijian seats (Fiji Voice
April/May 1990).
Table 9.2 Fijian Voter and Seat Distribution By Province
Number of Percentage of Voters
Voters Seats Voters Seats Per Seat
Ba 16751 3 5.3 4.3 5584
Nadroga/Navosa 11425 2 3.6 2.9 5713
Cakaudrove 12963 3 4.1 4.3 4321
Tailevu 12879 3 4.1 4.3 4293
Lau 6343 3 2.0 4.3 2115
Serua 2876 2 0.9 2.9 1438
Namosi 1909 2 0.6 2.9 955
Naitasiri 9892 2 3.1 2.9 4946
Macuata 7818 2 2.5 2.9 3909
Ra 7140 2 22 2.9 3570
Lomaiviti 6388 2 2.0 2.9 3194
Bua 5198 2 1.6 2.9 2599
Kadavu 4817 2 1.5 2.9 2409
Rewa 4202 2 1.3 2.9 2110
Source: ibid.
Such, then, was the gerrymander orchestrated by the regime. The
new distribution of Fijian seats was especially controversial but quite
unsurprising. It was intended to undermine those areas where Fijian
opposition to the regime was generally acknowledged to be most
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heavily concentrated. This was one of the two prongs in the regime's
attempt at damage control. The other was the formation of the SVT.
The regime's transparent desperation was immediately ridiculed,
and the cynicism was well captured by Simione Durutalo, then still a
vice-president of the Fiji Labour Party:
This is the last hurrah of the chiefs. It is an attempt to stem the
tide and salvage their hold and support of the Fijian people.
There has been a gradual erosion of their political influence,
accelerated particularly in the urban areas and this is a last ditch
attempt to contain that (ibid.).
In the months that followed, the cyncism showed few signs of
abating but worse was yet to come. One week before the constitution
was promulgated, the Fiji Labour Party had announced that it would
boycott elections. For a while the SVTs electoral chances looked
reasonable, and all the more because Butadroka's former political
party, the Fijian Nationalist Party, had by then broken up. Butadroka
formed the Christian Fijian Nationalist Party (CFNP), and later his
former colleague, Isireli Vuibau, formed the Fijian Conservative Party
(FCP). But whatever optimism this split might have produced for the
regime was soon dented with the formation of the All National
Congress (ANC).
A meeting convened in January 1991 in Nadi by leading General
Electors from the west agreed to launch a new political party which
Nadi businessman Mick Beddoes described as 'a united party without
racial associations or groupings' (Islands Business February 1991:25).
Present at the meeting were 'several influential Fijian politicians'
prominent among whom was Apisai Tora, a commoner from the west
and minister for Infrastructure and Public Utilities. His presence
suggested a desire to distance himself from the SVT, but he was also
concerned about eastern chiefly dominance. As one report put it: 'Tora
believes that it is time western Fijians challenged the convention that
eastern Fijians are the country's naturally-born leaders' (ibid.). Tora
became president of the ANC and at a meeting of the Ba Provincial
Council in the following May he criticized the formation of the SVT.
Soon afterwards he was sacked from the cabinet, the official reason
being that cabinet ministers were not allowed to hold office in a political
party and Tora had refused to resign as president of the ANC. After
this he continually exploited the wider sense of disaffection amongst
western Fijians.
Class conflict and the other face of Fijian discontent
The formation of the ANC heightened the regime's concern about its
electoral chances but there was also the added problem that the SVT
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had not yet been formally constituted. That did not happen until
October 1991. It is significant therefore that in April 1991 the elections,
which in the previous year appeared so imminent, were again
postponed. The Electoral Commission announced that the elections
would not be held until mid-1992 and a few weeks later Mara
expressed his support for the postponement when he opened the
National Economic Summit on May 2 (Fiji Voice May/June 1991).
Administrative difficulties were given as the reason for the delay but the
evidence pointed strongly to another explanation— concern about the
SVT's electoral chances in the face of growing Fijian opposition
which, moreover, was becoming increasingly organized. Beneath that
concern lay two other major worries. One was the continuing struggle
between Mara and Rabuka. The other was the growing level of class
tension.
Well before the April 1991 postponement of the elections the
regime was already planning a further attack on the lower classes.
Continuing economic difficulties, industrial unrest, discontent among
canefarmers, and growing pressure on state revenue spurred the regime
into action. At the May economic summit it launched its attack. That
offensive and the Mara/Rabuka struggle compounded the regime's
problems. But they are also important for the fight they shed on the
class character of the intra-Fijian tensions, and the weight they lend to
the general argument advanced in this book.
In the earlier chapters we argued that the strongest tendential forces
shaping the broad trajectory of development in pre-coup Fiji were class
ones. The argument here is that the same is true of the post-coup
period, and a test of this argument is the nature of the intra-Fijian
tensions. Those tensions appeared to be a peculiarly Fijian
phenomenon. But that surface appearance, as we will presently show,
hid the other face of the intra-Fijian tensions, their class face. By
revealing the class dimension, and tracing its connections to the wider
class tensions, we seek to strengthen further the general argument of
this monograph.
To advance the argument about the class character of the intra-
Fijian conflicts, however, is not to deny the importance, even the
primacy, of non-class factors in the explanation of particular instances
of intra-Fijian tension. But we are not concerned here to explain each
case of intra-Fijian conflict in all its detail and complexity; rather we
seek to explain the general phenomenon of intra-Fijian tensions, why
they were so important, and how they shaped the broad contours of
change in post-coup Fiji. The primary task of this monograph is to
explain the broad trajectory of change in Fiji, and to understand the
place of post-coup intra-Fijian tensions as a whole in that trajectory. To
that end we now return to regime's latest attack on the lower classes.
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The regime's class attack was launched at the economic summit in
May 1991 where Mara announced the introduction of new anti-labour
legislation and a value added tax (VAT) which was to become effective
in July 1992. What lay behind these initiatives and the timing of their
announcement?
Turning first to the proposed VAT: clearly it was the result of the
fiscal crisis of the state. By early 1991 the national economy was
looking shaky. The annual growth in real GDP had fallen from a high
of 1 1.7 per cent in 1989 to 5.4 per cent in 1990 and was expected to
slump even further to 1.2 per cent in 1991. In 1990 the trade deficit
had grown by 3 per cent, reaching an all-time high of Fiji$31 1 million
in 1990, and the foreign debt remained high at $435 million (Ministry
of Finance & Economic Planning, Supplement to the 1992 Budget
Address, p.5; Bureau of Statistics, Current Economic Statistics, April
1991, October 1991).
One effect of all of this was increased pressure on the regime's
finances. As Table 5.3 below shows, the budget deficit remained high
from 1987 to 1989 and then fell in 1990. The decrease in 1990 was
achieved by restraining public expenditure. In 1988 public expenditure
rose by 1 1 .9 per cent and in 1989 by 13.7 per cent. In 1990, however,
it rose by a mere 2.4 per cent. The belt-tightening indicated by that
lower growth rate was the main reason for the reduced budget deficit in
that year. But the temporary improvement obscured the deeper problem
which remained — the falling rate of increase in state revenue. After
1987 state revenue increased in absolute terms but the annual rate of
increase fell progressively from 17.5 per cent in 1988, to 15.8 per cent
in 1989 and 10.9 per cent in 1990. By the beginning of 1991,
therefore, the signs of a fiscal crisis were clear.
Table S3 Public Finance 1987-1991
Revenue Expenditure Deficit
$ mill. % increase $mill. % increase $mill.
1987 352.5
1988 414.2 17.5
1989 480.8 15.8
1990 532.3 10.9
1991(e) 535.6 0.6
451.7 99.3
505.5 11.9 91.3
574.7 13.7 94.8
588.8 2.4 52.6
621.0 5.4 69.8
Sources: Supplement to the Budget 1991; Current Economic
Statistics, October 1991.
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Despite a reduced budget deficit in that year, the underlying trend
pointed to a potentially serious cash shortage. Hence the proposal to
introduce the VAT.
The alternative, of course, was to further restrain public spending,
but that was politically risky. Already the austerity was hurting the
masses as the knife was applied to social services, and with elections
scheduled for 1992 further restraint would be unwise. The regime
therefore decided against that option. Indeed, as Table 5.3 shows, in
1991 public expenditure increased by 5.4 per cent. That, of course,
made matters worse. The looming cash crisis which the regime feared
was underlined by the very marginal increase in state revenue that was
projected for 1991 , an increase of a mere 0.6 per cent.
The proposal to introduce a VAT, then, was the regime's response
to its fiscal crisis and the timing of its announcement was no
coincidence. The elections had just been postponed until mid 1992 so
there was a full year to sell the idea. On the other hand, one year was
also plenty of time for the underclasses to realize that the burden of the
tax would fall most heavily on them. And this they did. Trade unions
and the FLP were among the first to condemn the tax and expose its
class bias. Later, however, further attacks were made by others as
well, including, very significantly, Fijian political leaders and parties.
Apisai Tora promised that the ANC would scrap the tax if it
became the government (Daily Postal December 1991). Even Rabuka
expressed serious doubts, and that he was worried about the effect of
the tax on ordinary Fijians is suggested by his concern that the VAT
could harm the SVTs electoral chances (Daily Post 5 November
1991). The concerns of the Fijian Conservative Party are also
revealing. Describing the VAT as a 'political hot potato', party
secretary Jolame Uludole warned of its effects on the lower 'socio
economic classes' and on the 'gap between rich and poor' (Fiji Times
25 September 1991).
These examples of Fijian resistance to an initiative of the Fijian-
dominated regime exposed the class face of intra-Fijian tensions. Here
was evidence of ordinary Fijians resisting their Fijian political masters
not because of something that was peculiarly Fijian but because they
would be hurt by tax and its class bias.
The proposal to introduce the VAT, then, was driven by the fiscal
crisis of the state. That the proposal was an attack on the underclasses
is shown by the way that the burden of the tax would fall most heavily
on the underclasses. And when Fijians in the underclasses resisted it,
the class face of intra-Fijian conflict was clearly exposed. Much the
same can be said of the new anti-labour legislation that was also
announced in May 1991.
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The previous year had seen growing industrial unrest and the
instability was most serious in three of the most important economic
sectors — sugar, mining and manufacturing. By May 1990 tensions
were building in the sugarcane industry. Farmers were threatening to
boycott the upcoming cane harvest in protest against the new master
award that had just been handed down by Justice Kermode. A major
cause of the farmers' anger was the lower percentage of the sugar
proceeds they would receive under the new award, and in the struggles
which ensued strong support for the boycott was shown by many
Fijian canefarmers. A meeting of the Vanua Levu Fijian Canefarmers
Association, for example, revealed that its 800 members supported the
boycott. More Fijian support had earlier been shown at meetings called
by the National Farmers Union in Tavua and Rakiraki, and this
statement by Marika Salemaibau, president of the Rakiraki branch of
the NFU, is revealing: '[farmers] will only harvest under the old
Denning contract...let's not bring race and politics into the issue as the
new Master Award will affect us all, irrespective of our race or
religion' (Fiji Voice June/July 1990).
But class tensions were not confined to the sugar industry. Gold
was an important source of foreign exchange, so the regime was clearly
worried when mineworkers at the Vatukoula goldmine went on strike
in February 1991 over pay and working conditions. The strike lasted
over one year and resulted in one death. About 90 per cent of the
strikers were Fijian. In one major respect, the continuing tensions in
the manufacturing sector were more serious than the unrest in the
goldmines.
As we noted in the previous chapter, a key part of the regime's
strategy for economic recovery was the Tax Free Factory scheme.
Since its introduction in 1988, the scheme quickly came to centre
around garment production. Soon, however, garment manufacturers
came under increasing attack over the low wages and poor working
conditions of their workers, of whom the vast majority were women
and many were Fijiaa And as the workers intensified their struggle the
regime became increasingly worried. After all, the 'international
competitiveness' of the industry depended critically on ensuring that
costs were kept low. By 1989 garment workers were becoming better
organized and the number of disputes, strikes and lockouts grew. In an
attempt to limit the damage, the regime introduced new minimum
wages and working conditions at the beginning of 1991. The new
minimum hourly rate for learners was 65 cents and for others 85 cents.
These rates were condemned by Kevin Barr, whose earlier study of
poverty in post-coup Fiji suggested a minimum rate of $1.50 an hour.
The new rates were seen as evidence of 'bowing to presure [from]
business and keeping people well below the poverty line'. Worse still,
according to Ema Druavesi, secretary of the Women's Wing of the
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FTUC and a key union organizer in the garment industry, some
employers were flouting the new regulations and were not being
prosecuted (Fiji Voice March 1991). It is not surprising therefore that
the industry continued to be plagued by conflict For the regime this
was a major threat. The industry on which it pinned such high hopes
had to be protected from the increasingly assertive workers.
It is against this background of continuing industrial unrest in key
economic sectors that the introduction of the anti-labour laws in May
1991 need to be understood. Justified in terms of 'protecting the
economy', the draconian decrees (numbers 18 and 19) were in in fact a
response to rising class tension. And in terms of the argument we are
developing here, an important feature of the growing class conflict was
its strong 'Fijian' character. Increasingly Fijians were confronting
bosses and the state not as Fijians but as workers. Previously the
outwardly 'Fijian' appearance of intra-Fijian conflicts was strong.
Now, however, it was being stripped away and the class face of those
conflicts surfaced more and more. hi the months ahead, when the
regime intensified its attack against the working classes, that class face
became even clearer.
By May 1991 the miners' strike in Vatukoula showed no signs of
ending and in the caneflelds farmer patience with the regime was
quickly running out For a long time farmers had complained about the
continual postponement of elections to the Sugar Cane Growers
Council (SCGC) and also about the regime's failure to pay the
remaining $8.74 per tonne owing to them under the master award
which had been concluded in the previous year. Their anger was vented
at large meetings organized by the National Farmers Union in Nadi,
Tavua, Sigatoka and Labasa. And when they decided to boycott the
forthcoming cane harvest, the scheduled commencement of cane
crushing in late May was threatened. The regime's response was to
invoke the anti-labour legislation which it had recently announced.
The new decrees outlawed strikes in Fiji's key industries (and
sugar and goldmining were two of these) and on 29 May President
Ganilau invoked them and threatened to send in the troops to break the
fanner boycott. Soon afterwards Rabuka defiantly stated that he would
not send in the troops against the striking canefarmers, many of whom,
it needs repeating, were Fijian. Earlier he had given a similar guarantee
to striking miners in Vatukoula, and nearly all them were Fijian also
(Fiji Voice August/September 1991). Indeed, he became increasingly
critical of the regime's handling of industrial unrest in the country and
on June 8 called on the 'government' to resign. This support for
workers further underlined the populist streak which by now Rabuka
was increasingly showing; we will take up this issue later when we
discuss his struggle with Mara.
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In the political crisis which followed his call for the government to
resign, Rabuka called up his reserves and for a while it seemed that he
might oust the very people he had put into office. He went so far as to
draw up a list of ten people he wanted to appoint to a government he
would lead, a list which reputedly included the names of four people
from the Coalition cabinet he overthrew in May 1987. In the end,
however, he decided that to act against the regime he was a part of
would be too costly politically, especially as he would have to move
against Ratu Penaia Ganilau who was not only president but also his
paramount chief. He therefore apologized to the president and later
resigned from the army and rejoined the cabinet But it was not long
before he again showed his populist colours.
Ganilau's action on 29 May drew immediate condemnation from
the FTUC, and at a special economic summit of trade unions held on
21 and 22 June a decision was taken to stage a national strike on 16
July in protest against the new anti-union laws. The decision was even
supported by conservative trade unions outside of the FTUC, such as
the Hotel and Catering Workers Union, Municipal Workers Union,
Factory Workers' Union, and Telecommunications Workers Union. As
the day of the planned strike approached, Rabuka met with Methodist
leaders and key Fijian labour leaders in an attempt to avert the strike.
On 12 July Rabuka and Ganilau met FTUC leaders Mahendra Chaudry
and Micky Columbus at Government House. After a half-hour meeting
the president's office issued a statement which committed the regime to
revoking the anti-union decrees and to meeting farmers' leaders to settle
farmer grievances. The statement also provided some hope that a legal
avenue would be found to settle the the miners' strike in Vatukoula (Fiji
Voice August/September 1991). Rabuka's key role has been described
as 'remarkable' (ibid.:l4) but seen against well-known prime
ministerial ambitions, this most recent example of his 'populist turn' is
not all that surprising (see below).
That the 12 July meeting succeeded in averting the national strike
was a significant achievement but any hopes that the working classes
might have entertained that the regime's assault had ended were well
and truly dashed four months later. In the following October Mahendra
Chaudhry revealed to a meeting of more than 1200 farmers in Ba the
contents of a confidential World Bank report on the sugar industry. The
report, he said, had been submitted to the regime three months earlier
but had been kept secret because of the upcoming elections in 1992
(Daily Post 21 October 1991). He also predicted that the report would
be implemented in 1992. Among the recommendations contained in the
report were the following:
that land rents be increased by 300%-600%;
210 Beyond the Politics of Race
that growers be paid according to world market price for
sugar (which at that stage ranged between 4 and 9 cents
US per pound, rather than US24 -27 cents per pound that
Fiji was receiving under preferential arrangements with the
European Community and the United States); and
that the farmers' share of sugar proceeds be reduced from
70% to 60% and the government's share be increased
from 30% to 40%
The report was strongly attacked by farmers, the NFP and the
FLP, and NFP leader Dr Balwant Rakka asked some probing
questions: 'who authorised the [investigation] of the industry, whom
did they interview, who were in the team, and when did this take
place?' (Daily Post 26 October 1991). If Chaudhry was correct that the
report had been submitted back in July, then the investigation must
have been well underway in the first half of the year. If mat was the
case, then questions can be asked about how much the regime knew
about the kind of recommendations mat were likely to be included in
the World Bank report when it was preparing to launch its class
offensive in May 1991. In any case, the intense anger generated by the
revelation of the report's recommendations in late October was
followed in early November by the promulgation of new anti-labour
legislation.
Attacked by the FTUC as being little different in content and intent
from the two earlier decrees (numbers 18 and 19), the new 'labour
reforms' heightened class tensions, which by then had already become
serious. Industrial Relations minister, Taniela Veitata, said that the
'reforms' were essential to boost economic growth and were part of the
the regime's strategy of strengthening the export sector and the
country's competitiveness in the international market (Fiji Times 6
November 1991). The new legislation was of course welcomed by
employers. This was made clear in a statement issued jointly by the Fiji
Chamber of Commerce and the Fiji Manufacturers Association (ibid.).
For the FTUC, on the other hand, the new decrees represented a
deliberate subversion of the 12 July accord which prevented the
planned national strike. The union body said they were aimed at
destroying the trade union movement and dispossessing workers of
their basic rights and freedoms. And this after the regime had earlier
given undertakings to the contrary to two missions from the
International Confederation of Trade Unions (TFCTU), one in 1988,
the other in 1989 (ibid.). The 'reforms' included the following:
expansion of the meaning of 'strike' to include
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withdrawal of labour either wholly or partially or reducing its
normal performance;
breach of contract of service;
refusing or failing to accept engagement for any work in which
the person is normally employed;
reducing the normal output or normal rate of work;
a six-week limit on the validity of a strike ballot;
supervision of secret ballots on selected issues by the Registrar
of Trade Unions or an officer of the Ministry of Employment;
postal balloting in the election ofunion officials;
penalties for breach of legislation;
employer deduction of trade union dues from wages no longer
to be mandatory,
prosecution ofunions for damages caused by strikes resulting
from improperly conducted ballots;
prohibition on industrial associations from engaging in
industrial disputes;
prohibition on any person to hold the position of secretary or
treasurer in an industrial association if he or she is already an
official of another trade union or industrial association (Fiji
Times 6, 11 November, 10 December 1991).
The last of these is significant because it affected the regime's most
powerful opponent in the trade union movement, Mahendra Chaudhry.
That the regime had been planning to weaken his influence is suggested
by a letter sent by the administrator-general, Aminiasi Katonivualiku, to
the permanent secretary for Employment and Industrial Relations.
Dated 7 February 1991, it said:
A member of a trade union should be able to hold office in his
union. If he is also a member of an industrial association
[which is what the National Farmers Union is], he should also
be able to hold office in his association. The restriction being
advanced here if effected, could be taken by many as directed
personally at M P Chaudhry, he being an officer of three
organisations — general secretary of FPSA, FTUC and the
National Farmers Union (quoted in Daily Post 1 1 November
1991).
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That industrial associations were prohibited from engaging in
industrial disputes is highly significant. The two most militant
industrial associations in the country were in two of the most important
industries, the National Farmers Union (NFU) in the sugar industry
and the Fiji Association ofGarment Workers in the garment industry.
Resistance to the new legislation was immediate. The NFU vowed
to defy the new decrees, the FTUC called for their revocation, and
Apisai Tora promised that if elected the ANC would immediately scrap
the new decrees. In his words, 'Those labour laws will be the first to
go' (31 December 1991). Considerable external support for the fight
against the legislation was secured, largely through Chaudhry's efforts,
from trade unions in New Zealand and Australia and also from
international trade union organizations.
For its part, the regime showed little sign of relenting. Indeed it
continued to hound Chaudhry, finally charging him in February 1992
with illegally holding office in more than one worker organization. By
then, however, divisions had opened up within the FTUC as a result of
disagreements over the FLP's decision to boycott the upcoming
elections. One victim of that was the national strike which had been
planned for late February to protest against the anti-labour legislation.
At the workplace, however, defiance of the laws continued. In
February 1992, nearly 300 garment workers at a factory in Nausori
continued their strike over a pay dispute despite warnings from the
Chief Labour Officer that they were in breach of the new laws (Fiji
Times 12 February 1991). Here were women at the forefront of the
struggle against the state's attack on working people. Many of them
were Fijian, including their leader Siteri Tuilovoni. The class face of
intra-Fijian tensions was again revealed.
In March 1992 the dates for the first post-coup elections were
announced, 16-23 May. Campaigning was already well underway and
soon gathered pace. But underlying class tensions remained unresolved
and continued to threaten the interests of the regime and its allies. They
were to significantly influence the unfolding electoral struggle. But here
we come across an interesting twist
In 1991 the regime had already launched a frontal attack on the
working classes but its impact was blunted somewhat by contradictions
within the ruling elite, in particular by the rivalry between Mara and
Rabuka. That rivalry was worsened by Rabuka's populism. In an
attempt to broaden his appeal, he criticized the regime's assault on the
working classes. In so doing, he too represented a threat to the
fundamental class interests of both the regime and its allies. By
February 1992 his populism had become a serious class threat. The
need to marginalize him had become more urgent and in January 1992
Mara acted on that need. The class dimension in the struggle between
chief and commoner would soon become clear. To better understand
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that class dimension and its connections with the deeper class tensions
we need to go back a few years.
Chief vs commoner: class agenda in the Mara/Rabuka
struggle
Rabuka returned Mara to office at the end of 1988. He joined the
cabinet but also kept his position as head of the military. Soon,
however, the latent rivalry between the two men began to surface. As
early as January 1989 the commoner soldier began directly challenging
the high chief from Lau, something which up until then few, if any,
had dared to do. At a cabinet meeting the two reportedly 'traded insults
about the other's use of government allowances, perks, etc. with Mara
finally offering to make substantial refunds if Rabuka did the same'
(Fiji Voice February 1989). In the following February Rabuka was
reportedly incensed at 'being left out of important [cabinet] decisions
and policies'. In particular, he was angry that 'Mara was considering a
cabinet reshuffle and that most other ministers were aware of it but he
was kept in the dark' (ibid.).
Over the course of 1989 the tension between the two men grew,
and in September was heightened by the revelation of a military
document submitted by Rabuka and Colonel George Konrote to Mara
and President Ganilau in the previous May. The document was never
meant to be made public. Among other things, it suggested that
constitutional government be delayed for fifteen years and and that
more executive authority be given to the army commander (Fiji Voice
December 1989). The heat generated by the public exposure of the
document worsened when Mara later put pressure on Rabuka to choose
between politics and the military. On 3 October Rabuka announced that
he would return to barracks and in the following January he was
dropped from the cabinet
As we have already seen, by early 1990 the regime was under
increasing pressure. Fijian discontent v*as grovravg; kp\sa\Toia, ftven
still a cabinet minister, hadjoined the ANC; trouble was brewingin the
sugar sector over the master award; under Chaudhry's leadership
public servants were pressing for a wage increase; and there was
continuing industrial unrest in the garment industry. The growing
unease served temporarily to contain the rift between Rabuka and Mara.
Believing that it threatened the regime he had installed, Rabuka told a
military parade in Suva on 22 January that the military would not
tolerate any attempt to hinder progress and growth or to destabilize the
country. Significantly, he specifically referred to the threat of a national
strike in the sugar industry (Fiji Voice February/March 1990).
In the following February the military staged a major military
exercise in Suva, the purpose of which, in the words of the army, was
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to 'upgrade...preparedness to handle emergencies' (quoted in ibid.:5).
In May Rabuka repeated an earlier threat of military intervention if the
farmers' planned strike against the new award went ahead. In June he
told soldiers that the military was the 'final guarantor of peace and
stability for the nation' and that trade unions and political parties should
be controlled (Fiji Voice June/July 1990). In the same month Mahendra
Chaudhry's home and car were attacked by five masked men. Along
with other clues, the clinical precision of the attack led to suspicions
that the military was responsible.
Rabuka's attacks against the forces of opposition in Fiji served to
prevent the rift between himself and Mara widening. After earlier being
at loggerheads with the prime minister, he went to the defence of the
regime. But that is not surprising. He was, after all, a part of it From
about the middle of 1990, however, he began exhibiting signs of
change. The hardliner was becoming increasingly populist, a shift
which, interestingly, started soon after the constitution was
promulgated and the poposal to form the SVT was announced. That
was in June 1990.
At the end of that month nurses went on strike. Rabuka visited the
striking nurses and gave them his support In the following February
he condemned the removal of thirty squatter families in Kalabu, a
suburb just outside Suva, to make way for a tax free industrial
complex. In the same month he even stunned diners at a Fiji Press Club
luncheon when he told them he believed that the army had too much
power under the new constitution and expressed his hope that the
constitution might later be amended so that 'the military be subjugated
and subordinated' (Fiji Voice March 1991).
Rabuka's populist turn hinted at a personal political agenda which
later in 1991 became clear when he publicly declared his prime
ministerial ambitions. For Mara and his government, Rabuka was a
threat. Not only was he making a bid for the leadership, but by
showing sympathy for the plight of workers and other underprivileged
groups, he was siding with the enemy. It is significant, therefore, that
in April 1991 Mara offered to have Rabuka and his friend, Methodist
minister Manasa Lasaro, in the cabinet. Rabuka was offered the
positions of deputy prime minister as well as minister for Home
Affairs. Better, after all, to draw him into the cabinet and hopefully
lock him into cabinet decisions than to leave him to threaten the
positions of people in government and also to drift further towards the
lower classes. As one report put it, the offer was seen by some
observers as a buy-off (Fiji Voice May/June 199 1).
For several months Rabuka stalled on the offer. He wanted to take
up the posts but he also wanted to remain as army commander.
Significantly, in 1990 the president's son, Epeli Ganilau, was
promoted to brigadier-general and the speculation was that with Rabuka
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in the cabinet and out of the military, the way would be clear for Epeli
Ganilau to become head of the military, which is precisely what
happened several months later. By the time that happened, the class
threat which Rabuka's populism posed had again become evident but
this time much more menacingly than before.
The occasion was his defiance of President Ganilau over the
latter's threat on 29 May 1991 to send in troops against the
canefarmers. Rabuka had earlier promised the striking miners at
Vatukoula that the military would not move against them. His refusal to
move against the canefarmers was especially serious because it
threatened to deprive the regime of a lot ofmoney. When, therefore, he
called on the 'government' to resign he sparked off a major political
crisis but that, as we noted earlier, ended with Rabuka apologising to
the president, his paramount chief, resigning from the army and
rejoining the cabinet The president's son became military commander.
Rabuka's refusal to intervene militarily in the farmers' dispute with
the regime underlined his populist turn. Several weeks later it was
again demonstrated by his important role in averting the national strike
which had been planned for 16 July. Rabuka's popularity was on the
increase and three months later it served to reopen his rivalry with
Mara.
The inaugural convention of the SVT was held in October 1991
and in the election for the presidency Rabuka defeated his two rivals,
both chiefs — Ratu William Toganivalu and Mara's wife, Adi Lady
Lala Mara. Soon afterwards Mara demanded his resignation from the
cabinet, invoking the policy he had introduced earlier in the year to get
rid of Apisai Tora, that cabinet ministers were barred from holding
office in a political party. Rabuka subsequently resigned and devoted
his energies to the SVT. His rivalry with Mara was deepening.
Mara denied any hand in his wife's candidacy for party president
but he soon found himself locked in battle with Rabuka yet again. The
SVT constitution provided that in a parliament led by the SVT, the
party leader would be prime minister. By this time Rabuka's prime
ministerial ambition was well known. The question was whether the
party president would also be party leader. Some, including Mara,
argued that the two positions were quite separate; others, including
Rabuka, argued that the SVT constitution tied the presidency to the
position of party leader. The issue was not resolved but Rabuka clearly
saw himself taking the party into the forthcoming elections as party
leader (Fiji Voice November/December 1991).
Soon after assuming the party presidency, Rabuka deepened his
rivalry with Mara by distancing himself and the SVT from two key
initiatives which were very unpopular. One was the creation of the Fiji
National Petroleum Company (Finapeco) to purchase petroleum under
a monopoly supply arrangement with Malaysia; the other was the
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proposed introduction of a VAT in July 1992. Among the
recommendations of the World Bank report discussed earlier was a
recommendation to abandon the scheme. In November Rabuka
distanced himself from the scheme by saying he was not present when
cabinet accepted the scheme and that he always had reservations about
it. He also cast doubt over its future by saying that it could be
discontinued. Mara, as the Daily Post put it, was 'one of the strongest
backers of the oil deal' (5 November 1991). Rabuka also criticized the
proposed VAT and hinted that it too might be scrapped: "There will be a
need to look at VAT, its effect, whether there are alternatives' (ibid.).
About a month later he seemed to soften his position somewhat but he
still left open the possibility of removing it (20 December 1991).
The proposed VAT, as we argued earlier, was necessitated by the
regime's fiscal crisis but was an attack on the lower classes. Little
wonder, therefore, that it was unpopular. By distancing himself from
it, Rabuka's populist instincts again shone through; but the real worry
for the regime was the possibility that Rabuka might later scrap the tax.
Here was another example of Rabuka's populism compromising the
class interests of the regime and its allies. That Rabuka wanted to leave
no doubt about where he and his party stood in relation to Mara and his
government is clearly indicated by his response when asked if the
proposed VAT and the Finapeco affair could cost the SVT the
upcoming election: 'The interim government is not the [SVT] and the
policies of the interim government do not necessarily reflect the policies
of the [SVT] ' (Daily Post 5 November 1991).
In the face of this kind of attack, it was likely that the growing
tension between Mara and Rabuka would explode in public. In early
December 1991 it did. Mara announced that he would quit politics
because he could not work under the new constition. Elaborating, he
said he could not 'after banging on the table of multiracialism [for 20
years] then come to be head of a non- multiracial government' (Daily
Post 9 December 1991). Later we will take up the broader significance
of this statement.
Rabuka's reaction to Mara's statement was swift and strong. He
asked how genuine Mara's doubts about the constitution were,
especially as he had remained silent throughout the entire process
leading to its promulgatioa To this and other matters including family
matters that Rabuka had raised earlier, Mara wrote an extended reply
that was published in the local dailies. For his part, the president
refused to be drawn into the public war of words, saying 'It's between
the PM and Rabuka'. But by then Rabuka had said that Mara should
not aspire to becoming president of Fiji. He also revealed that he asked
Ganilau to 'hang in there in the interests of the nation' (Daily Post 12
December 1991). Approaches had been made to certain western chiefs
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to ask the president to step down. That would have cleared the way for
Mara to assume the presidency.
It was inevitable that the very public dispute would cost Rabuka
some support, including within the SVT, and soon rumours began to
circulate that some people within the party wanted him removed as
leader. When asked about this, he said that he was aware of the
rumours but that he would not step down unless he was voted out by a
special general meeting of the party. In the early months of 1992 the
manouevrings against him took a revealing turn when Mara convened
what came to be known as the 'Dining Club'. This was the result of
concern about growing disarray within the SVT as splits emerged in the
wake of disagreements over candidate selection for the upcoming
elections. But it was also an attempt to undermine Rabuka. In part that
had to do with personal rivalries but it had also to do with protecting
the class interests of the regime and its allies against the threat
represented by Rabuka's opposition to several key initiatives of the
'interim government' . Before developing this argument, however, it is
necessary first to consider the growing internal strife within the SVT.
With elections promised for mid 1992, the SVT began selecting its
candidates in November 1991 and in the ensuing scramble for party
nomination cracks began to appear. When the provincial councils met
to select their candidates under the SVT ticket, disagreements about
selection procedure surfaced but it soon became clear that in at least
some cases the reasons for the divisions ran much deeper. So bitter
were the disagreements in two provinces that they led to the formation
of rival political parties in December 1991: the Soqosoqo ni Varum ko
Macuata (SVM), roughly the Macuata Fijian Party, in Macuata
province; and the Soqosoqo ni Taukei ni Vanua (STY), roughly the
Fijian Landowners Party, in Nadroga. The latter is particularly
revealing because it not only underlined the regional cleavage between
east and west but also exposed a secondary but inherent contradiction
within the chiefly class.
Formed by Bulou Eta Vosailagi, the paramount chief of
Nadroga/Navosa and whose traditional title is Na Marama na Ka Leva
(literally, the lady who is the 'big one'), the STV explained that its
creation was the result of dissatisfaction over selection procedures
adopted by the SVT in selecting its candidates for Nadroga/Navosa.
But beneath this public account lay another, more telling reason. The
dissension, explained Ratu Ifireimi Buaserau, Chairman of the Namosi
Provincial Council, was caused not by the selection procedures but by
the fact that the chiefs of the area had largely been left out of the
Council of Chiefs.
The chiefs of Nadroga/Navosa, including the Ka Levu, he said,
were merely 'invited' members of the Council of Chiefs. They were
not nominees of the Ministry of Fijian Affairs, nor were they included
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among the 32 chiefs nominated by the provinces. This was a put-
down, a rebuff that bordered on disdain. Little wonder therefore that
the STV was formed. As Ratu Ifireimi so succinctly put it, it was their
status as mere invitees 'which made these chiefs from the powerful
province of Nadroga and Navosa feel left out [and which] was the
cause of the dissension and the cause of the formation of the new party'
(Daily Post 9 December 1991).
This kind of intra-chiefly rivalry did little to advance the SVTs
electoral chances but there were other tensions as well. As dissent
surfaced in other provinces the party became increasingly divided.
Personal ambition, factionalism, and even genealogy caused much
stress. Indeed, genealogy emerged as a major source of division not
only within the SVT but in the country at large. The key issue was the
criteria for determining who was a Fijian. The issue was brought to a
head by the case of Jim Ah Koy, nominated as a SVT candidate by the
Kadavu Provincial Council. His mother was Fijian but his father
Chinese and it was on the ground mat his father was not Fijian that his
nomination became controversial. The case provoked an intense and
emotionally-charged public debate about who was a 'Fijian', and for
the chiefly class in particular the affair had potentially serious
consequences. This was indicated by Ah Koy's own objection to the
nomination ofRatu Viliame Dreunamisimisi as a SVT candidate on the
ground that his father was not a full Fijian. Ratu Dreunamisi's father,
the late Ratu Edward Tui Cakobau, was a high chief from Bau and a
cousin of the late Vunivalu ofBau (the paramount chief ofFiji). But he
also had Tongan blood and it was on this that Ah Koy's objection
rested.
By raising this matter, Ah Koy's objection demonstrated audacity.
For others, however, it bordered on insolence and, worse still, it
represented a potentially serious threat because it went to the very heart
of the chiefly system. Not surprisingly, Ah Koy's action was strongly
criticized. Jo Raikadroka, a member of the Vunivalu ofBau's warrior
clan, criticised Ah Koy for mixing 'tradition and polities'. As he put it:
We have our traditional links and these must be
respected...Ratu Edward Tui Cakobau's status is being
questioned and the political virus may spread to provoke other
traditional households. This is tantamount to calling for a split
in the system...we are concerned that [Ah Koy] is dragging
our traditional system into disrepute....Politics is politics...but
to question tradition for the sake of politics may cause
irreparable damage (Daily Post 26 February 1992).
Ah Koy had opened a can of worms and caused further strife
within the SVT. Indeed, in March 1992 his backers within the Kadavu
Provincial Council hinted at a possible boycott of the elections. But
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well before then much damage had already been done. What is more,
the party's internal problems did little to stem the rising tide of
opposition to it, especially Fijian opposition. By February 1992 there
were no less that 1S political parties of which at least 9 were opposed to
the SVT, and of those five were Fijian parties — the STV, SVM,
CFNP, FCP and the Vanua Party. In addition there was the National
Democratic Party (NDP). Formed in late 1991, the NDP grew out of
the strike by miners in Vatukoula, most of whom were Fijian. Among
its objectives, according to party secretary Atunaisa Lacabuka, was a
change in the constitution because the democratic rights of union
workers were under threat (Daily Post 2 January 1992). With the SVT
now opposed by more political parties and plagued with internal
divisions, the time was opportune for another Mara attempt at
undermining Rabuka.
On 15 January 1992 Mara chaired a meeting at the home offormer
Alliance supporter Kuar Battan Singh Gater we will consider the
significance of the venue). In attendance were Mara's son, Ratu Finau
Mara; the permanent secretary for Employment and Industrial
Relations, Taufa Vakatale; and six cabinet ministers, Adi Finau
Tabakaucoro, Berenado Vunibobo, Tomasi Vakatora, Viliame
Gonelevu, Ratu Inoke Kubuabola and David Pickering. Apologies
were sent by three other cabinet ministers, Jo Kamikamica, Ratu Ivini
Bokini and Filipe Bole, and former Alliance minister (and Ah Koy's
rival for SVT nomination in Kadavu) Akariva Nabati. They were
present, however, at a second meeting held on 28 January. A third
meeting followed on 1 1 February.
According to the notes of the first meeting, this 'select committee',
which came be to known as the Dining Club, was formed to provide a
forum for 'people of like minds' (Mara's words) 'under informal
conditions and surroundings outside the inhibiting environment of a
formal cabinet meeting' (Daily Post 15 February 1992). Mara wanted
to 'to leave with people of like minds some of his experiences over the
past 40 years' but also share his thoughts on other matters as well. The
notes of the meeting stated: 'In his opinion the SVT is a debacle and the
organisation is in disarray' (ibid.). Mara was not present at the second
meeting which, as the Daily Post reported, 'went further to say no
candidates in the coming elections should be on the [SVT's]
management board. This was to ensure the board's neutrality in its
dealings with candidates'. But the hidden agenda was not lost to the
Daily Posr. 'Major-General Rabuka is [a] party candidate and is on the
management board as party president'. It also observed, correctly, that
the formation of the 'club' came 'in the wake of attacks against the
interim government and its ministers by Rabuka' (ibid.).
Cabinet minister Gonelevu had earlier stated that he no longer
supported Rabuka's prime ministerial ambitions. Rabuka then revealed
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that along with the late Jone Veisamsama, Gonelevu and Inoke
Kubuabola had asked him to stage the coup. Another person would be
named in March 1992, but more on that later. Rabuka also
acknowledged that 'certain elements' in Kadavu were unhappy with
him because of his support for Jim Ah Koy. But at a broader level, the
Daily Post correctly noted, 'there was also the matter of his [public
criticism] of a number of projects and policies— such as FTNAPECO,
VAT and the government's handling of unions' (15 February 1992).
Indeed just a few days before the Dining Club's third meeting Rabuka
declared that should it win the elections the SVT would dismantle
FTNAPECO: 'I've always opposed the concept of a national oil
company from the beginning. And I still oppose it' (Fiji Times 6
February 1992).
Much speculation followed the formation of the Dining Club and
when questioned Adi Finau Tabakaucoro denied that it was aimed at
forming a rival party to the SVT, insisting instead that it was concerned
to strengthen the SVT. But the signs were there that the initiative was
linked very closely to Mara's rivalry with Rabuka. Mara supported
Kamikamica as the next prime minister and the evidence pointed to the
'club' as a further attempt to undermine Rabuka. But another aspect of
the new development raises much broader issues beyond those of the
personal rivalry. Of the many questions that were asked about the
'club', one that was never adequately answered was one posed by
Rabuka himself : 'why was one of the meetings held at Kuar Battan
Singh's home?' (Daily Post 18 February 1992). For a club that had no
Indian members, why did it meet in an Indian's home? The argument
here is that the use of Singh's home as a venue points to an attempt at
creating multiracial links of the kind that previously underpinned the
former Alliance regime and at the same time served the class interests of
that regime and its allies. And that even Rabuka was thinking along
these lines is suggested by the second question that he posed: 'is it the
old Alliance link?' (ibid.).
Two earlier developments provide further evidence for the
argument being advanced here. The first was the original communique
which announced the proposal to form the SVT. In it the chiefs said
that the new party would 'guarantee, promote and strengthen the
indigenous rights, political aspirations and political future of the Fijian
people' and 'strengthen and promote the unity of the Fijian people and
the consolidation of their culture and tradition' (quoted in Pacific
Islands Monthly July 1990:14). There was nothing surprising about
this but, as political commentator Iva Tora said, 'what did raise a few
suspecting eyebrows were the provisions that the party would
"accommodate association with other political/ethnic groups/parties'".
It was that 'mention of multi-racialism' which 'sent sirens
ringing'(tWd.).
The myth of Fijian supremacy 221
For a body which had so strongly argued the case for 'Fijian'
supremacy, why did it now want to re-open the door to multiracialism?
Who in the august body was concerned to leave open the possibility for
the new Fijian party to 'accommodate association with other ethnic
groups', particularly Indian groups? After all, the coup had supposedly
been staged to neutralize the 'Indian threat'. Furthermore, if links with
other ethnic groups were to be forged sometime in the future, what
form might they take? The two former leaders of the FNP were in no
doubt. Butadroka saw the hand of Mara at work: 'If this proposal [to
form the SVT] did not have Mara's blessing, it would never have been
initiated' (ibid.). For his erstwhile partner, Isireli Vuibau, the new
party would be 'a resurrection of the Fijian Association under a new
guise' (ibid.). The second telling development had to do with the
formation of yet more political parties by, yet more, former members of
the Alliance. In January 1991 former members of the GEA formed the
General Voters Party and although its leaders insisted that the party
would be 'fully autonomous', there was skepticism. As one report in
October 1991 put it, 'It is clear that the [GVT] will quickly align itself
with the [SVT] (if it wins seats) (Islands Business October 1991:37).
Also in early 1991 'Indian supporters of the discredited and defunct
Alliance Party' had formed the Fiji Indian Liberal Party (FTLP). Later
in the year the Cakaudrove Bharatiya Party (CBP), about which little is
known, and the Fiji Indian Congress Party (FICP) were formed.
Prominent in the latter were businessmen and former Alliance
supporters Ishwari Bajpai and Vijay Raghwan (who became president
of the Suva branch) and the sole Indian in the cabinet Irene Narayan. In
November the FTLP and the FICP announced their acceptance of the
constitution despite some reservations (Daily Post 5 and 9 November
1991).
What do these developments suggest? As we have seen in this and
the previous chapter, well before the possibility of the SVT forming
links with other ethnic groups was revealed in the chiefs' communique
of June 1990, warnings had continually been sounded by a variety of
interests that Fiji's long-term future depended on a more democratic
and multiracial arrangement than the constitution (in both its draft and
final versions) allowed. Importantly, such concerns were also
expressed by people in the business community. In the light of this, the
revelation in the chiefs' communique is not at all surprising. The door
to multiracial alliances would have to be left open, and over the next
year emerged precisely the kinds of non-Fijian political parties with
which the SVT could easily forge links. By December 1991 those
parties were in place and the evidence suggested that such links were
being contemplated.
This, we argue, provides an important clue to why the 'Dining
dub' held its first meeting at the home of Kuar Battan Singh. It also
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helps to explain the timing of Mara's announcement that he could not
work under the constitution and that he could not lead a non-multiracial
government 'after banging on the table of multiracialism for twenty
years'. Having first declared his 'multiracial colours' he then acted in a
multiracial way. It is of course possible that this was driven by a
perceived need to give the SVT a multiracial appeal but the argument
here is that there was also an important class agenda.
Rabuka, of course, saw the Dining Club as an attempt to
marginalize him. As he put it: "There is still some dissatisfaction among
the group with me personally' (Daily Post 18 February 1992). The
Daily Post put the case more strongly:
Some members of the interim government have found Major-
General Rabuka a threat to their careers....They regard his
public utterance an embarrassment to the governmenL...They
felt that Adi Lady Lala, the paramount chief of Burebasaga
confederacy and wife of Prime Minister Ratu Sir Kamisese
Mara...should have been the SVT president. The disputes at
provincial level over the selection of SVT candidates have
reaffirmed their doubts over Major-General Rabuka's
leadership. The final straw...came when Rabuka launched a
scathing attack on Ratu Mara [in December 1991]. The attack
was probably the harshest dished out during [Mara's] long
political career....For Rabuka the writing was on the wall
when he changed his mind and decided to enter politics instead
of remaining in the army. From the outset he was the odd man
out in the cabinet His age, unpredictability and his open style
were incompatible with old cabinet traditions. He obviously
did not belong to the fold. But to drive him out of the SVT and
politics altogether would not be an easy task because Major-
General has his own supporters and sympathisers. The stage
is now set for a showdown between his camp and Ratu Sir
Kamisese's camp (ibid.).
All of the factors identified here are important for explaining the
attempt at marginalizing Rabuka. In terms, however, of the class
agenda that also ran through the Dining Club affair, the key factor was
the threat which Rabuka's populism posed to the class interests of the
regime and its allies. He had shown sympathy for striking nurses,
miners and canefarmers; helped to avert a national strike; condemned
the eviction of squatters to make way for tax free factories; opposed the
centrepiece of the regime's attempt to cope with its fiscal crisis, the
VAT; and promised to dismantle FTNAPECO. These positions posed a
threat not only to the regime but also to capital, and left to his own
devices he just might continue do even more damage.
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Amongst other things, the Dining Club affair was an attempt to
prevent such damage. But that did not mean simply undermining
Rabuka's position as leader of the SVT, it also meant strengthening the
party. That latter task would be enhanced if it could become more
multiracial. More importantly, multiracial links would better serve the
class interests of the regime and its capitalist allies if those links
involved people who were likely to be sympathetic to those interests.
Kuar Battan Singh was a former Alliance supporter and a businessman.
So too were leading figures in the Fiji Indian Congress Party and the
General Voters Party. The former Alliance party was known as the
party of the chiefly elite and of business. By February 1992 signs were
appearing that Mara and his followers were moving to forge links to
ensure that any future government would be similarly biased. When
Rabuka asked of the Dining Club 'Is this the old Alliance link?', the
commoner may well have sensed the class agenda that ran through this
latest initiative by his chiefly rival.
Clearly, then, Rabuka's rivalry with Mara further exposed the
deeper tensions in Fiji — regional, chief/commoner, tribal and class
tensions — and in so doing worsened the strife that internally divided
the SVT. Nor indeed was Rabuka's populism necessarily cause for
hope. To be sure the sympathetic positions towards the disadvantaged
that he had adopted increasingly from 1991 onwards were
encouraging, and there is no reason to doubt his sincerity. But three
points are worth remembering.
First, his populism followed a much longer history of antagonism
towards the key sections of the opposition in Fiji, particularly
organizations like the FTUC, NFU and FLP and individuals like
Mahendra Chaudhry. Secondly, his sympathy for the underclasses was
never fully tested. To criticize policies and initiatives which advance the
interests of the ruling elite and their class allies and which undermine
the interests of the underclasses is one thing, to actually undo them and
set in place radically different ones is quite another. Thirdly, it was not
altogether clear how Rabuka might react if he failed to achieve his
leadership ambitions. What might he do if the SVT did not win the
elections? How would he react if he did not become prime minister?
After all, he faced stiff opposition from the other likely contenders —
Kamikamica, Filipe Bole, Berenado Vunibobo, and Ratu William
Toganivalu. And there was also the matter of his possible links with the
military. Did he still have any? If so, how strong were they? Would he
activate them if he suffered electoral defeat? Significantly, in March
1992 he warned that should the SVT lose the upcoming elections in
May, Fijians might rise up and fight for their interests. To many
people, including Simione Durutalo, FTUC president Micky
Columbus, and ANC leader Apisai Tora that sounded like a veiled
threat
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In the end, Rabuka could criticize the regime's policies because he
disclaimed any responsibility for them. Someone else had to carry the
can. But how, for example, would he react if, as prime minister, he
was faced with mounting pressure from the business sector to keep
wages down? What would he do if women workers in the garment
industry intensified their struggle for better wages and conditions?
How would he react if a government which he led was running short of
cash? Would he reintroduce the VAT or might he impose higher
company taxes?
The point of questions such as these is to indicate that Rabuka was
never subjected to the kind of test which would more fully reveal his
real class biases. His opposition to certain policies and initiatives posed
a threat to the regime and its allies, and Mara and his supporters sought
to contain that threat Rabuka could be a critic and a populist because he
was an outsider. He did not have to make the tough decisions that are
necessary to deal with underlying class tensions in Fiji. Only when he
is forced to do so will the underclasses have a chance to judge just how
deeply his apparent sympathy for them runs. Certainly he had given
encouraging signs, but the signs were not necessarily cause for real
hope. The real test would come if he became the country's leader.
In the meantime, the underclasses were faced with another
problem. What chance there might have been of a strong and united
opposition defending their interests no longer existed. Already the
forces of opposition had splintered and as the elections drew closer
they became even more divided. Later we will argue by way of
conclusion that by 1992 the the myth of 'Fijian' supremacy in post-
coup Fiji was well and truly exposed and that the underlying reality of
class rule which the myth sought to hide was as firmly entrenched as
ever. We will also argue that for the labouring masses, the poor and the
weak, the signs strongly suggested that beyond the May election lay yet
more painful struggles, a future predicament that was all the more likely
because the leadership of the forces of opposition had become deeply
divided. To those divisions we now briefly turn.
Masses in jeopardy: the divided opposition
The NFP/FLP Coalition was always a fragile partnership. The
opposition within the FLP towards the merger rested fundamentally on
the argument that not only was the NFP widely perceived to be a 'racial
party' but also, more importantly, its leadership was much less
committed to the FLFs explicit class agenda of alleviating the plight of
the underclasses whatever their racial background. Put differently, the
FLP was a reformist party but it had much stronger leanings than its
partner towards the working classes. That is why the key difference
between the two parties has been portrayed as an 'ideological one'. As
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Jai Ram Reddy, former leader of the NFP, put it in 1991: '[The NFP]
tends to be a little conservative...The Labour Party is more
ideologically-based, it had a more multiracial beginning and that helped
attract a level of Fijian support which [the] NFP couldn't' (Islands
Business January 1991:26)
With its class appeal and it strong roots in the trade union
movement, the FLP was the leading advocate of the underclasses in
Fiji. The electoral arrangement it concluded with the NFP was therefore
seen by many of its supporters, actual and potential, as a partial
betrayal of its class agenda. To recapture the lost confidence would
require an enormous amount of effort, maybe even breaking the link
with the NFP. But that was not to happen, at least for some time yet.
Only with the NFP's decision in 1991 to participate in elections did it
begin to appear likely that the Coalition might come unstuck. In the
meantime the uneasy tensions between the two parties constantly
simmered and periodically surfaced. Thanks largely to the efforts and
charisma of Dr Bavadra, they were mostly contained. With his death in
November 1989 the potential for a split increased but was again
contained, albeit temporarily, when his wife, Adi Kuini Bavadra,
assumed the leadership soon afterwards.
One week before the constitution was promulgated in June 1990
the FLP announced that it would boycott any future election held under
its provisions. That position was reaffirmed by the Coalition executive
in January 1991 but by then some within the Coalition were already
having doubts. On the principle that participation in elections would be
tantamount to legitimizing the 'racist, undemocratic and feudalistic'
constitution it had so strongly fought against, the FLP stood by the
decision to boycott. From the NFP, however, a different view began to
emerge. Harish Sharma, formerly deputy to Prime Minister Bavadra,
hinted at the possibility of NFP participation. In his words, the party
would contest 'if it is the wish of our people' (Islands Business
January 1991:25). Jai Ram Reddy, a major influence on the NFP, put
his case more strongly:
...while the constitution is abhorrent and something no
political party with a sense of propriety can accept, I feel as a
matter of practical politics, the chances of getting it improved
are better by participatfing] rather than by staying out, and
perhaps creating room for mischief makers who don't really
represent the people (ibid.).
It was this case for pragmatism which finally won the day within the
NFP.
In April 1991 Adi Kuini Bavadra resigned from the leadership of
both the Coalition and the FLP and was succeeded by Jokapeci Koroi,
a vice-president of the party and a former leader of the Fiji Nurses
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Association. In the following September the FLP formalized its
decision to boycott and the NFP announced it would participate. But it
was not long before serious doubts about the decision surfaced within
the party and by early 1992 the growing schism became so wide that it
forced the split which led to the formation of the New Labour Party.
By then, of course, the wider political landscape had changed
significantly.
By the end of 1991 , earlier expectations that the NFP would sweep
all 27 Indian seats in an election were tempered by the emergence of
three new Indian political parties — the Fiji Indian Liberal Party, Fiji
Indian Congress Party and the Cakaudrove Bharatiya Party. Also, the
SVT now had to contend with not only Apisai Tora's All National
Congress and but also six new Fijian parties. In the face of all this
opposition and its own internal problems, the SVTs electoral chances
looked shaky. There was even the prospect of the SVT being hard put
to win a majority of Fijian seats. Whether or not this was a factor in the
push within the FLP to review the party's decision to boycott is
difficult to say. But it was certainly the case that those who urged a
review were influenced by the level of Fijian oppositon to the regime
and the SVT.
In 1991 Jone Dakuvula returned from New Zealand to take up a
one year position as organising secretary of the FLP. In part his task
was to build grassroot support for the party and in that capacity he
undertook visits to several parts of the country. But his quick rise to
prominence was due also to his highly effective role as a party
intellectual. Together with other leading party figures, he publicly
engaged the regime on a whole host of issues and so helped to
recapture some of the shine which for many the Party had lost since
Bavadra's death.
Along with other leading Fijians within the party, including Amelia
Rokotuivuna and Simione Durutalo, Dakuvula articulated the view that
a review of the Party's decision to boycott was necessitated, in part at
least, by the need to accommodate discontented Fijians who did not
want the SVT to go unchallenged in an election and who also preferred
the FLP over the other opposition parties. For such Fijians, this group
argued, the forthcoming election was an opportunity to express through
the ballot box the discontent and hostility they privately lelt towards the
regime. Amongst other factors, fear ofjob loss and the constraints of
'Fijian culture and tradition' had prevented them from publicly
opposing the regime. And Fijians wanted the chance to show their
opposition to the regime. The constitution was fundamentally faulty
and they wanted to have a say, to 'seize the time' so to speak. Against
this argument, others in the party stood firmly by the boycott decision.
For them the decision was based on principles mat simply could not be
compromised. Futhermore, they argued, there was widespread support
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for the boycott. The disagreement eventually led to a split and the
formation of the New Labour Party in January 1992.
A major problem in trying to assess the increasingly heated debate
has to do with the conflicting claims about support for the respective
positions. Meetings of party leaders and delegates had reaffirmed the
boycott decision several times but the evidence for widespread
grassroot support was not obvious. Plans were made to hold meetings
throughout the country to put the case for a boycott but that process did
not really get underway until well into the latter half of 1991. By
February 1992 about twenty meetings, reasonably attended (mainly by
Indian supporters), meetings had been held. But by then the rift within
the party executive had widened considerably, arguably even
irreparably. On the other hand, the evidence to support those who
opposed the boycott was not obvious either. There is little reason to
dispute the view that there was Fijian support for participation and for
the FLP. But whether or not the such support was widespread is not
clear.
In the absence of persuasive evidence one way or another the task
of winning over the other side was all the more difficult. But even if
persuasive evidence had been available, there was no guarantee that
either side would have been won over. As the debate unfolded it
became clear that each side held passionately to its respective position,
and in the pages of the local dailies, sadly, a torrent of invective was
unleashed as the two leading protagonists, Chaudhry and Durutalo,
levelled charges and countercharges against each other.
Tensions within the party were aggravated when the executive
refused approval for Fijians within the party to contest the upcoming
elections as independents. Dakuvula and others had argued that this
would not compromise the party's official position. They had also
considered a loose 'alliance of progressive Fijians' as a means of
maximizing the chances of defeating the SVT. That too did not find
favour with the Party executive. Frustrated, Dakuvula resigned from
the party in February 1992.
Later that month, the dispute in the party spilled over into the
FTUC. At a meeting on 20 February FTUC president Micky Columbus
led an attack against the Party's decision to boycott and 48 to 12 voted
to urge the FLP to contest the elections. Chaudhry's reported response
was that the party was autonomous and would not be dictated to by the
FTUC (Fiji Times 21 February 1991). Soon afterwards it was revealed
that he would be challenged for the position ofFTUC secretary at the
organization's biannual conference in the following May. Less than a
week after the FTUC meeting, the New Labour Party (NLP) was
formed with Columbus as interim president and Dakuvula as interim
secretary.
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The FLP had been formed to advance the interests of the working
classes. Now that it had split into two, its capacity to continue that fight
was dented. The philosophy and policies of the NLP are similar to
those of the FLP (see Daily Post 26 February 1992) but the rifts within
the leadership of the key worker organizations would have done little
for the confidence of the underclasses. With elections in May 1992 fast
approaching, they were now faced with the urgings of the FLP to
boycott and the equally strong urgings of the other opposition parties to
vote.
For the underclasses, then, both options were problematic. To
boycott would be to take a principled stand and thus capture the moral
high ground, but it would also mean bypassing an opportunity to at
least signal discontent with the regime. With die vote option, on the
other hand, there was no guarantee of returning a government that
would necessarily advance their interests. Indeed, there were grounds
for doubting even the NFP. Already it was showing signs of a return to
the old days when the party was dominated by men from the business
and professional classes. As a former party supporter put it, '[The
NFP] stands condemned in history as a party of the rich, the cliques,
and the wheeler-dealers', and he bemoaned the return of 'its old and
decrepit horses' (Fiji Times 20 November 1991). His worries may not
have been without foundation altogether. Businessmen and
professionals figured very prominently in the party leadership as well
as in the committee that was set up to select candidates for the elections.
That, together with the lessons of the parry's history, would not have
inspired much confidence in the NFP leadership as champions of the
underclasses.
On 21 April 1992 two significant announcements were made. The
first was of an electoral merger between the New Labour Party and the
Vanua Party was announced. The two parties agreed to jointly contest
the elections as the New Vanua Labour Movement (NVLM), with Jone
Dakuvula as interim secretary. The second was that the FLP was likely
to reverse its decision to boycott the elections. Explaining the imminent
reversal, party secretary Navin Maharaj said 'there was strong pressure
upon the party to reconsider its boycott stand in [the] wake of ...
concerns about [the] NFP's tacit support for the new Constitution
should they enter into parliament' (Fiji Times 21 April 1992). Several
days later the party decided to contest the elections, but its
disagreements with the NFP, and with other parties as well, pointed to
continuing divisions within the opposition.
Class rule in the republic
With the leaderships of the forces of oppposition divided, the working
classes, the poor and the underpivileged in Fiji could hardly entertain
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prospects of fundamental improvements in their condition. The
outcome of the upcoming elections might produce some unexpected
results, maybe even encouraging ones, but that was unlikely to alter the
key parameters of post-coup Fiji in a way that would guarantee their
long-term interests. The political ascendancy of the Fijian chiefly and
bureaucratic elite, the heightened political salience of the Fijian-
dominated military, and the emergence of the nascent Fijian business
class had altered the configuration of power relations in Fiji but the
underlying reality of class rule remained.
For disadvantaged Fijians, the sharpening of traditional, regional
and chief-commoner tensions served to expand the space for political
expression, and that had been useful as they sought to defend their
interests as members of the underclasses. Equally, however, they had
also been constantly reminded that there was only so much that the state
would tolerate. For the Indian underclasses this was also true, but their
predicament was even worse. While they could take some heart in the
NFP leadership's opposition to racial discrimination and also in the
FLP's decision to contest, there was not the same confidence that the
outcome of the elections would serve to lift them out of their abysmal
class condition. As for the disadvantaged 'general voters', there was
reason to view with skepticism the fine sounding promises of the GVT.
It was, after all, suspiciously similar to the former General Electors
Association, the third leg of the former Alliance Party. And in the past,
especially in the lead-up to the 1987 elections, they had complained a
great deal about the GEA.
Clearly, then, for those in the underclasses, irrespective of their
race, the future did not look too promising. The opposition parties in
the upcoming elections had said much about improving the condition of
the disadvantaged groups. But the class biases and personal ambitions
that characterized some of the leaderships were sufficient cause for
doubt about their capacity and commitment to bring about fundamental
improvement for the underclasses.
For the vast majority of people in Fiji it was unrealistic to expect
much from the outcome of the May 1992 election. hi the five years
since the coup of May 1987 they had endured much hardship, and as
events subsequently unfolded the veil of ideological obfuscation was
lifted to expose the myth of 'Fijian' supremacy and the reality it was
intended to obscure — the reality of class rule. It is even likely that
multiracialist ideology and practice will return and again be used in an
attempt to mask class rule. Signs ofthis are already there.
For Fiji's underclasses — the vast majority of women and low
income earners, the poor, the elderly, and the unpaid — the 'brighter
and better Fiji' which five years earlier Dr Bavadra had committed
himself and his party to achieving now appeared much less likely. This
is not to say that the goal is beyond reach. But one thing is certain, for
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the underclasses it would never come easily. They would have to fight
for it, and fight hard. More than ever before, it was now clear that in
Fiji there was, and is, another reality beyond the politics of race.
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Five years after the crisis of 1987, Fiji continues to be plagued by
conflict. Not only have racial tensions persisted but there has also
been a deepening of intra-Fijian conflict. Regional cleavages have
widened, chief-commoner relations are under stress, and
traditional political rivalries have resurfaced. The military coups
that were supposed to rescue the Fijian race from the 'threat of
Indian domination' have instead served primarily to entrench
class rule. The crisis of 1987, in other words, had less to do with
racial tension than with class power.
In advancing this argument, this book breaks with the orthodoxy
which sees Fiji politics primarily in racial terms. It does not deny
the importance of race, nor of other axes of conflict. It argues,
however, that beneath these forms of conflict lie underlying class
causes whose origins lie deep in Fiji's history. By presenting that
hidden history of class exploitation, the book seeks to contribute
to a fuller understanding of the tensions in contemporary Fiji and
also of what might lie ahead.
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